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Section 27 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 pro 
vided for the establishment of a presidential commission to evaluate 
state workers' compensation laws. In 1972, the National Commission 
on State Workmen's Compensation Laws issued its report, which found 
many shortcomings and inadequacies in the state programs. It called 
upon the states to improve their laws and the administration of these 
programs, but urged that federally set minimum standards be imposed 
if these reforms were not implemented by 1975. The threat of such 
federal intervention in an area that traditionally had been left to the states 
caused many states to upgrade their programs dramatically, especially 
in the area of benefits. However, efforts to set and impose federal stan 
dards, which began in 1973, never succeeded in the Congress.
By the late 1970s, federal interest in state workers' compensation pro 
grams had shifted to the problems of occupational diseases. This had 
been prompted by a number of studies that appeared to demonstrate 
some major difficulties in the way the states were handling the com 
pensation of workers or the survivors of workers who might have con 
tracted an occupational illness. Compounding this was the upheaval 
created in about 1981 over growing numbers of workers' compensa 
tion and product liability claims involving asbestos exposure. Once more, 
there was a serious inclination shown by some in the U.S. Congress 
to legislate in the area of occupational disease compensation.
A variety of difficult issues had to be confronted in the course of the 
debate over federal involvement. Should the federal government im 
pose standards on the states or should the state systems simply be sup 
planted in this area? Should such legislation deal with all occupational 
diseases or only with those specified in a statute? Would compensation 
be provided solely for newly emerging cases, or would cases be ac 
cepted where death or disability had occurred before the enactment of 
the law? Who was to bear financial responsibility for such a compen 
sation program? Who would administer such a program? Could a federal 
program coexist with the state workers' compensation systems without 
somehow undermining them? Was legislation understood to be the
vn
forerunner of an eventual usurpation of the state programs, many of 
which had existed for about 70 years?
In the course of legislative skirmishing, answers to such questions 
appear to emerge more from ideology than from analysis or experience. 
Perhaps it is convenient or comfortable for the parties engaged in such 
debates to resort to some conventional wisdom rather than to a hard 
look at evidence. Possibly, the inevitable exigencies of time and a lack 
of available evidence account for the casual or superficial manner in 
which such tough questions are analyzed. Or possibly, legislative in 
itiatives are navigating in totally uncharted areas.
Current or future debates regarding federal workers' compensation 
legislation need not deal with those issues de novo. Instead, the parties 
can turn to the experience of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 
(CMHSA) of 1969, which created a compensation program for victims 
of a specific type of occupational disease. That program's existence 
allows us to evaluate at least one model of how a federal compensation 
scheme operates. The purpose of this study is to describe and evaluate 
that program.
This study focuses primarily on the period 1969-1981. The CMHSA 
or Black Lung program was substantially modified in 1982 and later, 
and it is premature to detail that more recent experience. Moreover, 
by 1982 the program had largely accomplished the goals its supporters 
had set for it. Although the amendments of 1981 are referred to when 
necessary throughout the text, they are treated in this study almost as 
an epilogue.
The first chapter of the study provides an explanation of how the 
federal government wandered into the area of occupational disease com 
pensation in 1969. The next chapter gives an outline of the legislation 
and an explanation of why the statute was modified in 1972 and again 
in 1977. The medical issues of black lung compensation are described 
in chapter 3. This leads to a discussion in chapter 4 of the standards 
of proof imposed in the law and by the agencies that administer the 
law. Administrative matters and insurance issues are the focus of chapter 
5. The purpose of chapter 6 is to give the reader some idea of the dimen 
sions of the program, including an idea of the numbers of beneficiaries,
Vlll
the size of benefits available, and the costs of the program. The con 
cluding chapter includes a description of the 1981 amendments. Also, 
it contains some material drawn from evaluations of the program under 
taken by the General Accounting Office, using source data that could 
not be made available to me.
In assessing any governmental program, a critical initial step is to 
properly specify what the goals of the program were. Depending upon 
one's choice in this, however, the program can be considered to have 
been either highly successful or a crushing failure. I leave it to the readers 
to make their own assessment. My own views, which have changed 
often during the preparation of this study, are summarized in chapter 7.
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of the Black Lung Act
Until early in the twentieth century, an employer's liability 
for compensating an employee who was disabled as a result 
of a workplace injury was determined in a civil action. 1 
Similarly, the survivor of an employee killed on the job was 
entitled to compensation from the employer only as a result 
of winning a law suit. In either case, it was the claimant's 
burden to prove that the employer had been negligent, 
thereby causing the disability or death of the worker. 
Demonstrating negligence was no simple matter, as 
employers could rely on several potent lines of defense. 
Delays of several years in reaching some final judgment were 
commonplace, legal expenses were perceived as substantial, 
and decisions often appeared to be capricious. Even as 
claimants began winning more judgments at the turn of the 
century, a few large awards were made to some claimants 
while others received nothing.
Considerable pressure for reform grew during the first 
decade of the twentieth century. Rather than seek to modify 
the system of tort law, proposals started to build on a 
relatively new approach to compensating injured workers 
and survivors that had recently spread across much of in 
dustrialized Europe. Known as workmen's compensation, 2 
the system appeared to represent a significant improvement 
for workers—and possibly for employers as well—in Ger 
many, England and some other western European nations.
2 Development of the Act
Beginning with Wisconsin and New York State in 1911, the 
various states began to adopt their own workers' compensa 
tion laws, thereby replacing the existing tort approach.
As each state enacted such a law, considerable variation 
appeared in terms of the administration of the system, 
coverage, benefits, insurance arrangements and so on. All 
the laws seemed to conform, more or less, to certain underly 
ing principles, however. First, each system operated on a no- 
fault basis so that claimants no longer needed to prove 
employer negligence. Benefits were to be paid for disability 
or death "arising out of and in the course of employment," 
a phrase found in all of the state laws and closely mimicking 
language in the various European states. The no-fault 
feature of the laws led to the hope that compensation would 
be paid swiftly and with little or no controversy and litiga 
tion. Benefits were to be paid in proportion to the wages 
earned by the employee prior to disability or death. As a 
kind of quid pro quo, each of the state laws made workers' 
compensation the "exclusive remedy" of workers or sur 
vivors against their employers. Thus, employers became 
obligated to provide benefits under this new scheme, but 
they freed themselves of the threat of possible law suits by in 
jured employees or their survivors.
As the states administered their workers' compensation 
laws, a number of difficulties emerged in the matter of 
claims for occupational diseases. 3 A common problem was 
the need to establish the cause of the disease that disabled or 
killed a worker. Another cause of dispute between claimants 
and defendants often involved the question of whether or 
not disease was even present. Contention could arise also 
over the identification of the disease itself, since the presence 
of one disease rather than another might be more likely to be 
found compensable by those administering the compensa 
tion system.
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Until 1969, the compensation of workers or their survivors 
for industrial injuries or diseases had been left entirely to 
state governments in the United States. 4 Since the federal 
government played virtually no direct role in the employer- 
employee relationship at the time states began enacting these 
laws, there was no question that if workers' compensation 
laws were to be developed, they would be left in the hands of 
the states. Federal legislation in this area prior to the 
mid-1930s would almost certainly have been declared un 
constitutional. As each state refined its own unique system 
of compensation, and as various interests arose that depend 
ed upon that system, any potential role for the federal 
government seemed to diminish. Yet despite its historic inac 
tivity, in 1969 the federal government shifted from its 
historic position and passed legislation to provide compensa 
tion to a specific class of workers—coal miners—for a single 
specific occupational disease. The purpose of this chapter is 
to explain how that change occurred.
The Nature of the Coal Mining Industry
Several factors set coal mining apart from other industries 
as a source of employment. These differences are due to a 
variety of special circumstances surrounding this work. One 
of coal mining's special, though not unique, characteristics is 
the physical risk of harm associated with it. The industry has 
been widely regarded as dangerous. Best known perhaps are 
the large-scale disasters where scores of miners have died in a 
single accidental occurrence. Yet the nature of the work also 
contributes to smaller scale or individual incidents that lead 
to death or disability. For example, in the period 1926-30, 
the fatality rate in coal mining was almost 2 per million man- 
hours of work. 5 Assuming a 2,000 hour work year, about 1 
worker in 250 would die in a mining accident each year. 
Though the rate had fallen to 0.84 fatalities per 1 million 
man-hours by 1969, the rate was still high—about 1 fatality
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annually for every 600 miners employed full time, or a rate 
7-9 times greater than that for the entire employed 
workforce. 6 Recognition of the dangers was widespread.
A second characteristic of mining is its isolation, both 
geographically and culturally, from other areas of the na 
tion. Coal is mined, generally, in remote regions that are 
rarely, if ever, seen by people from the more populated parts 
of the country. This implies that coal mining is more than 
simply an occupation. Instead, it represents a form of society 
that was not touched by developments in the balance of the 
nation for much of this century. Set apart in this way, miners 
have often been subject to different treatment and standards 
by government.
A third characteristic of mining is the secular decline that 
gripped the mining economy during the 1960s. Coal produc 
tion that had been at 631 million tons in 1947 fell to below 
500 million tons per year during the early 1960s and had not 
exceeded 560 million tons per year by 1969. Moreover, in the 
later years of this period, less coal was being taken from the 
more labor-intensive underground mines and, instead, was 
surface-mined. Surface mining was found primarily in the 
middle west and western states, meaning that mining in Ap- 
palachia was even more adversely affected. The price of 
domestic coal, measured in constant dollars, fell in most 
years from 1947 to 1969, and by 39 percent overall during 
this period. 7
The changing sources of coal, along with its displacement 
by other forms of energy, had a tremendous impact on 
employment in the industry. Between 1950 and 1970, 
employment in coal mining declined by 70 percent, from 
483,000 to 144,000." In addition to the decline in the quantity 
of coal demanded and the relative shift to surface-mined 
coal, the sharp increase in labor productivity in below- 
ground mines contributed to the drop in employment (see 
table 1-1).
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Table 1.1 






















































































SOURCE: The President's Commission on Coal, Staff Findings, March 1980, p. 47.
6 Development of the Act
One of the results of all this change in the economics of 
coal mining was the severity of conditions for miners and 
their families. With little or no other employment alter 
natives in the coal mining areas, long-term unemployment 
and poverty were endemic there. The economic deterioration 
of the coal mine regions created a sense that a great injustice 
had been perpetrated against the miners. The difficulty that 
many of these workers had in being able to relocate into 
totally different types of employment resulted in very slow 
rates of mobility out of these depressed regions. Those per 
sons who remained behind but had no work were those with 
the greatest handicaps in the labor market: limited skills, ad 
vanced age, or health problems.
The economic difficulties of both the individual miners 
and the regions created financial difficulties for unions also. 
Since the United Mine Workers' Welfare and Retirement 
Fund was largely financed by a royalty based on coal ton 
nage paid by the mine owners, revenues were inadequate to 
meet the growing demands placed upon them by increasing 
health care costs and increasing retirement rates. Conse 
quently, the fund was forced to reduce or eliminate certain 
benefits during the 1950s and 1960s, including some that 
were formerly provided to disabled miners or to survivors of 
miners. 9
The Federal Role in Coal Mine Health and Safety
It has been observed here already that one of the things 
that sets coal mining apart from other industries is its 
physical dangers. What role has government, at any level, 
played in attempting to reduce the risks of coal mine employ 
ment?
As early as 1865, a bill was introduced in Congress to 
create a Federal Mining Bureau. However, it was only after a 
series of disasters that the Bureau of Mines was created
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within the U.S. Department of the Interior in July of 1910. 10 
The Bureau was charged with ". . .diligent investigation of 
the methods of mining, especially in relation to the safety of 
miners. . . ." n The act did not provide the Bureau any in 
spection authority. Indeed, the law explicitly denied all 
Bureau employees any right or authority in connection with 
the inspection or supervision of mines. Part of the Bureau's 
difficulty was remedied in Title I of the Federal Coal Mine 
Safety Act of 1941, which authorized the Bureau to make in 
spections and publicize its findings and recommendations. 
The Bureau was unable, however, to set safety standards, an 
area previously left to the states.
During a period of serious labor-management strife in 
1946-47, the federal government operated a substantial por 
tion of the country's coal mines. The government used its 
opportunity as an employer during this period to have In 
terior Secretary Krug reach an agreement with United Mine 
Workers president John L. Lewis on a federal Mine Safety 
Code. When the industry was returned to private ownership 
in 1947, the code became a guideline (but not a standard) for 
federal inspectors. Operators were free to comply or not. 
Mine operators and state mine agencies were asked (in 1947 
in PL 328) by the federal government simply to report on the 
extent of compliance with the guidelines. Seventeen of the 
coal mining states cooperated fully in reporting, two others 
responded partially, and seven states did not cooperate to 
any extent.
In December 1951, an explosion in a coal mine in West 
Frankfort, Illinois, killed 119 miners. In the wake of the 
disaster, President Truman signed PL 552 in 1952, which 
made compliance with the Mine Safety Code mandatory in 
mines employing 15 workers or more. Federal inspectors 
were given the right to shut down dangerous mines. Subse 
quently, several efforts were made both to tighten up mine
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safety provisions and to eliminate the exclusion from 
coverage of the smaller mines (14 or fewer miners), including 
a bill that passed in the Senate but not in the House in 1960. 
It was only in 1966 that PL 89-376 accomplished these goals.
The shared responsibilities of federal and state inspectors 
created obvious administrative problems. The federal role 
was aimed at averting large-scale disasters. The states* safety 
responsibilities dealt more with practices and conditions that 
could involve injury or death to individual miners. Aside 
from federal-state differences, substantial interstate varia 
tions existed in inspection policies and standards.
Workers' Compensation for Coal Miners
For an industry with the great physical risks of coal min 
ing, it is not surprising that workers' compensation has 
always been an important issue. With the enactment of the 
state laws, miners injured or killed in mine accidents had 
recourse to state workers' compensation programs in order 
to secure some indemnity and health care benefits. While 
benefits may have been short of generous, they were not dif 
ferent systematically from those available to workers in 
other industries. 12 However, the widely shared perception 
was that workers who were disabled or the survivors of those 
killed by dust diseases had little or no access to workers' 
compensation benefits.
The two states with sizable populations of miners that did 
provide compensation for coal mine dust diseases before 
1969 were Pennsylvania and Alabama. In the former, 
benefits were provided under a distinct program for miners 
with pneumoconiosis and were lower and less favorable in 
several respects than benefits available under the regular 
workers' compensation law. A benefit ceiling of $75/month 
was set on the program. Under the special program enacted 
in Pennsylvania, about 25,000 miners received some com-
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pensation for coal workers' pneumoconiosis from January 
1966 through early in 1969. 13 In Alabama, 1,318 cases of 
coal workers' pneumoconiosis were compensated between 
1962 and 1966. 14 It was very difficult for coal miners to 
receive workers' compensation benefits for dust diseases in 
West Virginia, though some did for silicosis. Only in 1969 
was the workers' compensation law there liberalized for dust 
diseases in coal workers.
In the late 1960s, little interest in workers' compensation 
programs had surfaced at a national level. 15 Concerns re 
garding state programs were not evident, especially in regard 
to the arcane matter of compensation for occupational 
disease. This was not the case, however, at the state level, 
particularly in West Viriginia, which was in a state of fer 
ment. A grass roots movement that began to coalesce among 
the miners in 1968 had begun to move for (better) compensa 
tion for dust diseases suffered by coal miners. A series of 
resolutions was introduced at the United Mine Workers of 
America (UMWA) convention in 1968 by various local 
unions. They won endorsement easily from the convention. 
The issue had been given high visibility in West Virginia, par 
ticularly through the efforts of three physicians who worked 
closely with the miners there: Isadore Buff, a cardiologist; 
Donald Rasmussen of the Appalachian Regional Hospital in 
Beckley, West Virginia; and H. A. Wells.
Following the convention, negotiations occurred between 
the UMWA and the customary coalition of mine operators 
over a new labor-management contract. In early October 
1968, the first nationwide strike in 16 years was called by the 
union, and an agreement followed on October 14, 1968. The 
new contract provided a number of improvements in wages 
and fringe benefits over the three years of the new contract, 
but it did not contain any new language regarding either 
safety or compensation for occupational disease. The 1968
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contract was consistent in this respect with a long history of 
UMWA contracts that had concentrated on wages and fringe 
benefits of working miners, but showed little concern with 
issues of safety or occupational health. The "business as 
usual" practice by the union displayed some insensitivity to 
concerns regarding compensation and safety on the heels of 
the interest demonstrated by the membership at their con 
vention less than five weeks prior to the signing of the new 
collective bargaining agreement. The issues of safety and 
health might have disappeared or been forgotten except that 
the Farmington disaster followed so closely on the heels of 
this new contract.
Concern about dust diseases and compensation for them 
was generated by the three West Virginia doctors and also by 
Ralph Nader. At the local level, interest was also stimulated 
and spread by young activists who had been drawn to Ap- 
palachia as VISTA workers (Volunteers in Service to 
America), or in a variety of Great Society antipoverty pro 
grams established primarily under the Office of Economic 
Opportunity. Believing that economic and social injustice 
had led first to disease and then to economic deprivation ow 
ing to the lack of compensation, these young persons provid 
ed both the energy and organizational skills that allowed 
local Black Lung Associations to be formed and to grow. 
The union was not considered an ally. Instead, it was 
perceived as a part of the same establishment that paid little 
or no attention to the plight of sick miners or their survivors. 
The black lung movement during 1968 must be understood 
to have been driven by a dynamic that was more than in 
dependent of the UMWA; in large measure it was hostile to 
the union and seen as a source of political threat to the union 
leadership.
The three physicians appeared in coal mining communities 
throughout West Virginia. Dr. Buff warned his audience
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that they all had black lung disease and that they would die 
from it. 16 Buff traveled with a pair of lungs that he showed 
to his audiences. Dr. Wells would participate in the same 
program, holding up dried, black tissue sections that he 
claimed were ". . .a slice of your brother's lungs." 17
In January of 1969, a large rally was held by black lung 
advocates at the Charleston Civic Center to focus attention 
on the issue. In addition to the trio of physicians, Con 
gressman Ken Hechler (D-W. Va.) spoke to the group and 
read a long letter sent by Ralph Nader. The targets for much 
of the rally were the mine operators, the medical establish 
ment that did not acknowledge black lung as a disease, and 
the union, for its apparent lack of interest in issues of health 
and safety and compensation. The breach between much of 
the union's leadership and the miner activists of the black 
lung movement can be understood in terms of the political 
divisions that were operative in the UMWA at this time and 
the eventual challenge to the Tony Boyle presidency. 18
Although black lung legislation had been proposed in the 
West Virginia legislature that session, by February 1969 no 
action had been taken. At this time a series of wildcat strikes 
in southern West Virginia had spread quickly through other 
mine fields in the state. The original causes of the strike are 
in dispute but the issue that prompted its widening was the 
demand by miners for black lung legislation. As the strike 
spread, miners traveled to Charleston to let state legislators 
know that they wanted an improved compensation law. 
Bringing enormous pressure on the governor and state 
legislators, the miners marched through the city, ringed the 
legislature, threatened continued shutdowns of the mines 
and eventually pushed through legislation that liberalized 
workers' compensation for coal miners with dust diseases. 
Only after Governor Arch Moore signed the legislation did 
most of the state's coal mines reopen in early March 1969.
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The role played by the UMWA in the West Virginia black 
lung strike was a passive one at best, and actually was seen as 
less than supportive by the activists in the black lung move 
ment. One reason given by the UMWA for its role was that it 
had sought federal rather than state legislation to deal with 
problems of safety, health and compensation. By being an 
inactive party in the black lung strike in West Virginia, the 
union unwittingly had allowed a dissident group to emerge 
that could challenge its leadership. Thus the UMWA was 
forced into a more active role in the development of federal 
legislation.
The Development of the Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act of 1969
On November 20, 1968 an explosion occurred in a huge 
mine (subsequently described by some as the size of Manhat 
tan Island) owned by the Consolidation Coal Company at 
Farmington, West Virginia. In a year that recorded 309 
fatalities in the coal mines in 13 different states, 150 of which 
were in West Virginia alone, two things made Farmington 
different. First, the magnitude of the toll from a single acci 
dent exceeded anything that had occurred since the West 
Frankfort, Illinois disaster in 1961. Of the 99 miners under 
ground at the time of the explosion, 78 were entombed when 
the mine was sealed 10 days after the blast. Second, the pro 
longed process of search and rescue lent itself to massive 
media coverage. Farmington became subject to nightly re 
porting on the network news. Very extensive coverage was 
given to the story in The New York Times and other national 
press. Coal mine safety was not simply an issue for the coal 
mining states any longer. A strong sense developed, spurred 
by the attention given to this community, that something had 
to be done for the miners to assure their safety in the 
workplace.
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There is little dispute that the Farmington disaster was the 
catalyst that moved Congress to act. A widely shared goal in 
the Congress was to enact improved coal mine safety legisla 
tion within a year of the date of the Farmington explosion. 
The political environment guaranteed that the public's revul 
sion regarding the death toll in the mines would have to be 
assuaged. Lyndon Johnson's administration had proposed 
stricter mine safety legislation prior to this disaster. Farm 
ington assured that something would be done. The physical 
danger of coal mining combined with a sense of economic 
hardship, if not injustice, assured that some federal action 
would be forthcoming.
In speaking on the floor of the Senate, the feeling was well 
summarized by Senator Williams:
The active miner of today who toils manfully deep 
in the bowels of the earth to produce about 15 tons 
of coal per day was, until recently, the forgotten 
man, but the tragedies of the past year and one-half 
have raised him high in the eye of the public. The 
people of this Nation have been shocked by these 
unfortunate events and have demanded, on his 
behalf, that government and industry do a great 
deal more—not just half-way measures—to im 
prove his lot. The active miner of today is feeling 
the wonderful benefits that an aroused public can 
bestow on him. The bill before the Senate today 
(S.2917) is a tribute to this public awareness. 19
The legislation that eventually emerged as the federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (PL 91-173) was 
directed at improving the safety of coal mining by enlarging 
the role of the federal government in setting standards and 
inspections. The tragedy at Farmington was treated as the 
last straw that compelled the federal government to extend 
its jurisdiction into areas previously left to the states. Early
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versions of the legislation that was to work its way through 
the Congress made no mention of occupational disease, 
compensation or pensions for disabled miners or widows of 
miners. By all accounts, the portion of the law that dealt 
with these matters arose as an afterthought by some, in the 
process of drafting and redrafting the health and safety law.
Within three months of the Farmington disaster the Sub 
committee on Labor of the Senate's Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare opened hearings on coal mine health and 
safety legislation. Harrison Williams of New Jersey in 
troduced a bill that embodied the views of the United Mine 
Workers. Senator Javits of New York proposed a bill that 
had support from the Nixon administration. Jennings Ran 
dolph of West Virginia also put forward a proposal. On July 
31, 1969, a bill that earlier had been reported out of the sub 
committee won approval of the Committee. The bill's focus 
was on prevention and contained no mention of compensa 
tion.
The obvious response by the Congress to Farmington was 
to legislate tighter safety standards and possibly deal with 
health issues as well. Any dissatisfaction with compensation, 
an area administered traditionally by a state government, 
was not a federal concern. Yet the success of the black lung 
movement in West Virginia would be harder to replicate in 
the other coal-producing states. The mood in Congress was 
one of seeking to demonstrate some sensitivity to the plight 
of the miners and their families. The UMWA leadership 
needed some legislative victories to validate its tactics to its 
own rank-and-file.
In September 1969, S 2917 was brought to the floor of the 
U.S. Senate by Senator Williams. It contained no reference 
to compensation. The first person to raise the issue publicly 
on the Senate floor was Senator Byrd (D-W. Virginia). 
Senator Williams responded that a "short-term program"
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could be handled "temporarily" by amending the bill direct 
ly on the Senate floor. The two senators agreed that a study 
of the matter could be conducted at the time that a tem 
porary program might be put into place. Their exchange 
helps to convey the spirit of that time:
Mr. Byrd of West Virginia: Mr. President, I would 
like to ask the able Senator from New Jersey a 
question as to what consideration, if any, was given 
to the possibility of having provisions included in 
the bill which would provide compensation for 
miners suffering from black lung who do not 
qualify for compensation under State law.
The reason I ask the question is that I have been 
very interested in legislation which would provide 
for compensation to miners suffering from 
pulmonary diseases who are not covered by State 
statute. In West Virginia there are many miners 
suffering from black lung and other pulmonary 
diseases who do not qualify under State statutes for 
compensation.
With this in mind, I gave considerable time to the 
development of proposed legislation which would 
provide Federal assistance in this area. I was able to 
work with Washington headquarters of the United 
Mineworkers of America in developing a proposed 
bill which would provide Federal assistance over a 
period of 20 years, with the Federal assistance 
decreasing, I believe, in the amount of 5 percent a 
year and the States picking up the additional costs 
annually, but with no cost to the coal industry. I 
have felt that if the Federal Government could pro 
vide assistance along this line, without additional 
cost to the industry, we would not incur the opposi 
tion of the industry, which is already heavily
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burdened with overhead costs: but, at the same 
time, the Federal Government would be assuming 
some responsibility in this area, and I think it 
should assume such responsibility.
So it was with the advice and counsel and 
assistance of Mr. George Titler, vice president, and 
other officials of the United Mineworkers of 
America, that I was able to prepare the proposed 
legislation, and my senior colleagues, Senator Ran 
dolph, and I joined in co-sponsoring it.
As the able Senator from New Jersey will recall, I 
appeared before his subcommittee and testified in 
support of this measure. My first question, 
therefore, is, Was consideration given in the sub 
committee deliberations to adding provisions deal 
ing with compensation?
My second question is, What are the prospects 
for such legislation at this point being added by 
way of an amendment to this bill?
My third question is, If such prospects are not 
good, what encouragement or assurance could the 
able Senator give to the Senator from West Virginia 
as to the prospects for such legislation in the near 
future?
Mr. Williams of New Jersey: First, the commit 
tee did not have before it any proposed legislation 
dealing exclusively with workmen's compensation 
for black lung disease, pneumoconiosis. One of the 
bills, S. 1094, although it included provisions on 
this subject, had health and safety as its major 
thrust, I believe I am accurate when I state by 
recollection that the first time the attention of the 
committee was directly drawn to the need for com-
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pensation for men disabled by black lung disease 
was by the junior Senator from West Virginia (Mr. 
Byrd). Of course, it was my personal feeling as 
chairman of the subcommittee that this certainly 
should receive careful attention and, so far as the 
chairman was concerned, most sympathetic con 
sideration.
As we continued our hearings and deliberations 
on the safety and health measure, we did not deal in 
any comprehensive way with this particular ap 
proach of compensation for the disease. As 
necessary as it is, it was not dealt with at that point 
to the extent that we were able to include it in the 
pending bill.
So far as amendments here are concerned, it 
would seem to me that it is now established that this 
disease, without preadventure, is associated with 
the dust in the coal mining process, that it is disabl 
ing, and that it should be a compensable disease.
I would believe that our committee responsibility 
should be to consider it in depth. In the meantime, 
if there were a way to deal with this temporarily 
through a measure to bring disability payments to 
men disabled by the disease, certainly I would try to 
find, even now, a way to deal with the emergency in 
a temporary fashion looking toward a comprehen 
sive long-range program of compensation for men 
disabled by pneumoconiosis.
Mr. Byrd of West Virginia: Mr. President I 
thank the able Senator for his response. I under 
stand his answer to be that it is quite possible that 
consideration might be given on the floor of the 
Senate to language which would establish a short-
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term program to assist coal miners who suffer from 
pulmonary diseases and who do not qualify under 
State statutes. Am I correct?
Mr. Williams of New Jersey: That is what I tried 
to convey to the Senator, yes. 20
The following day, the two senators from W. Virginia met 
with the very powerful chairman of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, Representative Carl Perkins of Ken 
tucky. The senior Senator, Randolph, introduced amend 
ments to S 2917, co-sponsored by Senator Byrd. One of these 
(Amendment #211), extended a federal workers* compensa 
tion law, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com 
pensation Act to coal miners not covered by a state workers' 
compensation law. The law was to become effective two 
years after the 31st day of December that followed the enact 
ment of the law. It would provide compensation to miners 
who were disabled or died as a result of "respiratory 
disease," and whose state workers' compensation law did 
not "contain provisions substantially the same" as those 
contained in the Longshore Act. Benefits would be paid by 
the mine operators under insurance arrangements; however, 
where this was not done, the Secretary of Labor would make 
payments from an Employees' Benefit Fund (Sec. 714). The 
fund would be repaid by having the Secretary of Labor ob 
tain the money from "the employer of the injured 
employee," but the amendment also provided for funding 
through general revenues (Sec. 714 (F) (4)).
This amendment also called for the Employees' Benefit 
Fund to pay benefits in cases where the miner or survivor 
had not received compensation previously, but would have 
been able to if the provisions in the amended Longshore Act 
had applied at the time. Thus, "old" cases were to be 
covered under this amendment, though compensation was to 
be paid only for the period of time after the effective date of 
the law.
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Senators Randolph, Byrd, Javits, Williams and Yar- 
borough co-sponsored Amendment #212, introduced at the 
same time as #211. It represented a significant compromise 
from 211 and in several ways showed the imprint of Senator 
Javits, one of whose goals was to keep temporary any federal 
benefits program for black lung. This amendment called for 
the states to administer a black lung program with funds pro 
vided from the federal trust fund established in the proposed 
law. The states would receive and adjudicate claims based on 
standards issued by the Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare. Benefits were to be paid to either of two types of 
claimants. First, benefits were to be paid to "any coal miner 
who is totally disabled and unable to be gainfully employed 
on the date of enactment of this Act due to complicated 
pneumoconiosis which arises out of, or in the course of, his 
employment in one or more of the Nation's coal mines." 
(Sec. 106) The second category of potential beneficiaries was 
"widows and children of any miner who, at the time of his 
death, was totally disabled and unable to be gainfully 
employed due to complicated pneumoconiosis arising out of, 
or in the course of, such employment." (Sec. 106)
Amendment 212 described the time horizon for this pro 
gram as "a temporary and limited basis, interim emergency 
health disability benefits. ..." (Sec. 106) Several elements 
stand out in this proposal. First, benefits were limited to old 
cases only, that is, where disability had already occurred 
prior to the enactment of the law. Benefits would cease to be 
paid by the federal Trust Fund by June 30,1972 at the latest, 
with the states taking responsibility thereafter. The terms 
temporary, limited and emergency are sprinkled throughout 
the amendment. Death benefits were to be paid regardless of 
the cause of death, so long as the miner was totally disabled 
and unable to be gainfully employed at the time of death and 
was suffering from complicated pneumoconiosis. Similarly, 
benefits for living miners also were limited to the relatively
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few persons who were unable to work and were totally 
disabled due to complicated pneumoconiosis. Of note also is 
the terminology used, "arising out of or in the course of 
employment," a phrase that appears in every state's 
workers' compensation law. (In virtually every state, 
however, the word and appears in place of the word or.) This 
clearly tagged the law as a piece of workers' compensation 
legislation.
After a series of further amendments, compromises and a 
resolution of the major issue that delayed matters in the 
Senate, i.e., its authority to legislate a revenue-raising 
measure not initiated by the House of Representatives, the 
Senate passed a black lung amendment on September 30, 
1969. The vote was 91-0 in favor of the amendment, which 
carried Senator Randolph's name, with nine senators not 
voting. This Senate version was Title V, Interim Emergency 
Coal Mine Health Disability Benefits, and was incorporated 
in the act that passed the Senate unanimously on October 2, 
1969.
On September 23, Congressmen Dent, Perkins, Burton 
and 22 others introduced HR 13950, their proposed version 
of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. It followed months 
of work and debate within the House Labor Subcommittee. 
By October 3, 1969, the bill emerged from the House Com 
mittee on Education and Labor without amendment and had 
83 sponsors. Section 112 of this bill dealt with compensation 
for death or total disability due to complicated 
pneumoconiosis.
Basically, it provided that general revenues would be pro 
vided by the U.S. Treasury to fund either grants to states or 
direct payments to beneficiaries by the Secretary of Labor 
where no agreement was made with a state. Payments were 
to be for retroactive cases and not for prospective ones. The 
compensation provision passed in committee by a vote of 25
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to 9. In reporting on the bill, the committee made a point of 
describing section 112 as follows:
This program of payment ... is not a workmen's 
compensation plan. It is not intended to be so and 
it contains none of the characteristic features which 
mark any workmen's compensation plan. 
Moreover, it is clearly not intended to establish a 
federal prerogative or precedent in the area of 
payments for the death, injury or illness of 
workers. These provisions of the bill are a limited 
response in the form of emergency assistance to the 
miners who suffer from, and the widows of those 
who have died with, complicated 
pneumoconiosis. 2 1
Yet, in justifying the section the committee appeared to con 
tradict itself:
One of the compelling reasons the committee found 
it necessary to include this program was the failure 
of the States to assume compensation respon 
sibilities for the miners covered by this program. 
State laws are generally remiss in providing com 
pensation for individuals who suffer an occupa 
tional disease as it is, and only one state—Penn 
sylvania—provides retroactive benefits to in 
dividuals disabled by pneumoconiosis."
The House version used the traditional workers' compen 
sation phraseology, ". . .arising out of or in the course of 
employment." (Sec. 112 (G) (1)) In that sense, the section 
looked something like a compensation act.
The bill was explicitly limited to workers employed in 
underground mines. It contained a rebuttable presumption 
that if a worker with complicated pneumoconiosis is or was 
employed for 10 years or longer in a coal mine, then the
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disease arose out of or in the course of employment. 
Moreover, all persons with complicated pneumoconiosis 
were deemed to be totally disabled.
Ten members of the Committee dissented from the ma 
jority's position on the bill. (Actually 12 did, but 2 of these 
supported section 112.) Several reasons for their dissatisfac 
tion with the compensation provision were given. The core 
of their argument, however, was that such legislation 
represented a threat to state workers' compensation laws by 
providing a federal program where none had existed before. 
"We believe that the long-standing and ever improving State 
system of workmen's compensation will be in serious danger 
of ultimate reduction to a mere subordinate appendage of a 
federalized system of workmen's compensation or even of 
complete elimination.""
In one dissent, a compensation administrator from Maine 
who had testified earlier on the bill for the association of 
state workers' compensation administrators, the Interna 
tional Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Com 
missions (IAIABC), was quoted as saying:
The bills under consideration call for abandonment 
of our 55 year-old workmen's compensation 
system. (And,) The health, safety, and well-being 
of all workers, with few exceptions, is a matter of 
state concern. Workmen's compensation ad 
ministration is a professional specialty demanding 
experience and dedication and an intimate 
knowledge of local problems. This proposed 
legislation would replace local control with a cen 
tralized administration impairing development in 
the various regions of this country. 24
That opposition to black lung legislation arose over the 
mere creation of a new compensation program was not sur-
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prising. Workers' compensation programs in the states pro 
vided the livelihood for many persons in the legal and health 
professions, for segments of the insurance industry and for 
state administrators. A growing federal involvement posed a 
legitimate threat to these groups at a time when federal pro 
grams were rapidly expanding into a host of areas once left 
to the states. It is a testimonial to the strength of these in 
terest groups that so much of the opposition to the Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act was directed at this one small 
piece of the proposed law, and that it was directed at the 
principle of compensation much more than at the details of 
it. As stated on the floor of the House by Congressman 
Scherle of Iowa in seeking to rid the bill of Section 112, the 
compensation provision, "If this section is not struck, it will 
be the first step toward the ultimate federalization of all 
workmen's compensation." 23
One of the specifics in the law that did occupy lawmakers 
was the bill's funding. Several issues were critical for them. 
The difficulties of the coal industry in the years preceding 
1969 were certainly well known to senators and congressmen 
from coal mining areas. Consequently, they hoped to avoid 
putting much of the burden of financing the benefits section 
of the law on the industry, especially at a time where the 
health and safety aspects of the law were certain to drive up 
production costs and reduce productivity in mines. Since 
black lung was thought to be exclusively a problem of the 
underground mines, a tax levied on coal production would 
shift some of the cost burden onto the surface mines, thereby 
relieving some of the potential costs to the underground sec 
tor. It would mean also that less of a competitive edge would 
be given to the surface mines vis-a-vis the underground 
mines. However, many of the black lung supporters in the 
Congress from states such as Kentucky, Pennsylvania and 
West Virginia were eager to have benefits paid out of general 
revenues of the U.S. Treasury.
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On October 29, 1969, HR 13950 was debated on the floor 
of the House. Congressman Scherle of Iowa sought to 
amend it by dropping the compensation provision, Section 
112. After that failed by a voice vote, he moved to have the 
bill recommitted, however that effort failed also. This led 
immediately to a vote on the bill, which passed 389-4. In an 
editorial, The New York Times applauded the action of the 
House and then predicted, "The Conference Committee 
should have a relatively easy task of reconciling the two ver 
sions now that both chambers have made clear their refusal 
to be sidetracked by the once omnipotent industry 
lobbyists." 26 This proved to be one of many predictions 
made about the program that later proved to be completely 
wrong.
In November of 1969, conferees from the House and 
Senate met in order to reconcile the differences in the bills 
passed by each house. What emerged was S 2917, a version 
that looked significantly different from either of the versions 
that had earlier passed in both chambers. Indeed, the dif 
ferences were great enough for John Erlenborn, the ranking 
Republican in the House Committee that fashioned the bill, 
to ask on a point of order for the Speaker of the House to 
rule that the conference report not be accepted. The grounds 
for such a decision would have been that the final version of 
the law amended matters that had not been in disagreement 
in the House and Senate versions. Erlenborn's point of order 
was overruled, thereby setting up the vote in the House on 
the conferees' version of the bill.
Erlenborn's position had been a difficult one. His work on 
the Coal Mine Health and Safety law had been substantial 
and had led to a number of compromises by the majority. In 
exchange for that, Erlenborn had supported the bill in 
cluding the black lung compensation provisions (Section 
112). However, from his perspective the bill which was
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returned from conference to the House of Representatives 
had been substantially undermined. According to him, the 
conference made at least seven changes in areas where the 
two versions previously passed were not in conflict and that 
changed the law substantially. Foremost among these, 
although both houses had provided only for the compensa 
tion of complicated pneumoconiosis, the conference 
stipulated that benefits were for the far broader coverage of 
"diseases of the lung caused by dust." Thus compensation 
could be paid, presumably, for a wide range of diseases in 
cluding simple pneumoconiosis, a condition that was far 
more prevalent than complicated pneumoconiosis.
Another important change was to obligate the coal mine 
operator to pay disability benefits where there was either no 
appropriate coverage under the state's compensation law, or 
where the Secretary of Labor had not approved the provi 
sions of the state's law. It also added an obligation on mine 
operators to be covered under an insurance arrangement for 
such claims.
The conferee's bill also required the Secretary of Labor to 
pay for compensation where the mine operator was not in 
sured or if the mine operator was no longer in business. A 
mine operator would be liable to the U.S. Government in a 
civil action for recovery of these funds.
The anger expressed by Erlenborn toward the conference 
and its report as dictated by the majority Democrats emerges 
clearly in the record of the floor debate. Using terms like 
"underhanded," "travesty" and "behind scenes dealing," 
he and fellow Republicans, such as Steiger and Esch, who 
had previously supported the House black lung provisions in 
committee and in the House vote, demonstrated their sense 
of having been sandbagged by House Democrats such as 
Perkins, Dent and Burton. Unable to win on the point of 
order, Erlenborn moved to recommit the bill but lost by
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258-83, essentially guaranteeing the acceptance of the con 
ference version of the bill. All of the controversy was 
directed at the black lung compensation portion of the law.
As the debate about the integrity of the conference wound 
down, the remaining discussion focused on the cost of the 
bill. The Nixon administration had promised to provide its 
thinking on the legislation, but had never developed a 
coherent position on it. Only after the two chambers of the 
Congress had passed their bills did the administration begin 
to play an active role. Strong threats emerged that the presi 
dent might veto the legislation, partly on the matter of cost. 
Well after the Conference Committee had begun its work, 
and only four days before its final report was issued, 
Secretary of Interior Hickel wrote to Senator Javits, pro 
viding him with estimates of the cost of the benefits provi 
sion of the law. Based on the disability criteria used to deter 
mine eligibility, the Interior Department estimated that black 
lung legislation would cost between $155 million and $384 
million in the first full year of the program, and between 
$1.2 billion and $3.0 billion cumulatively for 20 years. 27 
HickeFs estimates were ridiculed by Carl Perkins on the 
grounds that they were provided hopelessly late in the 
legislative process, and for being excessively high, 
presumably for political reasons. Further, Perkins asserted 
that ". . .this legislation transcends petty arguments over 
costs." 28
Additional criticism of the administration's stance was ex 
pressed by Congressman Dent: "At one point a senator came 
before us (the Senate-House Conference Committee) and 
told us that the cost would be as much as $180 million. 
Gentlemen, if you took every miner in these United States 
and if you paid him $5,000 a year and bought his wife a chin 
chilla coat, you would not spend that much money. Finally, 
after a little bit of fact finding, he came down to $154 million
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and yesterday he came down to $124 million." 29 Dent 
estimated that compensation for living miners could not con 
ceivably exceed $32.3 million.
HickePs estimates were attacked by another of the legisla 
tion's primary movers, Congressman Phillip Burton. He 
charged that the last minute cost figures were". . .politically 
motivated and White House dictated ... an ignoble effort 
to deny any meaningful help to black lung widows and 
miners. . . ." 30
The administration provided virtually no support for 
Erlenborn and others who were fearful that the compensa 
tion provision had been carried too far. Ultimately, the Nix 
on White House argued simply that workers' compensation 
was a matter to be left for the states. In the absence of any 
leadership from the White House, the final bill was a 
creature of the Democratic majority in both Houses. The 
conference report was easily accepted in the House by a vote 
of 333-12 on December 17, 1969.
On December 18, the Senate took up the Conference Com 
mittee's report. Unlike the House, there was no disagree 
ment voiced by members of the Senate. Senator Javits ex 
plained how the compromises had been reached with the 
House members of the conference. All of the discussion was 
centered on the black lung provisions. Senator Williams in 
dicated that he anticipated that 50,000 claimants would 
receive federal benefits under the law. 31 Javits asserted that 
Secretary Hickel's cost estimates were wrong and that he 
estimated the cost of the program would be between $80 and 
$100 million and "certainly no more than $120 million per 
year." 32 The conference report was approved in the Senate 
without a roll call vote. It was signed by President Nixon, 
despite his previous threat to veto it, on December 23 and 
became law on December 30, 1969.
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The passage of Title IV of the Coal Mine Health and Safe 
ty Act was a tribute to the legislative prowess and doggedness 
of a few key members of Congress. None played a more 
significant role in shaping the final outcome than did Carl 
Perkins of Kentucky. While the legislation's most fervent 
supporters came from coal mining areas, there were at least 
three prominent exceptions, Congressman Phillip Burton of 
California, Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey, and 
Senator Jacob Javits of New York did not represent such 
areas. Support for Title IV was helped by the very prominent 
positions in the Congress held by certain senators and con 
gressmen from the coal mining areas. Senator Jennings Ran 
dolph, who sat on the Subcommittee on Labor along with 
Schweiker (R-Pennsylvania) and Taft (R-Ohio), had been 
chairman of the Senate Public Works Committee, earning 
for himself the sobriquet, the "Prince of Pork." The ranking 
Republican on the committee was John Sherman Cooper of 
Kentucky. Senator Byrd of West Virginia also served on the 
Appropriations Committee, and at that time had begun to 
climb the ladder of his party's hierarchy, serving as secretary 
of the Senate Democratic Conference.
In the House, the key Education and Labor Committee 
was headed by Perkins, who had served in the House since 
1948. Congressman Daniel Flood, representing the an 
thracite districts in Pennsylvania, was chairman of the Ap 
propriations Committee for the Labor Department and 
Health, Education and Welfare and was the speaker pro 
tempore. Congressman Hechler, a Columbia University 
Ph.D., was chairman of the Subcommittee on Advanced 
Research and Technology. John Dent of Pennsylvania held 
no special position of influence in the House, but his 
previous experience as an attorney, a former coal company 
executive, and a local union president (United Rubber 
Workers #1875) was helpful. Ultimately, there was little 
reason to expect much opposition to a bill that was pushed
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by such Congressional heavyweights and that appeared to be 
relatively cheap, if not innocuous.
Summary
The arguments introduced above are directed at showing 
the special place that mining occupied in the public percep 
tion. A combination of very high physical risk, growing 
dissatisfaction with state safety regulations, and economic 
deterioration in the industry meant that federal policy pro 
viding special treatment for the miners was not a surprising 
development by the end of the 1960s. In addition, this will 
ingness to give the miners some assistance or support must 
also be viewed against the backdrop of Lyndon Johnson's 
Great Society.
Beginning in 1964 and extending through the balance of 
that decade, a very broad range of public programs of cash, 
health care and other services and in-kind assistance was pro 
vided to specific clusters within the country. Targeted at 
groups from the unborn to the aged, at veterans, ex- 
offenders, the handicapped, Indians, inner-city residents, 
the rural poor and myriad other populations, the prevalent 
view appeared to be that government support could right all 
of the past ills of the society. By the late 1960s, miners were 
simply one group that had not yet shared much of this 
federal largess. Apparent shortcomings in state workers' 
compensation programs that uniquely impacted coal miners 
provided a potential opportunity, fortuitously, for Congress 
to demonstrate its beneficence. The federal government had 
an established history of enacting coal mine safety legislation 
after major mining disasters. Hence, it was hardly surprising 
that there was a major bill passed in 1969, following the Far- 
mington explosion. It proved to be a convenient vehicle for 
doing something that provided income to the coal miner 
community. The presumed need of the law arose from inade-
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quacies that were evident in state administered programs, 
both in terms of workplace safety and health, and in 
workers' compensation programs for occupational diseases.
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Black Lung Law and Its Changes 
1969-1981
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly outline the major 
areas of black lung law as it evolved from 1969 through 
1981. Here, the most significant characteristics of the law of 
1969 and the amendments of 1972 and 1977 are described. In 
the chapters that follow this one, more attention can be given 
to specific issues and how they were developed under black 
lung law.
Title IV of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 is 
the section of that rather large statute dealing with compen 
sation. It is called "Black Lung Benefits," with hearsay 
crediting this name to Congressman Phillip Burton, a 
California Democrat who actively supported the legislation 
and the subsequent efforts to liberalize it. The term hardly 
had been used before this time and apparently the name was 
inserted in humor into the statute.
The title consists of three parts, with Part A consisting 
simply of a statement of findings and declarations and six 
very brief, though not insignificant, definitions. The re 
mainder, Parts B and C, bifurcate the law on the basis of the 
time when claims for benefits were filed. Part B, "Claims for 
Benefits Filed on or Before December 31, 1972," was to be 
administered by the Secretary of the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, which meant by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA). By contrast, Part C, "Claims for
33
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Benefits after December 31, 1972,'* was to be placed under 
the management of the U.S. Department of Labor. Subse 
quently, the dates noted above were changed, but Part B and 
Part C have always referred to the separate programs 
operated respectively by SSA and the Labor Department.
The broad and stated goal of Title IV was to provide 
benefits to coal miners who were totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis and to dependent survivors of miners who 
died from that disease. There was little question raised about 
the desirability of compensating either those persons whose 
disease may have disabled them long before the 1969 law was 
enacted or the survivors of those whose death occurred at an 
earlier time. Indeed, the primary purpose of SSA's involve 
ment was to administer a program for these old cases. Once 
this existing backlog was dealt with, the program would 
become a workers' compensation program for newly 
developing victims, administered more or less by the Labor 
Department. It was the hope of the bill's architects that Part 
C would find the states providing entitlements and ad 
ministration under their own individual workers' compensa 
tion laws, with the Department's role reduced to one of certi 
fying that the state was in compliance with the federal stan 
dards created in the 1969 statute. Thus, SSA's administrative 
responsibility for the program was a temporary one, to be 
turned over to the Labor Department, whose responsibilities 
were to diminish. Indeed, the latter's role was expected to be 
entirely eliminated eventually.
The Part B program provided cash benefits to miners 
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal 
mine employment and to survivors of miners who had died 
from the disease. The program was funded by the general 
revenues of the U.S. Treasury (and not by the social security 
trust funds). To assist applicants in furthering their claims, 
certain presumptions, including an irrebuttable one, were in-
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eluded in the statute. Claims were filed in local social securi 
ty offices.
Several of the characteristics of benefits under the law 
seem noteworthy. First, unlike workers' compensation or 
social security benefits (old age or disability), monthly 
benefits paid to successful claimants were invariant with 
respect to the miner's or survivor's age, the previous level of 
miner earnings, or the extent of impairment—although 
benefits were provided only for those judged to be totally 
disabled. Benefit levels were adjusted for the number of 
dependents, however. In most cases, benefits were awarded 
and paid for a lifetime. Benefits were awarded based on the 
date the claim was filed, not on the date when total disability 
began or death occurred. Since it was possible to be found 
totally disabled even though still actively employed in a mine 
or elsewhere, the social security earnings test was applied so 
that some or all of the cash benefits could be offset due to 
wage income. Offsets were applied as well to benefits miners 
received from state workers' compensation, unemployment 
insurance or temporary disability programs. Since SSA con 
sidered the benefits to be workers' compensation, benefits 
were also offset by receipt of social security disability in 
surance. Benefit levels were tied to federal employee salary 
scales, so that both new awards or continuing payments rose 
paripassu with federal pay levels and roughly, at least, with 
rates of inflation.
The Part B program was to accept claims for two years. 
The (virtually) lifetime benefits paid by the federal govern 
ment under Part B were to be paid only for those successful 
claimants who filed no later than December 31, 1971, or 
where the miner died on or before that date, or finally, where 
a miner, who was entitled to Part B benefits, died leaving a 
survivor. Initially, 1972 was to be a year of transition. Suc 
cessful claims filed during that year were to be paid by SSA
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only until the end of the year, with payment thereafter 
becoming the administrative responsibility of the Labor 
Department and possibly the states.
Essentially, liability for claims filed during this phasing-in 
period of 1972 were to be paid by coal mine operators begin 
ning in 1973 under either Part C or federally certified state 
workers* programs, as were those claims filed after 
December 31, 1972. Presumably, the claims filed during the 
transition year of 1972 and later would reflect cases where 
the disease had only recently emerged. The hope was that all 
of the "old" cases would have been filed and dealt with in 
1970 and 1971.
Some newly developing cases could be expected in the 
future, but by 1972 and beyond, the number was expected to 
be quite small, given the teeth in the dust suppression provi 
sions of the new Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. Where 
new cases were not paid under acceptable state workers' 
compensation laws, they would be paid by individual mine 
operators. Where benefits from neither source were forth 
coming, federal general revenues would be used. Aside from 
the continuing benefits paid to successful claimants under 
the Part B program, federal involvement in black lung com 
pensation was to cease seven years after the law's enactment, 
that is, by December 30, 1976.
Since the 1969 law made individual coal mine operators 
liable for the benefits to be paid under the Part C program, 
the mine operators were required to obtain insurance to 
assure that successful claimants would be compensated. This 
obligation could be met either through a private insurance 
carrier authorized by the state to sell workers' compensation 
insurance, a state insurance fund, or through self-insurance 
where qualified by the Secretary of Labor. Where a worthy 
claimant was unable to receive benefits from a coal mine 
operator, e.g., the operator had ceased to exist and no in-
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surance was available, benefits were to be paid by the 
Secretary of Labor out of general revenues of the U.S. 
Treasury. Unlike the (virtual) lifetime benefits provided 
under Part B, no benefits were required to be paid after the 
Part C program ended at the close of 1976. Thus, mine 
operators' liability was temporary—limited to four years 
(1973-1976)—although individual state workers' compensa 
tion laws were expected to fill in thereafter.
In order to assist claimants and to ease the burden of ad 
ministering the law, three presumptions were inserted into 
the statute. Most significant was section 411 (c) (3), which 
created an irrebuttable presumption that evidence of com 
plicated pneumoconiosis meant that either the living miner 
was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or that the 
deceased miner's death was due to the disease.
The Social Security Administration was handed the 
responsibility for administering a law that was utterly new to 
it. For several reasons, including the specificity of the disease 
and the population covered, the Part B program bore almost 
no similarity to its disability insurance program. The 1969 
statute left myriad issues to the discretion of the Secretary of 
Health, Education and Welfare, and a number of matters 
seemed never to have been considered by the Congress in its 
haste to legislate reform by the anniversary of the Farm- 
ington explosion. Of all the uncertainties associated with the 
new program, however, perhaps the greatest was the one 
regarding the dimensions of the program. However, SSA 
would not have long to wait before some idea of the size of 
the applicant pool materialized. Indeed, it was precisely this 
realization, along with one other development, that pro 
foundly reshaped the character of the 1969 law.
Almost as soon as the law was enacted, claims began to 
flood into local social security offices. The same individuals 
and groups responsible for the passage of Title IV sought to
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encourage potential beneficiaries to file claims. These includ 
ed representatives of the Black Lung Associations and the 
United Mine Workers of America, along with elected of 
ficials, antipoverty workers and to some extent, SSA itself. 
Undoubtedly, part of the effort by these groups was 
motivated by a concern to help the needy victims of the 
disease. Some of it was generated by those hoping to receive 
some of the credit for the existence of a law that would pump 
substantial sums of money into coal mining communities. 
Individuals who assisted miners or survivors in the filing of 
claims, primarily local attorneys and Black Lung Associa 
tion representatives, had a financial stake in generating ac 
tivity under the law. Finally, time was essential since benefits 
were paid from the date of the filing of the claims, and not 
the date of death or disability. Delays in filing would mean a 
direct decline in the value of one's benefits.
In the first year of the law, approximately one-quarter of a 
million claims were filed. By December 31, 1971, approx 
imately 350,000 claims for black lung benefits were received 
by SSA. At the end of 1971—two years into the term of the 
law—new claims were being filed at the rate of 1,800 a week.
If the law of 1969 had remained unchanged, a massive 
potential liability would have awaited coal mine operators in 
1973, based on claims filed in 1972 and thereafter. It also ap 
peared evident by 1971 that the belief that the old cases 
would have been fully dealt with under Part B was unwar 
ranted. As claims continued to pour in, the large bulk of 
them involved disability or death that occurred in earlier 
years.
It was not simply the massive number of claims, and 
especially the continued inflow of old cases, that concerned 
those members of Congress who were closely watching the 
development of the program. Senators and representatives 
who were strongly supportive of the law became increasingly
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dissatisfied with SSA's administration of it. To be sure, the 
agency had moved very swiftly to carry out the provisions of 
the law and render determinations. By the end of 1971, SSA 
had made determinations in almost 93 percent of the claims 
filed with it, despite the continuing flow of new claims being 
made. However, about half the claims made during these 
first two years had been rejected by SSA. Anger and resent 
ment toward the agency by the coal mining community and 
their elected representatives over the rate of denials was 
substantial. In actively encouraging older miners and sur 
vivors to file claims, the law's supporters had given little con 
sideration to the possibility that benefits would not be paid.
The consequences of the unforeseen volume of old cases, 
along with the disappointment over the rejection rate, caused 
the program's supporters to push for changes in the law. An 
obvious need existed, in any case, to amend the law to cor 
rect an error or oversight in the original act. Dependent sur 
viving children of miners were able to receive benefits only 
where there existed a surviving spouse. Somehow, the 
language of the original law neglected to provide for 
"double orphans." There was no objection in the Congress 
to reopening the law to provide for these persons.
The prime mover in amending the law of 1969 was 
Representative Perkins. On the Senate side, Senators 
Williams, Javits and Randolph played a key role in reshap 
ing the law. Ultimately, a reluctant Richard Nixon signed in 
to law PL 92-303 in May 1972, following a unanimous vote 
in the Senate and an overwhelming vote in the House of 
Representatives (311-79). Its passage represented another 
clear-cut victory for supporters of the original legislation 
who hoped to liberalize its provisions further—largely, 
though not entirely, representatives from the coal mining 
states. Clearly, support came from more than Congressional 
liberals and/or Democrats. While supportive of the
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liberalization, a continuing concern of Senator Javits of New 
York was to place as much responsibility as possible on the 
mine operators. In his view, the entire problem reflected the 
". . .accumulated injustice of not having adequate 
workmen's compensation laws on the books for 
years. . . .' M Perhaps his words were being directed to the 
National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation 
Laws, which was created through the Senator's efforts and 
was deliberating at that very time over the future of the state 
programs.
Republican Senators such as Taft (Ohio) and Schweiker 
(Pennsylvania) spoke enthusiastically for the bill that passed 
the Senate, as did influential Democrats including the 
Senators from West Virginia—Byrd and Randolph. The coal 
mine operators were behind the law, so long as it delayed the 
time when they would have to bear the financial responsibili 
ty for successful claims. The United Mine Workers were 
behind the bill solidly also. The recently elected president of 
the union, Arnold Miller, had received substantial support in 
his election drive from Black Lung Association groups.
The reconciliation by the Conference Committee of the 
Senate and House versions of the amendments was less 
dramatic or "creative" than it had been in 1969. Differences 
between the chambers tended to be resolved by selecting the 
more liberal provision or by splitting the difference between 
the two bills where that was feasible.
The amendments of 1972 were significant in several 
respects. The foremost of these was that the amendments 
served to clarify for all parties, and particularly for SSA, the 
agency administering the law, the intent of Congress. That 
is, the law's supporters wanted much more than simply to 
have created a new entitlements program. Rather, they 
wanted a program that actually delivered benefits to their 
constituents.
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The huge and continuing inflow of claims, including many 
based on employment that ended prior to 1970, caused Con 
gress to extend the dates of the act in several respects in the 
1972 amendments. The House sought to extend Part B for 
two additional years so that it would run until December 31, 
1974. This would have delayed the coal industry's financial 
liability accordingly. Further, the House sought to move the 
original seven-year federal role under sec. 422 (e) (3) to nine 
years, the period after which no benefits had to be provided 
under Part C. When the Senate voted to extend Part B for 
one year, the conferees split the difference and extended it 
for 18T months. The Senate voted to make the federal role 
under Part C a permanent one and the conference voted in a 
compromise to keep it until December 31, 1981. After that 
date, no payments to miners or their dependents were re 
quired under Part C of the law. Presumably, state laws 
would protect claimants who had filed for benefits only in 
1972 or thereafter.
The conference also agreed that the transition period, 
originally planned to operate in 1972, would run from July 
1, 1973 to December 31, 1973. As such, claims filed prior to 
July 1, 1973 involved lifetime benefits for miners or their 
widows paid by the federal government; claims filed after 
December 31, 1973 were the industry's full responsibility, 
and those filed in this six-month gap were to be temporarily a 
federal responsibility administered by DOL and then a 
private responsibility.
The 1972 amendments substantially widened coverage 
under the law by redefining both "miners" and "total 
disability." The revised statute added a new presumption 
which effectively expanded the meaning of pneumoconiosis. 
It enlarged the coverage of survivors, thereby widening the 
scope of the entitlements. It eliminated one of the financial 
offsets that had been applied to black lung benefits and 
made the change retroactive to 1969.
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The 1972 amendments eased the burden of proof on 
claimants by preventing the government from denying a 
claim solely on the basis of X-ray evidence. In so doing, it ef 
fectively widened the range of impairments that could pro 
duce an entitlement under the law.
Possibly the most significant change of all occurred as a 
consequence of the amendment process, but it was not 
reflected in the revised statute itself. In brief, SSA agreed to 
revise the medical criteria it used to determine whether a clai 
mant was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. Essential 
ly, the agency promised to revise its published regulations in 
such ways as to assure that a larger proportion of claims 
would be accepted. Since the impact of these and all other 
changes were made retroactive, SSA was required to review 
all pending and previously denied claims using these new 
standards. This involved almost 195,000 claims, 90 percent 
of which had been rejected previously by the agency.
If the law's most ardent advocates were somewhat disap 
pointed with its track record until 1972, they were devastated 
by developments after the enactment of the amendments. 
While SSA proved to be entirely accommodating to the 
liberalization of the law, on July 1, 1973 administrative 
responsibility for it shifted away from SSA to the Labor 
Department. The Part C program quickly became a disaster 
for the agency and the law's supporters. Over the next four 
years, six sets of problems became clear to all parties con 
cerned with black lung legislation.
First, claims flowed in under section 415 (the six-month 
transition phase) and Part C in very large volume. Moreover, 
the bulk of these represented old cases, not recent or newly 
emerging diseases. The volume of cases had implications for 
both the future costs of the program as well as for the ad 
ministration of those claims.
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A second factor that became clear during this period was 
that the states were not replacing the Labor Department in 
the administration of the law. Few states applied to the 
Secretary to have their workers' compensation programs cer 
tified as acceptable to replace the federal scheme. No state 
ever received certification, so this vision of how the program 
would develop never materialized.
The third essential characteristic of the program that 
emerged under Part C was the litigiousness of those involv 
ed. The Part C program sought to place financial liability on 
specific coal mine operators. Also, unlike Part B, this was a 
workers' compensation program with an adversary process 
involved, and employers aggressively defended claims. In 
virtually every instance where a determination was made that 
an employer (or the insurer) should pay compensation, the 
matter was appealed.
A fourth characteristic of the program was that the 
Department of Labor, almost alone, was paying benefits 
under the program. In more than two out of three cases 
where benefits were awarded, no responsible mine operator 
could be identified or made liable. Moreover, where the ap 
peals process meant that a mine operator would not pay 
benefits, these were paid by the Labor Department as well, 
though repayment was anticipated.
These four characteristics aside, there were two others that 
made matters particularly intolerable to the supporters of the 
program. One of these was the phenomenal delays that 
developed in the Labor Department in making determina 
tions. Partly due to the unexpected outpouring of claims, 
partly due to the nature of the adversary process, and com 
bined with the inexperience of and perhaps the ineptitude in 
the Labor Department, the system became totally backed up. 
From July 1, 1973 to December 31, 1977, no determination 
had been made in about 50,000 of the 123,000 cases filed.
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The final straw, however, for the program's supporters 
was the approval rate in the Labor Department. By early 
1978 (at the time that the 1977 amendments became effec 
tive), about 125,000 claims had been submitted to the Labor 
Department, with 6,000 awards made and 70,000 claims 
denied! Thus, in administering the law that the Congress 
handed it in 1973, the Department had been able to accept 
fewer than 8 percent of the claims received where a decision 
had been rendered, and most of these had had to be paid by 
the federal government rather than by the coal mine 
operators. To make matters even grimmer for the Labor 
Department, SSA had been able, by that time, to bring its 
approval rate under the Part B program up to 70 percent.
The Labor Department's track record was not a result of 
more restrictive policymakers there than in SSA. Rather, 
they were administering Part C with a different set of rules; 
the law gave them little choice, or at least so they believed. 
By 1975, Congressman Perkins and other black lung ad 
vocates worked to increase the number and proportion of 
applicants who would win awards. One means of pressuring 
the Labor Department was to hold hearings on the program 
and to continue to press for new amendments to further 
open up the law. Much of the work on the House side involv 
ed working closely with representatives of the Black Lung 
Associations, and the United Mine Workers. In 1975, 
Perkins pushed legislation that would have provided benefits 
for black lung based solely on 15 years employment in the 
mines. 2 Eventually, this was softened so that an automatic 
entitlement would occur for any coal miner after 30 years of 
employment in the mines. Such a version was actually voted 
upon favorably at one point by the House of Represen 
tatives.
In 1976, Representative Perkins and the Black Lung 
Associations pushed HR 10760, which created an automatic
The Law & Its Changes 45
entitlement to benefits for miners with 30 years of work in 
the mines (or 25 years in the anthracite fields). Supporters of 
the bill argued that it was not a pension bill for miners, but 
instead that it reflected the very great propensity for long- 
term coal miners to develop black lung. Such a presumption 
would eliminate errors in claims adjudication and simplify 
processing them. The Senate was unable to act in a timely 
manner on HR 10760, but a similar bill, HR 4544 was in 
troduced the following year. Largely with an eye on the 
Senate and on some public reaction to HR 10760, and realiz 
ing alternatives existed to accomplish this same goal, the 
House cleared a version of the bill on September 19, 1977 
that dropped the controversial automatic entitlement. The 
Senate cleared its bill on the following day. The reconciled 
version that emerged from the Conference Committee sailed 
through both Houses and was signed by President Carter. In 
fact, to deal with the concerns about the implementation of 
Part C, two new laws emerged.
The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, PL 95-239 
(actually signed March 1, 1978) was a set of sweeping 
changes in the law. A primary goal of the law was to ease the 
burden on claimants seeking benefits for death or total 
disability due to pneumoconiosis. This was accomplished in 
several ways. Probably foremost among these, the Depart 
ment of Labor was finally enabled to set its own medical 
standards, as well as to set temporary standards. Until per 
manent ones were developed, though, these temporary ones 
were explicitly to be no more restrictive than those set by 
SSA under the Part B program after the 1972 amendments. 
Recall that SSA had put in these post-1972 standards in 
order to raise the acceptance rate for Part B claims.
The law eased the problem for claimants of providing 
satisfactory evidence in several other ways. It eliminated the 
critical role played, until then, by specially certified experts,
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working as consultant radiologists for the Labor Depart 
ment. Further, in the absence of other (medical) evidence, 
survivors could support claims by submitting affidavits 
regarding a deceased miner's condition prior to death. 
Autopsy reports by local physicians had to be accepted as 
evidence by the Secretary of Labor beginning in 1978. Some 
time limitations regarding the filing of claims were dropped. 
Certain restrictions on the use of the 15-year presumption 
that was added by the 1972 amendments were dropped, mak 
ing the presumption usable by more claimants. Additionally, 
a rebuttable presumption that the miner was disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis was added for survivors claims where the 
worker was employed 25 years or more and died prior to 
June 30, 1971.
The concept of total disability was substantially broaden 
ed by several provisions of the law. For example, the Depart 
ment was prohibited from using employment in the coal 
mines as evidence that the miner was not totally disabled at 
the time of death or of filing. The scope of coverage was fur 
ther widened by adding three occupational categories and by 
significantly redefining the relevant workplace covered.
Prior to the 1977 amendments, the Part C program was to 
be terminated by December 30, 1981. This had been stretch 
ed out in 1972, so that the original termination date of 1976 
had been pushed back five more years. In 1977, the provision 
that identified an ending date for the Part C program (sec 
tion 422 (c) (3)) was eliminated, thereby appearing to make 
the program permanent. With improved dust conditions an 
ticipated due to the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 
and its amendments, and with the states expected to be fully 
in line to replace the Part C program, the termination of the 
federal role had seemed reasonable at one time. Since the lat 
ter had clearly not occurred and since doubts existed about 
the potential for eliminating black lung disease, Congress
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chose to drop any pretense that this was only a temporary 
federal program.
To make its intent perfectly clear, the 1977 amendments 
required the Labor Department to re-review all claims 
previously denied and to evaluate them, along with the tens 
of thousands of pending cases, based on the new amend 
ments. Moreover, new information could be provided by 
claimants who had been denied. Claims previously denied 
under Part B were to be reviewed again as well, though 
SSA's review needed only to have been based on the existing 
file. If a previously denied claimant, or one denied after the 
new review by SSA, wished to submit new material or 
evidence, that file would then be evaluated by the Labor 
Department.
The goal of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act was to 
raise the probability that a miner or survivor would receive 
compensation under the program. But it did not deal with a 
central issue of liability, that is, the source of funding. Since 
the large majority of cases under Part C were ones where no 
"responsible operator'* could be identified, and employers 
were vigorously contesting liability where they were so 
designated, almost all payments under the Department of 
Labor program came from the U.S. Treasury. Recall, that 
the original concept of the 1969 law had been that the 
Treasury would pay for the old cases only, and that the mine 
operators would be responsible for very recent and newly 
emerging ones beginning with claims made after 1971. 
Senators and congressmen from the mining areas particular 
ly had been sensitive to the economically precarious position 
of the coal industry by 1969 and thereafter and did not want 
to burden it with substantial new costs for compensation. 
The 1972 amendments deferred the time when the mine 
operators would have to begin paying for black lung. And by
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1977, very little payment had been made by them in any case. 
In defense of the industry, however, many of the Part C (and 
section 415) claims were based on employment in the mines 
that had occurred many years earlier.
To deal with the issue of liability, the Congress opted for a 
"superfund" approach, with the passage of the Black Lung 
Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, PL 95-227. Signed into law on 
February 10, 1978, the new statute levied a tonnage tax to be 
paid by all coal producers. These funds went to a federal 
Trust Fund to be used to pay benefits in three categories of 
claims. First, the Trust Fund was to be responsible where the 
Labor Department did not identify a "responsible 
operator." Second, the Trust Fund would be liable to pay 
successful claimants where the last employment in the mines 
had occurred prior to January 1,1970. Thus, the coal mining 
industry now became financially responsible for the very old 
cases, though no single operator would be required to pay in 
these old cases. Finally, the Trust Fund would make 
payments where a benefit was awarded but the designated 
responsible operator did not pay in a timely manner. The 
Trust Fund would then seek repayment by the mine 
operator.
The creation of the new Trust Fund raised several intrigu 
ing questions. Was the tonnage tax rate to be equal across all 
producers, regardless of the risks of disease and of past and 
future claims emanating from employment therein? Would 
the tax be adequate to pay for the Trust Fund's obligations? 
And who would pay for claims filed in the early years of the 
program, where the last employment in the mines was after 
January 1, 1970? The latter problem arose because of two 
legislative changes in the 1977 amendments. First, coal mine 
operators previously had not been liable for claims filed 
prior to July 1, 1973 under the Part B program. Yet the 1977
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changes made individual mine operators liable for claims fil 
ed at any time where coal mine employment had occurred 
prior to December 31, 1969. Congress had recast liability to 
be based not on the date of filing but on the date of last 
employment. Second, previously denied claims filed between 
January 1, 1970 and July 1, 1973 would have to be recon 
sidered by SSA and the Labor Department with more liberal 
criteria applied because of the 1977 amendments. Thus, 
denied claims that had once been the potential liability of the 
U.S. Treasury were to be reopened and could now become 
the liability of individual mine operators or, conceivably, 
their insurance carriers.
The trust fund concept satisfied those parties who wanted 
the coal mining industry, rather than the U.S. Treasury, to 
bear financial responsibility for black lung disease. Some in 
volved parties would have preferred the Trust Fund to be us 
ed to pay for all successful claims, thereby eliminating in 
dividual mine operator liability. For example, Arnold Miller, 
President of the United Mine Workers of America, testified 
that this was his union's preference, primarily because it 
would remove the mine operators from the claims process. 3 
The adversary process was perceived by the union to be 
responsible for many of the delays and claims denials that 
had characterized the Part C program.
The 1977 amendments meant that the Labor Department 
would dramatically alter its administration of black lung 
claims. First, it would now be able to award benefits to a 
larger proportion of claimants, including those previously 
denied claims that it would reassess. Second, it would have 
to develop procedures that would allow the Department to 
open the logjam that had developed, and to process incom 
ing claims and deliver benefits more promptly. The 1977 
amendments gave the agency the tools to carry out both of
50 The Law & Its Changes
these goals. Subsequently, it would be argued that the Labor 
Department accomplished these goals at the expense of its 
compensating many claimants who were neither totally 
disabled due to pneumoconiosis nor survivors of miners who 
died from the disease. An alternative view was that, from 
1978 to 1981, the Department responded to the clear call of 
the Congress in the 1977 amendments, much as SSA had em 
phatically responded to the 1972 amendments. As we will 
see, benefits during this period were awarded at a much 
higher approval rate than they had been, and the backlog 
was substantially reduced.
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Medical Issues 
in Black Lung Compensation
In 1969, as members of both Houses of Congress debated 
the merits of Title IV of the Coal Mine Health and Safety 
Act, most appeared not to differentiate at all between terms 
such as black lung, pneumoconiosis, complicated 
pneumoconiosis, or some others that were bandied about. 
This may have reflected an inability on the part of some 
members to comprehend certain medical concepts or ter 
minology, but it may also have been a sign of disinterest in 
an issue that promised to affect only small numbers of peo 
ple and relatively few dollars. Yet major problems that soon 
surfaced in the program and continued to dog it over its en 
tire existence were the product of this initial lack of preci 
sion. The focus of this chapter is on the medical issues that 
confronted the program.
While there were numerous difficult questions regarding 
the administration of this program, they all sprang from a 
single basic concept. It was the intent of Congress that a 
specific group of workers would be compensated if they had 
been rendered totally disabled due to a specific disease, or 
their survivors would be compensated if death was due to the 
specific disease. By limiting compensation to a specific 
population and a single disease, and by excluding partial 
disabilities for purposes of compensation, a set of very dif 
ficult decisions had to be made about how to construct the 
appropriate boundaries of the program. Since little or no
53
54 Medical Issues
guidance was provided on these matters in the 1969 law, it 
was left originally to SSA to decide them. Dissatisfaction 
with that agency's administration was reflected in the 
passage of the 1972 amendments and, subsequently, the 1977 
and 1981 amendments were products of congressional 
displeasure with the way that the boundaries were set by the 
Labor Department. A considerable amount of the blame for 
that displeasure, however, resulted from the ambiguities and 
vagueness in the legislation itself. What disease(s) did Con 
gress seek to compensate? How was the disease to be iden 
tified? Did total disability mean what it had meant under the 
Social Security Disability Insurance program? Was the basis 
for compensation impairment or was it to be disability?
This chapter examines the three sets of medical issues that 
created intense controversy under the law. Each issue is 
treated separately here, but they are not entirely unrelated. 
The issues developed in the presence of scientific uncertain 
ties, but not because a total lack of consensus or agreement 
existed. Instead, even where the medical-scientific communi 
ty was largely, though not wholly, in agreement, the presence 
of any type of controversy enabled Congress to legislate 
without due consideration of the medical issues. The 
legislative branch sought to achieve certain social and 
economic goals and the existence of medical uncertainties or 
disputes enabled Congress to do precisely that.
The three sets of issues involve: (1) the methods ap 
propriate to the diagnosis of the disease; (2) relating the 
presence of the disease to the assessment of disability; and 
(3) identifying the disease(s) to be compensated under law. 1 
It is the third issue that is addressed here initially. Ironically, 
that issue had become relatively unimportant in most state 
workers' compensation laws, just as it grew controversial in 
the federal law. During the 1970s and 1980s, the states 
became generally less restrictive in their compensation for 
claims involving occupational diseases, ending the archaic
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practice of limiting compensation solely to diseases that were 
listed on a schedule. Had the states become more responsive 
to claimants with diseases prior to 1969, perhaps no black 
lung legislation would have developed. Yet, the perception 
that state practices had been and were restrictive led to 
passage of the 1969 law, which, ironically, itself was highly 
restrictive. It provided compensation to only a single class of 
occupational disease cases, black lung, and excluded all 
other diseases. In creating such a categoric entitlement, the 
law made the determination of black lung a critical compo 
nent of the compensation process.
Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis
Respiratory and pulmonary diseases among coal workers 
have long been known, if not well understood. 2 In 1831, 
Gregory identified coal as a factor in lung disease in miners. 
By 1837, Thomas Stratton had coined the name anthracosis. 
Until then, lung diseases in coal workers had been called 
miner's asthma. Observing lower death rates in miners than 
in other parts of the population, Smart wrote in 1885 that, 
"there must be some protective feature in coal mining opera 
tion, and that the preserving element might, after all, be the 
dust derived from the coal." 3 Indeed, this contributed to a 
view held by a number of physicians late in the 19th century 
and even into the early 20th century that coal dust had cer 
tain beneficial qualities for one's health. More likely, it 
probably reflected upon the good health of those who 
became coal miners.
Toward the end of the 19th century, mines in Great Britain 
became deeper and more machinery was introduced, with the 
consequence that more dust was produced and health condi 
tions actually worsened. The increase in lung diseases in 
miners was believed by most authorities to be due to the free 
crystalline silica that was a by-product of the mining process. 
Whether silicosis or another form of dust-induced disease,
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that is, a pneumoconiosis, was responsible for the increase in 
lung disease remained to be established, but concern regard 
ing the health of coal miners extended beyond Great Britain. 
Writing in 1925, H.R.M. Landis, a physician at the Universi 
ty of Pennsylvania, observed, "A man who works in a coal 
mine . . . sufficiently long will inevitably develop 
pneumonokoniosis [sic]. The changes may occur more 
quickly and be more extensive in one person than 
another . . . but there is no question as to the ultimate 
result. In fact, the progress of the pulmonary changes is so 
definite that, given the type of dust and the length of the ex 
posure, one can almost predict the (X-ray) findings." 4
A 1928 study by Collins and Gilchrist and another by 
Gough in 1940 appeared to establish that coal dust, in the 
absence of silica, could product pneumoconiosis. Autopsies 
confirmed the presence of disease without abnormal 
amounts of silica in the lungs.
A major watershed occurred when the Medical Research 
Council of Great Britain issued three separate reports on the 
subject in 1941, 1943, and 1945, which led directly to the 
placement of coal workers* pneumoconiosis on the schedule 
of compensable diseases. Indeed, the term coal workers' 
pneumoconiosis (CWP) first appeared in these reports. The 
British had found higher rates of CWP amongst anthracite 
miners, as well as differences related to the mines from 
which the coal was taken. At that time there was speculation 
that the chemical composition and the amount of volatile 
matter in the coal might explain some of these differences.
Research and interest in the U.S. in CWP lagged behind 
Britain. In the late 1950s and 1960s, several studies were 
done evaluating the causes of death among U.S. coal miners. 
Outside the research community, however, there appeared to 
be only limited recognition of the British findings that coal 
dust was associated with pneumoconiosis, aside from
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silicosis. It was only in the late 1960s and in the 1970s that 
coal workers' pneumoconiosis came to be recognized widely 
in this country as an occupational disease caused by coal 
dust.
The differentiation between silicosis and coal workers' 
pneumoconiosis was significant in both England and the 
U.S. Workers in most states and Great Britain who 
developed disabling silicosis could reasonably expect to 
receive some compensation for it, certainly by the late 1930s. 
However, if the symptoms of silicosis were not present or if 
the miner's work did not bring him into contact with silica, 
compensation was not likely to be paid. The symptoms of 
CWP and silicosis are not exactly alike. Consequently, 
miners would not be compensated in many instances where 
there was no silicosis present, though the worker was suffer 
ing from another pulmonary disorder which might have been 
CWP.
Coal workers' pneumoconiosis is a disorder caused by 
deposition of coal mine dust in the lungs. 5 It is customarily 
categorized into two sets: simple CWP and complicated 
CWP. According to a widely adopted scheme developed by 
and for the International Labor Organization and the 
University of Cincinnati, simple CWP is classified using the 
numbers 0, 1, 2, and 3. The patient is rated solely on the 
basis of X-rays, with the higher numbers indicative of larger 
numbers of small, pneumoconiotic opacities per unit area. A 
rating of 0 is indicative of few or no such opacities meaning 
the disease is not present. The rating 1 means few but 
definite opacities appear on the X-ray film and indicates that 
the disease is judged to be present, a 2 indicates the presence 
of a moderate number of small opacities and 3 is the 
classification when many small opacities are found. Within 
each numerical classification, a second number is added so 
that the rating can be further refined. Essentially, these sec-
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ond numbers connote below average, average, or above 
average within the major numerical categories.
While the major categories of simple CWP are classified 
by the numbers 1, 2, or 3, complicated CWP is classified by 
three letters, A, B, and C. Category A refers to the presence 
of one or more large opacities measuring one centimeter or 
more in diameter, with the sum total not exceeding five cen 
timeters. Category B describes a greater involvement than A, 
and C defines a condition that is greater than B. In com 
plicated pneumoconiosis, the large lesion that creates the 
opacity on the film is typically seen on a background with 
many small lesions characteristic of category 2 or 3 simple 
pneumoconiosis. A large lesion with no such background 
may indicate the presence of a tumor and no 
pneumoconiosis.
This system of classification, by itself, is not meant to ex 
plain the cause of the lesion(s) or to determine what type of 
pneumoconiosis, if any, is involved. Nor does the classifica 
tion serve to describe the extent of respiratory impairment. 
X-ray findings similar to CWP could result from other con 
ditions such as silicosis, berylliosis, aluminosis, talc 
pneumoconiosis or benign conditions like stannosis (tin) and 
silver polisher's lung. 6 However, this classification scheme 
has been useful beyond simply categorizing the extent of in 
volvement as seen by the X-ray.
Most of the authorities on CWP use the term complicated 
CWP interchangeably with progressive massive fibrosis 
(PMF). At least one group has termed this imprecise, 7 but 
generally the two are treated as synonyms. This is the least of 
the problems of terminology. Testifying for the National In 
stitute for Occupational Safety and Health on proposed 
federal regulations to administer the law, Dr. James Mer 
chant observed, "There is still considerable confusion 
among U.S. pathologists as to what exactly constitutes
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CWP. In addition, the terminology is confusing; an analysis 
of 1,300 cases submitted to the National Coal Miner Autop 
sy Study revealed that pathologists used 165 different terms 
to describe the lesion seen in coal workers' lungs. Currently, 
no pathological standards for CWP exist in the U.S." 8
The ventilatory (or bellows) function of the lungs is 
measured by spirometry. 9 Evidence of impairment is 
associated with bronchitis, cigarette smoking and/or com 
plicated CWP, but not with simple CWP. Persons with sim 
ple CWP are unaware of the presence of some impairment 
and usually become informed of the condition only after 
having been X-rayed. By contrast, persons with complicated 
CWP, particularly B or C, usually complain of shortness of 
breath (dyspnea) on exertion, and of coughing and sputum. 
Also, complicated CWP is associated with certain car- 
diopulmonary problems, including cor pulmonale (right ven 
tricular disease and failure), that is not associated with sim 
ple CWP.
Coughing and sputum are found in many miners, but 
these symptons are equally likely to be present in miners with 
or without X-ray evidence of CWP. Where these conditions 
exist, they are typically due to (industrial) bronchitis or em 
physema. This bronchitis, unlike that caused by cigarette 
smoking, has an insignificant clinical effect on ventilatory 
capacity.
The gas exchange function of the lungs shows a similar 
type of dichotomy between simple and complicated CWP. 
There is little or no deviation from the norm in miners with 
simple CWP. However, where complicated CWP, par 
ticularly category B or C is present, the diffusing capacity 
and the arterial blood gas tests reveal impairment, especially 
during exercise.
It is almost universally accepted that simple CWP (that is, 
categories 1, 2, or 3) is not disabling. Indeed, some in-
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dividuals with simple CWP are unaware of any type of 
respiratory-pulmonary problems. Even less disagreement ex 
ists regarding the position that serious functional impair 
ment is associated with category B or C of complicated 
CWP. As such, it is often disabling for persons employed in 
tasks involving some physical exertion. Some dispute exists 
on whether or not category A of complicated CWP virtually 
always causes serious functional impairment, as it does in 
category B or C.
Another significant difference between simple and com 
plicated CWP is that the latter is considered to be pro 
gressive, in that it can advance even in the absence of further 
coal dust exposure. By contrast, simple CWP not only will 
not advance if exposure to coal dust ends, the condition can 
be reversed if the worker is removed from the hazardous ex 
posure. Where workers with simple CWP continue to be ex 
posed, their condition may advance so as to be classified as 
complicated CWP.
CWP rarely develops before 10 years of exposure to the 
dust. The incidence of CWP is higher among persons expos 
ed to anthracite coal dust, a type of coal found only in this 
country in a small area of Pennsylvania and little mined in 
recent years. Its effects vary also by the region of the country 
where the coal is found, and also by the type of work done in 
the mines. The highest rates of simple CWP are found in Ap- 
palachia, the next highest in the Midwest and the lowest in 
the western part of the country. Simple CWP does not affect 
longevity. There is no effective treatment for complicated 
CWP but some forms of relief exist for the symptoms.
Another critical difference between simple and com 
plicated CWP is the frequency with which they are found 
among active and former miners. Considerable evidence ex 
ists regarding the differential incidence of simple and com 
plicated CWP among miner populations. While there are
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some significant differences reported among different 
studies, it is absolutely clear that complicated CWP tends to 
be found relatively infrequently compared to simple CWP. 
The differences in findings by medical researchers as to the 
relative occurrence of simple and complicated CWP likely 
derive from differences in populations being examined. In 
one study 9,706 miners from 21 bituminous mines and 2 an 
thracite mines were examined between 1969 and 1971. 10 W. 
Keith Morgan found almost 30 percent had simple CWP and 
about 2.5 percent had PMF. (Many of the latter cases came 
from the anthracite mines.) Roger Mitchell estimated that 10 
percent-30 percent of current miners have CWP with 
perhaps one-third of these having PMF. 11 He cited further 
evidence from Great Britain that about 1 percent of simple 
CWP cases become complicated each year. Earlier in the 
same report, it is estimated that 2 percent of simple CWP 
cases a year become complicated CWP. 12 About 70 percent 
of those persons with complicated CWP are in category A, 
where there is less likelihood of serious functional impair 
ment than in categories B and C.
During the 1970s, NIOSH began an extensive program to 
monitor the health of coal miners, providing additional 
evidence on the incidence of CWP. Data from two of their 
recent surveys, presented in table 3.1, indicated lower levels 
of CWP, and especially of complicated pneumoconiosis, 
than do the studies cited earlier. Aside from some differences 
in research methodologies, the different findings of these 
later studies may be explained, in part at least, by two 
phenomena. First, persons with CWP may have dropped out 
of coal mining and are no longer in the group surveyed, due 
to the presence of the Black Lung programs. Second, the 
dust controls imposed by the 1969 legislation may account 
for some of the apparent decline in incidence. It is unlikely, 
however, that these controls could have had a major impact 
on PMF, particularly in the Round Two Surveillance Study
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(see table 3.1), since it was undertaken from mid-1973 to ear 
ly 1975.
The differences between simple and complicated CWP 
described above place the 1969 legislative debate into 
somewhat better perspective. The version of the bill that 
finally passed the House of Representatives (HR 13950), 
provided compensation specifically for "complicated 
pneumoconiosis," which was defined precisely in section 
110(b) (7) (B): "The term * complicated pneumoconiosis' 
means an advanced stage of a chronic coal dust of the lung 
which (i) when diagnosed by chest roentgenogram yields one 
or more large opacities (greater than one centimeter in 
diameter) and would be classified in Category A, B, or C in 
the International Classification ... by the International 
Labor Organization. ..." Had this language been retained 
it would have ruled out compensation for the far larger 
cohort of miners or former miners with simple CWP or other 
pulmonary-respiratory diseases. Moreover, it would have 
made the process of identifying eligible claimants much 
simpler than it eventually was, since category A, B, or C is 
not difficult to observe by trained roentgenologists. The 
Senate's version of the 1969 law also limited benefits to per 
sons with "complicated pneumoconiosis" from coal mine 
employment. While that bill provided no definition of com 
plicated pneumoconiosis, there has been no controversy over 
either the meaning of complicated pneumoconiosis or its 
diagnosis.
Although both the House and the Senate bills specifically 
limited compensation to complicated CWP, the term "com 
plicated" had been dropped when the bill emerged from the 
Conference Committee. In section 402(b), the law defined 
pneumoconiosis as "a chronic dust disease of the lung aris 
ing out of employment in an underground coal mine." By 
entirely eliminating the term "complicated" that had ap-
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peared in both the Senate and House bills, and by an im 
mense revision of the definition from the version originally 
passed by the House, the Conference Committee was able to 
completely alter the character of the law.
The disease(s) to be compensated under the 1969 law had 
been described as pneumoconiosis or PMF and not as "black 
lung." With one or two exceptions, the term "black lung" 
does not appear in the scientific literature until 1969 or short 
ly thereafter. There is a medical condition, anthracosis, 
which refers to the blackening of the lungs found in coal 
miners. By 1920, however, it was realized that this was mere 
ly a pigment deposition, found widely at autopsy in persons 
from industrialized areas far removed from coal mining 
regions, and not a disease. Thus, the term used in 1969 and 
thereafter, black lung, is a legal or political concept and not 
a medical one. As such, it applies to whatever disease(s) the 
lawmakers or administrators wish it to. Unlike the fairly 
precise medical meaning of simple or complicated CWP, the 
term black lung has the twin virtues to some of being catchy 
and emotional, while providing maximum flexibility or am 
biguity.
The term, black lung, did not appear in either the House 
or Senate version of the 1969 law, but is found in the bill 
reported by the Conference Committee. While it is not used 
in the text of the various sections of the law, Title IV is entitl 
ed "Black Lung Benefits."
By defining pneumoconiosis as it did, and by using the 
term black lung rather than CWP, the law opened the door 
to claims for a variety of respiratory and pulmonary diseases 
that are not CWP. It also created a variety of problems for 
those charged with administering the program. First, it rais 
ed expectations among miners, their families and their 
representatives that compensation would be forthcoming for 
virtually all pulmonary-respiratory diseases contracted by a
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miner, not simply for a single, reasonably well-defined one. 
Second, partly because of the original language in the 
separate Senate and House bills, many persons believed that 
only CWP was to be compensable under the law. That no 
tion was reinforced by the language in the law which referred 
to "pneumoconiosis." Third, the definition of the disease 
that was inserted by the Conference Committee forced the 
law's administrators to identify those other diseases and con 
ditions that would be compensable on the grounds that they 
arise out of coal mine employment and are dust-induced.
Aside from CWP, at least two other lung conditions are 
understood to be related to coal mining. Silicosis (another 
type of pneumoconiosis) is found in workers involved in 
mine construction or transportation work. 13 These workers 
are exposed to aerosolized sands applied to the rail tracks in 
the mines to provide some traction. Construction workers, 
primarily roof bolters, also are exposed when they bore holes 
in the rock strata outside the coal seam. Generally, the 
presence of the disease is diagnosed by X-ray.
The other lung disease that is widely associated with coal 
mining is industrial bronchitis. Workers in all dusty trades 
can develop industrial bronchitis, which results from the 
dust being deposited in the trachea and bronchi, the airways 
that carry the inhaled air to the gas-exchanging portion of 
the lung. A properly functioning lung performs two 
necessary functions. First, it acts as a bellows, moving both 
inhaled air into the lungs and exhaled air out of the body. 
Second, the gas exchange function occurs as oxygen is 
transferred to the blood and carbon dioxide is removed from 
it to be exhaled. Dust in the trachea and bronchi may reduce 
the ventilatory capacity (the bellows function) of the patient, 
but not substantially. The body seeks to rid itself of the dust 
particles by producing excess mucus, leading to phlegm and 
coughing. Because the particles are removed, the condition 
does not appear on X-rays.
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The presence of coughing and sputum and slight reduc 
tions in ventilatory capacity occur no more frequently in 
miners with simple CWP than in those without the condi 
tion. Increasing the degree of simple CWP (and thereby the 
dust content of the lungs) does not lead to concomitant 
reductions in ventilatory capacity. Miners with reduced ven 
tilatory function have difficulty due to the obstruction of the 
airways reflecting industrial bronchitis, and not due to sim 
ple CWP. Obstructed airways due to coal dust may be un 
comfortable but are not likely to cause disability. However, 
for persons with PMF, more serious airway obstruction may 
exist, and consequently substantial functional impairment 
may be present. The incidence of breathing impairments in 
coal miners is significant. The National Study of Coal 
Workers' Pneumoconiosis surveyed the health condition of 
over 9,300 miners. It reported that 40.4 percent suffered 
some form of bronchitis, 11.2 percent had persistent 
breathlessness, and 24.2 percent had "significant" airway 
obstruction. 14
Cigarette smoking is also a cause of obstructed airways. 
Unlike industrial bronchitis, however, cigarette smoking is 
associated with a loss of flexibility in the lungs (emphysema) 
and destroys their ability to exchange gas. There does not ap 
pear to be any special synergism between cigarette smoking 
and coal dust, however, as in the case of asbestos exposure. 
In miners with chronically obstructed airways, the relative 
contributory causes as apportioned between cigarette smok 
ing and coal mine dust are a matter of dispute. The director 
of NIOSH has suggested that about 50 percent of the cases 
arising in coal miners are due to cigarettes. 15 Dr. W. Keith 
Morgan directly challenged this estimate. Based on com 
parisons of nonsmoking surface miners with nonsmoking 
mine face employees, he found that the average ventilatory 
capacities were 102 percent and 98 percent, respectively, of 
the predicted normal values. He termed this difference
Medical Issues 67
"statistically significant" but "clinically insignificant." 16 
Based on this he assessed cigarette smoking as having from 6 
to 10 times the effect of coal dust on ventilatory capacity.
The product of these legislative ambiguities and medical 
uncertainties were administrative, political and informa 
tional problems. In the first two-three years under the new 
law, numerous claims were denied to severely impaired 
miners, former miners or survivors of workers who had 
respiratory and pulmonary conditions at the time of their 
death. The basis for the denials tended to be X-rays that 
displayed no evidence of disabling pneumoconiosis. Some of 
these people suffered "black lung," however, to the extent 
that they did have industrial bronchitis, or cigarette-induced 
bronchitis and emphysema. Denials of compensation 
benefits by the Social Security Administration infuriated the 
supporters of the black lung program in Congress, the 
United Mine Workers union and the various Black Lung 
Associations. The key source of the problem, however, was 
the ambiguity created by the 1969 law regarding the 
disease(s) to be compensated. Reflecting this, Senator Byrd 
of West Virginia argued, "Let us stop quibbling with dying 
men as to whether their lungs are riddled with black lung or 
whether they are afflicted with asthma, or silicosis, or 
chronic bronchitis." 1 7
Congress took three steps to force the Social Security Ad 
ministration and the Labor Department to widen the 
coverage of the law beyond CWP. In the 1972 amendments it 
moved indirectly by disallowing X-ray evidence as the sole 
basis for denial of a claim. Thus, persons with no evidence of 
CWP based on X-rays were now to be eligible for benefits.
Second, it added the 15-year rule (section 411(c)): a rebut- 
table presumption of pneumoconiosis was established 
retroactive to December 30, 1969, for a coal miner who 
worked 15 years in underground mines (or in substantially
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similar conditions), if the person had a totally disabling 
pulmonary or respiratory condition, even with a chest X-ray 
that was negative for pneumoconiosis. The presumption 
clearly smoothed the path of claimants unable to 
demonstrate CWP due to negative X-rays.
Finally, in the 1977 amendments, Congress reworded its 
1969 definition of pneumoconiosis so as to make it far more 
inclusive: "The term * pneumoconiosis' means a chronic dust 
disease of the lung and its sequela, including respiratory and 
pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employ 
ment." 18 (The underlined words were those added by the 
1977 amendments.) While scientists could be left to ponder 
and argue what this meant, the intent of Congress to widen 
the basis of eligibility was absolutely clear to the ad 
ministrators of the program. The disease(s) to be covered 
under the law was (were) much more than CWP.
The meaning of the disease(s) to be compensated was not 
settled with the 1977 amendments. In April 1978, the Depart 
ment of Labor issued proposed regulations to implement the 
1977 amendments. Included was an elaboration of the 
definition of pneumoconiosis. 19 Almost two years later, the 
final version of the Department's regulations implementing 
the amendments of 1977 was issued. 20 In the Labor Depart 
ment's interpretation, the definition "... includes, but is 
not limited to, coal workers' pneumoconiosis, an- 
thracosilicosis, anthracosis, massive pulmonary fibrosis, 
progressive massive fibrosis, silicosis or silicotuberculosis, 
arising out of coal mine employment. For purposes of this 
definition, a disease * arising out of coal mine employment' 
includes any chronic pulmonary disease resulting in 
respiratory or pulmonary impairment significantly related 
to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal 
mine employment." 21 (Italics added here for emphasis.) In 
issuing its proposed regulations in 1978, the Labor Depart-
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ment had proposed to explicitly exclude lung cancer and 
diseases of bacteriological or viral origin from being con 
sidered to have arisen out of dust exposure in coal mine 
employment. One measure of the Department's timidity in 
the face of oversight by Rep. Perkins and other advocates of 
a more liberalized program was that it backed off from even 
this in its final version. It chose not to specify bronchitis and 
emphysema as chronic pulmonary diseases that arise out of 
coal mine employment. However, since the interpretation of 
the definition was not limited to the diseases listed, bron 
chitis and emphysema were clearly compensable, so long as 
other criteria for benefits were also met.
The Labor Department also sought as inclusive a defini 
tion as possible through the use of the aggravation theory. 
Under the Department's regulation, a claimant need only 
show that dust exposure in coal mine employment substan 
tially aggravated an underlying or pre-existing condition. In 
deed this was somewhat stricter than the regulations propos 
ed in 1978 which did not include the word "substantially." 
This tightening probably resulted from a hint provided by 
the courts after the proposed regulations were issued that the 
Department may have overstepped its legislative grounds in 
interpreting the meaning of pneumoconiosis in this way. 22
To summarize, coal workers' pneumoconiosis is a discrete 
disease, now recognized as such by the medical community. 
In its simple form, the condition is not disabling. In 1969, 
both Houses of Congress endorsed a new entitlements pro 
gram for workers disabled by or deceased due to complicated 
CWP. The Conference Committee eliminated the term 
"complicated," and defined somewhat vaguely the disease 
to be compensated. The definition was modified in 1977 to 
permit broader coverage. The Labor Department, eager to 
overcome its inability to compensate most applicants, fur 
ther extended the disease(s) to be compensated through the
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regulations it issued in 1978 and 1980. By then, "black lung" 
bore little relationship to coal workers' pneumoconiosis.
Diagnosis
The expressed aim of Congress in 1969 was to compensate 
coal miners totally disabled or killed due to pneumoconiosis 
arising out of underground coal mine employment. Had 
Congress meant to compensate only complicated CWP, or 
even CWP (in the presence of functional impairment), the 
matter of diagnosis would have been relatively straightfor 
ward. As noted earier in this chapter, the presence or absence 
of pneumoconiosis can be found by qualified readers of 
chest X-rays where the film quality is adequate. While X-ray 
evidence does not completely simplify an adjudicator's needs 
where only pneumoconiosis is to be compensable, it makes 
the task quite manageable.
If one has a compensation program dealing solely with 
disability or death due to CWP, there are at least five 
diagnostic problems that exist where X-ray films are used as 
the primary method of screening or diagnosis. One type of 
problem exists where one or more large (1 cm. or larger in 
diameter) lesions appear on X-rays. Though this is 
characteristic of complicated CWP, it may also be evidence 
of other diseases, including some other pneumoconioses 
such as silicosis. X-ray evidence is problematic where 
silicosis is not compensable but CWP is. The matter can be 
dealt with, though not to the satisfaction of all parties, by us 
ing presumptions involving work histories. Large lesions 
may also be seen in X-rays where a tumor is present. 
However, complicated CWP, as distinct from a tumor, is 
typically characterized by a large lesion or lesions on a 
background consistent with category 2 or 3 pneumoconiosis. 
Thus, the presence of large lesions can usually be diagnosed 
correctly as pneumoconiosis or not.
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A more difficult problem occurs at the very margin of 
category 1 (simple) pneumoconiosis and category 0 (no 
pneumoconiosis). 23 where the presence of pneumoconiosis is 
a necessary condition for compensation, difficulties can oc 
cur due to challenges in diagnosing the presence of the 
disease at its very earliest stages. This is complicated by the 
fact that some opacities that appear in chest X-rays may be 
related solely to the aging process. Dr. Russell Morgan has 
written, "The problem here is that pneumoconiosis is not the 
only condition that manifests itself by the presence of small, 
rounded or irregular opacities on the chest roentgenogram. 
Many other states, including some that might be considered 
to be normal physiological processes (e.g., aging) may pro 
duce them too." 24
A third set of problems occurs because the quality of the 
film may affect the ability to make a diagnosis or may affect 
the finding itself. One authority estimates that perhaps 25 
percent of the roughly 20,000 X-rays he has read of workers 
who have been occupationally exposed to various dusts were 
of substandard diagnostic quality, or unreadable for pur 
poses of detecting and classifying pneumoconiosis. 25 Where 
the film is underexposed, the less experienced reader will 
have a tendency to find disease where none is present. Where 
the X-ray film is overexposed it can cause the changes due to 
pneumoconiosis to be masked or obliterated. Morgan also 
pointed to the problem of poor quality X-rays for purposes 
of proper diagnosis. 26
A related but separate issue that created immense dif 
ficulties under the law is the technical ability of X-ray 
readers. Even where the quality of X-ray films is satisfac 
tory, not all physicians possess the skill or the training to 
properly read them. Testifying in 1978, Dr. William Cole 
estimated that "less than 200 physicians and radiologists 
have demonstrated a proficiency in the correct use of the 
classifications system" (the ILO-U/C scheme). 27
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The need for expert readers of X-ray films became ap 
parent early in the life of the black lung program. In 1976, 
NIOSH, in association with the Johns Hopkins School of 
Medicine, developed an examination to test the proficiency 
of readers in classifying chest roentgenograms. Of the first 
140 persons to take the examination, 77 were passed, 
thereby, qualifying as "B" readers. These experts worked as 
consultants to the government and were used to review 
X-rays and findings sent in from the field. An "A" reader is 
typically a local physician who has taken a course directed by 
NIOSH/Johns Hopkins or has otherwise demonstrated a 
proficiency in the ILO-U/C system. "B" readers have 
demonstrated a higher level of proficiency than "A" 
readers.
The issues of film and reader quality have been posed here 
in the abstract. In fact, the U.S. Department of Labor con 
ducted a study in 1977 where its expert "B" readers 
evaluated 18,014 X-rays and the reports filed on them by the 
field physicians who had evaluated black lung claims for the 
Department. (See table 3.2 below.) The study demonstrated 
a widespread pattern of disparities with a strong bias toward 
field physicians finding excessive (unwarranted) instances of 
disease. For example, and at its worst, the study found that 
in 10,044 instances where field physicians reported finding 
simple pneumoconiosis, over 10 percent of the X-rays were 
unreadable. Of the balance of almost 9,000 cases, only 27.5 
percent were actually simple pneumoconiosis, according to 
expert readers. Over 70 percent were judged to be not 
pneumoconiosis, and 2.4 percent were found to be com 
plicated pneumoconiosis.
The problem of X-ray reader quality stems from several 
underlying causes. At one level, the ability to read such 
X-rays properly develops with experience. Moreover, the 
skill will atrophy if not maintained. At another level, some
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physicians have a reputation as being more or less inclined to 
find pneumoconiosis. In the coal mining areas, some physi 
cians developed reputations as being "sympathetic" to 
miners and were prone to diagnose pneumoconiosis. Some 
doctors had precisely the opposite reputation. Testifying in 
1981, Dr. Keith Morgan argued "I regret that many 
radiologists invariably interpret every film as positive. In the 
case of certain radiologists whose services are invariably 
given to claimants, I have yet to see an X-ray which has not 
been read as positive. In looking through a hundred con 
secutive reports of one of these radiologists, all of which 
were reported as either category 2 or 3 simple CWP, only 
seven were subsequently reported as positive by a *B' 
reader." 28
Aside from the issues noted, X-rays have other limitations 
as a means of screening workers for compensation benefits. 
Clearly, mechanisms must be developed to determine com- 
pensability where claimants have died without having chest 
X-rays prior to death. Further, X-rays can indicate the 
presence of disease but not necessarily the degree of func 
tional impairment. The matter can be partially finessed, as in 
the case of black lung, by creating the presumption in the law 
that complicated pneumoconiosis was totally disabling. 
However, for the far more common cases involving the 
radiological diagnosis of simple pneumoconiosis, other 
criteria must be developed to measure impairment/disability 
and determine eligibility for compensation.
The shortcomings and limitations of X-ray evidence in 
pneumoconiosis claims make several other methods of 
diagnosis useful. For example, autopsies are considered a 
highly effective way of establishing that the deceased person 
had CWP at the time of death. It is also useful in establishing 
the cause of death and the linkages between the pulmonary- 
respiratory disease and any other factors causing death. The
Table 3.2 ^ĵ
Comparative Results of readings by Field Physicians and "B" Readers
Identifying 18,014 Chest Roentgenograms for the Department of Labor hi 1977 2
__ ____ ______________ _______________ _____________ _______ o.—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— "
1. # of films classified negative by field physicians 7603 £-
less # of films declared unreadable by "B" readers 668 gfc
# of readable films classified negative by field physicians 6935 8
# of these films classified negative by "B" readers 6299 or 90.8%
# of these films upgraded to simple pneumoconiosis by "B" readers 609 or 8.8%
# of these films upgraded to complicated pneumoconiosis by "B" readers 27 or 0.4%
2. # of films classified simple pneumoconiosis by field physicians 10044 
less # of films declared unreadable by "B" readers 1049
# of readable films classified by simple pneumoconiosis by "B" readers 2570 or 27.5%
# of these films downgraded to negative by "B" readers 6304 or 70.1%
# of these films upgraded to complicated by "B" readers 221 or 2.4%
3. # of films classified complicated pneumoconiosis by field physicians 367 
less ft of films declared unreadable by "B" readers 29
# of readable films classified complicated pneumoconiosis by field physicians 338
# of these films classified complicated pneumoconiosis by "B" readers 120 or 35.5%
# of these films downgraded to negative by "B" readers 123 or 36.4%
# of these films downgraded to simple pneumoconiosis by "B" readers 95 or 28.1%
4. # of films classified negative by "B" readers 12716
# of these films classified negative by field physicians 6299 or 49.5%
# of these films upgraded to simple pneumoconiosis by field physicians 6304 or 49.5%
# of these films upgraded to complicated pneumoconiosis by field physicians 123 or 1.0%
5. # of films classified simple pneumoconiosis by "B" readers 3174
# of these films classified simple pneumoconiosis by field physicians 2470 or 77.8%
# of these films downgraded to negative by field physicians 609 or 19.2%
# of these films upgraded to complicated pneumoconiosis by field physicians 95 or 3.0%
6. # of cases classified complicated pneumoconiosis by "B" readers 368
# of these cases classified complicated pneumoconiosis by field physicians 120 or 32.6%
# of these cases downgraded to negative by field physicians 27 or 7.3%
# of these cases downgraded to simple pneumoconiosis by field physicians 221 or 60.1%
SOURCE: Department of Labor.
8:oe.
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1969 act mandated the National Coal Workers* Autopsy 
Study, which provided a voluntary, cost-free autopsy for any 
former underground miner.
Dr. James Merchant of NIOSH testified on certain find 
ings from the National Coal Workers' Autopsy Study which 
matched the autopsy findings with the death certificates 
prepared by the worker's local physician. 29 Based on 1,300 
cases from 1970 to 1974, NIOSH reported that of the major 
disease categories found to be the underlying cause of death, 
e.g., lung cancer, tuberculosis, chronic obstructive airway 
disease, heart disease, 10 to 30 percent were not shown on 
the death certificate. Where autopsy revealed these diseases 
to be a contributing cause of death, they were not found on 
death certificates in over 50 percent of the cases. The study 
confirmed the fallibility of relying too heavily on death cer 
tificates for compensation purposes (or for that matter for 
epidemiological work), and the desirability of using autopsy 
as a diagnostic tool.
In practice, autopsy evidence was treated as having essen 
tial limitations under this program. That is most clearly 
reflected by the Labor Department's rules: "Because of the 
nature of autopsy, autopsy findings are accorded a high pro 
bative value. However, the claims examiner must keep in 
mind that the physician normally applies a narrow, scientific 
or medical definition of pneumoconiosis, while the claims 
examiner uses a broader, legal definition. Interpretation of 
autopsy reports is further complicated by the absence of any 
widely agreed-upon standards for the diagnosis of 
pneumoconiosis on autopsy, or for classification of the stage 
of advancement." 30
Aside from X-rays and autopsy, pneumoconiosis can be 
also detected by the use of biopsy. Bits of lung tissue are 
removed and examined either during surgical procedures or 
by inserting a needle and removing such small pieces. The
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latter is widely regarded as involving some risk to the patient, 
and is therefore widely considered inappropriate for use sole 
ly in the diagnosis for compensation purposes.
If the disease to be compensated was exclusively CWP, 
particularly complicated CWP, the means to make proper 
diagnosis would have been available readily to program ad 
ministrators since 1970. Obviously, the core problem was 
that it was black lung and not CWP that Congress wanted to 
compensate. Whatever was meant by the "legal disease" 
black lung, its diagnosis was far less clear than that of CWP. 
By extending the disease definition well beyond CWP, the 
law eventually forced program administrators to work in the 
roundabout way of establishing, first, the existence of an im 
pairment, and then using that to establish the presence of the 
compensable disease.
While the 1969 law was ambiguous, at best, in identifying 
the compensable disease, the agency charged with ad 
ministering the law initially was confronted with the task of 
determining eligibility in actual cases. Based on the Social 
Security Administration's reading of the law, the agency 
opted to compensate pneumoconiosis (as the law stated) and 
not the medically undefined disease(s) "black lung," as the 
law also stated. The criteria employed by SSA were 
straightforward and partially relied on SSA's experience in 
evaluating total disability under section 223 of the Social 
Security Act. In its defense, SSA was given virtually no op 
portunity to fully explore criteria for determining compen- 
sability. Incredibly, the 1969 law mandated that HEW pro 
mulgate its regulations for determining total disability and 
death due to pneumoconiosis by the end of the third month 
following the month of enactment. The agency published its 
regulations in the Federal Register and made them effective 
immediately. While it invited the public to comment on these 
regulations and to submit data and arguments about them,
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ultimately the agency did not change its regulations until 
forced to do so by the 1972 amendments. To be sure, the 
agency was experienced in operating a total disability in 
surance program, but it acknowledged that it had not ad 
ministered a program where eligibility was based on disabili 
ty due to a specific disease only, and where a causal connec 
tion had to be established with a specific type of employment 
(underground coal mining).
Initially, SSA operated under relatively simple decision 
rules. Where X-rays revealed the presence of complicated 
CWP, section 411(b) (3) created the irrebuttable presump 
tion of total disability or death due to pneumoconiosis. 
Where X-rays revealed no pneumoconiosis, the claim was 
denied. This decision reflected the medical concept of the 
disease, CWP, and not the "legal disease" that black lung 
could have implied.
To establish the causal or occupational connection 
with coal workers' pneumoconiosis, the regulations 
provide that there must be X-ray evidence of 
pneumoconiosis in the living applicant (in a rare 
case, a biopsy). This is based on the prevailing 
medical judgement that in the absence of positive 
X-ray evidence, the disease does not exist or exists 
to a degree that would have no significant effect on 
the claimant's functional capacity.
There is some minority medical opinion to the ef 
fect that disabling pneumoconiosis may exist in the 
absence of "positive" X-ray evidence thereof. 
However, this issue was thoroughly considered by 
the Social Security Administration, through exten 
sive consultation with a wide range of medical 
specialists, and the requirement was included in the 
regulations as reflecting the overwhelming consen 
sus of medical judgement on the issue. 31
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What remained for SSA was the very considerable task of 
dealing with claimants who were found to have simple 
pneumoconiosis. Section 413(b) of the statute required the 
agency to make entitlement determinations "to the max 
imum extent feasible'' according to the procedures used in 
the Social Security Disability Insurance program. Thus, in 
the presence of simple CWP the claimant's ventilatory func 
tioning was tested and standards were adopted that were 
basically the same as those already in place in the disability 
insurance program. Indeed, the agency argued that, in the 
presence of uncertainty, its administration of the program 
erred on the side of generosity:
An individual's ventilatory ability may be com 
promised by many diseases other than coal 
workers' pneumoconiosis. Emphysema commonly 
affects this ability: neurological, muscular, infec 
tious, or degenerative disease may do so also. From 
a medical standpoint, it is impossible in most situa 
tions to determine what portion of an individual's 
reduced ventilatory capacity is due to coal workers' 
pneumoconiosis and what portion is due to one or 
more other diseases he has. Nevertheless, to assure 
fullest equity to claimants under these cir 
cumstances, favorable disability determinations 
have been made where a claimant has a serious 
breathing impairment and has pneumoconiosis. 32
The implication of this admitted practice was that diagnosis 
followed from the finding of impairment, given any evidence 
of the presence of simple CWP, no matter how early or 
limited the stage.
SSA drew the line where no evidence of pneumoconiosis 
was found. "Some miners have emphysema or chronic bron 
chitis and may be severely disabled as a result, but do not 
have pneumoconiosis. Under the law, claims from such
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miners must be denied." 33 No doubt, the agency's 
understanding of the law followed from the language mak 
ing compensation limited to pneumoconiosis.
SSA's treatment of death claims paralleled that employed 
for living miners except where the 411(c) (2) presumption re 
quired otherwise. That provision presumed death due to 
pneumoconiosis when a person employed 10 years or more in 
underground mining died of a "respiratory disease." Sec. 
411(c) (3) created the irrebuttable presumption that death 
was due to pneumoconiosis (regardless of actual cause) 
where the miner had had complicated pneumoconiosis. 
Where the miner did not have complicated pneumoconiosis, 
and where 41 l(c) (2) did not apply, the agency could and did 
find grounds for compensation where respiratory disease 
may have contributed to the deceased miner's demise. 
"Unless death is due to trauma or clearly results from an 
acute disease process, the Social Security Administration has 
ordinarily held that pneumoconiosis or 'respirable disease,' 
if present, was a significant contributing factor in causing 
death." 34
According to SSA, most of the death claims that were 
denied were characterized in either of two ways. In some 
claims, there was no evidence of chronic lung disease. In 
others, the miner died either from an acute disease unrelated 
to pneumoconiosis or from trauma where complicated 
pneumoconiosis was not found.
The presumption under 411(c) (2), which provided 
benefits where death was due to "respirable" disease rather 
than pneumoconiosis, was justified by its proponents on 
several grounds. First, many U.S. doctors had never 
recognized CWP as a disease until recently. Widows would 
have been hard pressed to win claims without such a 
presumption since death certificates or medical reports 
would have otherwise undermined their chances for benefits.
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Also, since hard medical evidence would be difficult to ob 
tain where deaths had occurred in earlier years, the standard 
of proof was eased. Since the presumption was rebuttable 
where medical evidence did exist and where the worker died 
in the absence of complicated CWP, SSA could have sought 
to rebut the presumption when another respirable disease 
was the cause of death. Apparently, this was infrequently or 
never done.
Despite what appeared to be a magnanimous approach to 
claimants, SSA received immense criticism for its ad 
ministration of the act from the law's strongest supporters. 
By December 31, 1971, more claims had been denied than 
were allowed (163,000 denials compared to 159,000 
allowed). 33 Miners, their representatives, and others could 
point to denials in cases where former miners with lung im 
pairments were barely ambulatory, side by side with allowed 
claims where men still worked in mines. (The latter were 
workers whose X-rays showed the presence of complicated 
CWP, and who gained entitlement through the irrebuttable 
presumption found in sec. 411(b) (3).) The hearings that 
preceded the 1972 amendments were filled with criticism of 
SSA officials. Considerable anger was expressed at the 
negative presumption applied by SSA, which found miners 
ineligible for benefits where there was no X-ray evidence of 
pneumoconiosis.
A reading of the hearings and the floor debates that 
preceded the 1972 amendments provides a classic illustration 
of the adversaries' inability to communicate with each other. 
Black lung supporters insisted that SSA had denied large 
numbers of worthy claimants with serious lung diseases 
because of the agency's insistence that X-rays show signs of 
the disease. They assembled some evidence from the medical 
community, depending heavily on Dr. Donald L. 
Rasmussen, that concluded that black lung could exist in the
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absence of positive X-ray evidence. Led by Rep. John Erlen- 
born, opponents argued that coal workers' pnewnoconiosis 
was detectable by X-ray and that no better, single method ex 
isted to diagnose the disease. Responding to the charge by 
supporters of a more generous program that CWP or 
fibrosis had been found on autopsy of the lungs of miners 
who had been denied benefits, opponents argued that early 
stages of simple CWP could have been present, but that this 
would hardly have caused impairment or death.
One interpretation of the debate is that serious technical 
and definitional issues were present and that many members 
of Congress could not understand them. Even if that view is 
correct for most of the members, the issues were clearly not 
beyond the grasp of Congressmen Perkins and Erlenborn. 
Their substantial quarrel was a repeat of the bitter dif 
ferences that emerged over the original Conference Commit 
tee's revision that changed "complicated coal workers' 
pneumoconiosis" to "pneumoconiosis" and to "black 
lung." Lurking behind this fundamental difference was the 
extent to which this program conferred very broad or narrow 
eligibility to entitlements to older miners and their survivors.
The heated nature of the debate did not reflect the relative 
strength of the adversaries. A key vote in the House on a 
measure proposed by Erlenborn to stop the bill, failed on a 
voice vote, and the House bill was passed 311-79, with 40 
members not voting. The Senate version of the bill was pass 
ed unanimously.
For purposes of widening the scope of eligibility for 
benefits in the 1972 amendments, two key measures were 
taken. First, sec. 413 was amended to add the following:
... no claim for benefits under this part shall be 
denied solely on the basis of the results of a chest 
roentgenogram. In determining the validity of 
claims under this part (part B), all relevant evidence
Medical Issues 83
shall be considered, including where relevant, 
medical tests such as blood gas studies, X-ray ex 
amination, electrocardiogram, pulmonary function 
studies, or physical performance tests, and any 
medical history, evidence submitted by the claim 
ant's physician or his wife's affidavits and in case 
of a deceased miner, other appropriate affidavits of 
persons with knowledge of the miner's physical 
condition, and other supportive material.
Thus, Congress made its will clear to SSA. The diagnostic 
standards for determining the presence of black lung were to 
be loosened, most directly by eliminating the screening 
device of the X-ray. By adding a list of other medical 
evidence to be considered, and in the context of the evident 
dissatisfaction with the large numbers of rejections of 
claims, Congress told SSA to find ways to justify compen 
sating claimants. Just so that was clear to SSA, the Senate's 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare explained its in 
tent: "It is not the Committee's intention that all of these 
types of evidence be secured in every claim but that such 
evidence be sought in those claims as is necessary to assure a 
decision on the claim consistent with the remedial nature of 
the legislation (italics added by the author). 36
The other method used by Congress to widen the eligibility 
boundaries of the program was less obvious than the section 
413 amendment but no less subtle. When Senator 
Randolph's report of the committee's bill emerged, it con 
tained the following:
The backlog of claims which have been filed under 
these provisions cannot await the establishment of 
new facilities or the development of new medical 
procedures. They must be handled under present 
circumstances in the light of limited medical 
resources and techniques.
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Accordingly the Committee expects the Secretary 
to adopt such interim evidentiary rules and disabili 
ty evaluation criteria as will permit prompt and 
vigorous processing of the large backlog of claims 
consistent with the language and intent of these 
amendments. Such interim rules and criteria shall 
give full consideration to the combined employ 
ment handicap of disease and age. . . , 37
It is striking that no comparable statement appears in the 
report of the Committee on Education and Labor in the 
House of Representatives, 38 nor was there any such reference 
in the legislation itself. Yet the committee's sentiments were 
well understood, particularly in the context of the amend 
ments and the one-sided votes that supported them. Mark 
Solomons argues that the statement in the Senate report was 
conceived by HEW officials and Senate staff "as a conve 
nient mechanism to permit the adoption of temporary rules 
to expedite the approval of a much large number of 
claims." 39
The arrangement was created and rationalized on the 
grounds that adequate medical facilities were not in place to 
properly diagnose and evaluate the many black lung 
claimants, including those whose claims had been denied 
previously by SSA and would now be reopened due to the 
1972 amendments. To expedite the process of cutting into 
the backlog, "interim criteria" were to be created by SSA 
and applied to Part B claimants. "Permanent criteria" 
which were essentially those used by SSA since 1970 would 
be used by the Department of Labor to administer the Part C 
program when it eventually took over the administration of 
new claims on July 1, 1973. By that time, it was presumed 
that better exercise or physical performance testing facilities 
would be widely available in coal mining areas. More impor 
tant, the mine operators would have to take financial respon 
sibility for the Part C program.
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The interim criteria (also called the interim presumptions) 
were proposed by SSA on September 2, 1972 in a Notice of 
Rule Making published in the Federal Register, with in 
terested parties given only until September 20, 1972 to sub 
mit comments. On September 30, 1972, the regulations for 
the interim and permanent criteria were published in final 
form in the Federal Register.*0
SSA paraphrased the language of the Senate Committee's 
report in explaining why it developed the interim criteria. 41 
However, SSA described itself as fulfilling "congressional 
intent" when indeed it was actually responding to a state 
ment in a committee report, without explicit legislative sup 
port. 42
The interim presumptions greatly eased the burden of 
claimants by substantially lowering the criteria for eligibility. 
First, they created a rebuttable presumption of total disabili 
ty due to pneumoconiosis where X-ray evidence showed the 
presence of simple pneumoconiosis or where ventilatory 
function studies demonstrated the presence of chronic 
disabling pulmonary or respiratory disease and the claimant 
had worked 10 years or more in coal mine employment. The 
interim criteria allowed benefits either solely on the basis of 
an X-ray or ventilatory tests. SSA acknowledged that the 
crucial ventilatory criteria were more liberal than those in the 
permanent criteria. The reason given for this was that these 
more liberal criteria would compensate somewhat for the in 
ability of SSA to identify workers with impaired diffusion 
capacity, that is, the ability to transfer oxygen efficiently 
from the lungs to the blood. Such tests could not be carried 
out due to a lack of testing facilities or sometimes because 
claimants were physically unable to perform the exercise part 
of a test of diffusion capacity.
The ventilatory function tests were tied to the rebuttable 
presumption that disability or death was due to
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pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment if the 
tests indicated impairment, and the miner had been 
employed 10 years or more in underground (or, with com 
parable conditions, surface) coal mining. The presumption 
could be rebutted if the miner was still employed in his usual 
coal mining work or in comparable and gainful employment. 
Conceivably, it could also be rebutted if other physical tests 
indicated that no impairment was present
The interim presumptions meant that SSA had developed 
an entirely new perception of congressional intent after the 
1972 amendments. Essentially, where virtually any evidence 
of pulmonary or respiratory impairment was found, the 
claim was paid. Second, SSA sought to act very promptly. 
Not only did the SSA interim criteria presume that simple 
CWP was compensable, it also resulted in compensation for 
other pulmonary or respiratory diseases, such as emphysema 
and bronchitis, as well. What were critical were the values 
considered as normal or below normal for the ventilatory 
tests. By setting a high standard on the "normal" level, the 
door was opened through these test standards for many 
previously denied claimants as well as for new ones.
There are several ways to gauge the ventilatory test stan 
dards that were set for claimants or survivors. First, a com 
parison between the permanent criteria and the interim 
criteria can readily be made since both appeared in the same 
issue of the Federal Register. It is clear that the values in the 
interim presumptions are set much higher than in the perma 
nent standards. The higher the threshold is set, the larger the 
number of applicants that fall below it, enlarging the set of 
compensable applicants.
Second, at the time of the hearings on the 1977 amend 
ments, numerous physicians commented on the interim 
presumptions. The consensus of their testimony was that, 
because the threshold was set so high, the standards were far
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too low. In addition, the standards were technically flawed 
by not being age-adjusted. Since ventilatory capacity typical 
ly declines with age, a "normal" value for a 65-year-old will 
be lower than for a 45-year-old. By not adjusting for age, the 
interim presumptions provided a boost for those claimants 
who were older, which is to say, the large bulk of the claim 
ant population.
Aside from the age adjustment issue, a "normal'* figure 
does not necessarily imply that everyone falling below that 
level is sick. With normal variation in the populations, per 
sons without impairment often have capacities below the 
average, their age aside, so that impairment is not 
demonstrated simply because one's ventilatory tests place 
them below the "normal" figure. If the test takes age into 
account and perhaps certain other measurable factors, and 
the person's ventilatory capacity is perhaps 60 percent of the 
normal figure or less, one can then presume the presence of a 
significant impairment. This was what the medical com 
munity told the Perkins committee in 1977. 43
Dr. Harold I. Passes, former acting Chief Medical Officer 
of the Bureau of Hearing and Appeals for SSA testified on 
the development of the interim standards during hearings on 
the 1977 amendments. 44 According to him, the interim stan 
dards were never given official medical approval by the 
Chief Medical Officer of the Bureau of Disability Insurance 
for SSA. Instead, "The criteria were designed for expediency 
by the then Bureau director, Mr. Popick, a nonphysician, 
and drafted by Mr. O'Brien, the chief legal counsel at the 
time." 45 Thereafter, lay personnel used the criteria 99.9 per 
cent of the time without seeking medical advice. The interim 
criteria were
. . . extremely liberal and were not based on 
substantial medical evidence that the criteria 
chosen were in fact, equal to a disabling impair-
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ment. They did include many values, including 
pulmonary function standards, which were entirely 
normal and which would be read by at least 95 per 
cent of all physicians who were knowledgeable of 
the values presented as normal values. 46
Bernard Popick, who ran the Part B program in SSA, had 
been the focus for much of the criticism about the standards 
used by SSA until the 1972 amendments went into effect. 
The use of the interim criteria allowed him to respond to the 
heat directed at him and his office by black lung supporters, 
particularly in the Congress. The weight of the medical 
testimony regarding these criteria was that they were so 
liberal as to provide benefits to many claimants who suffered 
little or no impairment. As Solomons concludes, "The in 
terim presumption began life a sort of dark secret, contrived 
by federal agency personnel who probably saw their careers 
flash before their eyes as a few powerful members of Con 
gress grew more and more strident in their demands that 
more claims be paid.'* 47
The interim criteria applied by SSA beginning in 1973 
created a special problem for the Department of Labor. 
When their time came to administer claims under Part C, 
they were required to use the "permanent criteria" which 
were more demanding than the interim criteria. This created 
the almost laughable situation of two federal agencies ad 
ministering essentially the same program, using substantially 
different standards to determine compensability. The cir 
cumstance was hardly considered laughable at the Labor 
Department, however, where the denial rate on claims was 
much higher than at the Social Security Administration. The 
criticism that had been heaped on SSA by black lung sup 
porters before the enactment of the 1972 amendments soon 
was redirected at the Labor Department with its more restric 
tive standards. The Department's frustration was easy to
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understand. Since the statute appeared to give standard- 
setting power only to the Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare, the Labor Department felt trapped by the perma 
nent standards it was required to employ. (In particular, this 
was dictated by sections 402(f) and 411.) In its first 18 
months of administering the program, the Labor Depart 
ment's approval rate was below 20 percent while SSA's ap 
proval rate had risen to over 60 percent, using their interim 
criteria.
Some evidence of the Labor Department's desperation can 
be inferred from their report on the program submitted in 
1976 to Congress. 48 Apparently to explain the large number 
(and proportion) of claims denials, the Department reported 
on a sampling of 1,388 denials where ventilatory test results 
were available. 49 Of these, only 78 (6 percent) met the Labor 
Department's standard for benefit eligibility (and therefore 
had been denied on some other grounds), while 318 (23 per 
cent) met the interim standards but not those of the Labor 
Department. This demonstrates tangibly the consequence of 
the use of the interim presumptions by SSA and the reason 
for the far lower acceptance rate by the Labor Department.
In 1975, SSA apparently agreed, at the Labor Depart 
ment's urging, to extend the interim presumptions to the 
Part C program, but the effort was quietly killed by the Of 
fice of Management and Budget, according to Solomons. 50 
Until then, the Labor Department's wish to use these more 
liberal standards was not based on any medical or scientific 
study. Instead, it was simply a desire to have the two agen 
cies use the same standards, to take the heat off the Labor 
Department.
In March 1976, the House passed HR 10760, in which it 
provided that no claims were to be evaluated on the basis of 
criteria that were more strict than those applied by SSA in 
the interim presumptions. This bill would have permitted the
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Department of Labor to use even more liberal criteria than 
the interim presumptions, but the issue became moot as the 
Senate was unable to complete work on the bill before the 
legislative session ended.
By the time the 95th Congress began work on a black lung 
reform bill, a Democratic administration was in place at the 
Labor Department, and a new perception of the interim 
presumptions surfaced there. According to Solomons,
What happened, in fact, was that the Social Securi 
ty Administration finally made it clear to Depart 
ment of Labor officials that the interim presump 
tion was scientifically invalid and that it was used 
by them, not as a screening device to separate ap 
propriate claims from potential denials, but as an 
irrebuttable presumption which would permit the 
approval of large numbers of marginal claims with 
a minimum of effort and without full 
adjudication. 31
The result of this remarkable shift by the Labor Depart 
ment placed the new administration at odds on this critical 
issue with the powerful congressional advocates of liberaliz 
ed standards. The Department adopted the position that 
medical knowledge should be employed to develop 
justifiable medical criteria. Indeed, the Senate's version of 
the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 (BLBRA-1977) 
empowered the Secretary of Labor in consultation with the 
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health to 
issue medical criteria. The House version, on the other hand, 
required the Labor Department to apply the interim 
presumptions to all its claims, including those previously 
denied.
A compromise of sorts was accepted by the Conference 
Committee whereby standards no more restrictive than the
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interim presumptions were to be applied, but only until the 
Labor Department adopted new permanent medical 
criteria. 32 At that point, evaluation of all subsequent claims 
would be based on the new standards. Very shortly after the 
amendments became effective, the Department proposed 
"interim** regulations of its own to interest groups and con 
gressional staffers. Solomons reports that parts of the draft 
version were "severely criticized" and that the Department 
was compelled to back off most of the ones that appeared to 
tighten regulations. 53 The Department clearly complied with 
the legislative mandate that required these interim regula 
tions to be no stricter than the interim presumptions used by 
SSA. Ultimately, the interim regulations proposed on April 
25, 1978 were consistent with the Department's need to close 
out the enormous backlog of cases that had accumulated, 
along with the reevaluation of previously denied claims re 
quired under BLBRA-1977.
A final version of the permanent regulations was issued in 
February 1980, to be effective one month hence. The perma 
nent standards were more rigorous than the interim stan 
dards had been. Thus, from the effective date of the amend 
ments, March 1, 1978, the Labor Department had two years 
in which to administer the law using the SSA interim stan 
dards—and in so doing, to reduce the mountainous load of 
backed-up claims.
One way of assessing the significance of the Labor Depart 
ment's use of the interim standards is available. The General 
Accounting Office studied 450 claim files taken as a random 
sample in 1980. 54 Almost all of these claims had been 
evaluated on the basis of the interim standards. GAO found 
that 205 claims had been approved from this sample, but 
that only 111 of these claims would have been accepted had 
the permanent standards been used instead. If the interim 
criteria had not been available, fully 45 percent of the ac-
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cepted claims would have been denied. While this heftier 
denial rate would likely have reduced the volume of new 
claims, it would also have left the department with an enor 
mous backlog of appeals and unresolved claims, to say 
nothing of the wrath of the black lung supporters in the Con 
gress.
Disability
To this point, the focus of this chapter has been on the 
nature of the disease compensated under the black lung pro 
gram and the methods used to determine whether the disease 
is present. Closely related issues created a variety of other 
serious problems for program administrators and for all par 
ties involved with the system. These issues related to the re 
quirement that living claimants be totally disabled as a con 
dition of benefit eligibility. The concept of total disability is 
not as straightforward as Congress may have supposed it to 
be in 1969. To see why, some reference to other programs is 
necessary.
To help clarify what is meant by the term "disability," it is 
useful to distinguish it from the term "impairment." Impair 
ment is strictly a medical or physiological (or psychological) 
concept, referring to the outcome of an injury, disease or 
possibly a genetic disorder. The extent of the impairment is a 
measure of the loss or disorder in purely medical or scientific 
terms. An impairment may be life threatening or relatively 
trivial in terms of limiting an individual's physical or 
psychological abilities.
Disability, by contrast, refers to the social and/or 
economic loss resulting from an impairment. Thus, in most 
compensation and liability systems, the major component of 
disability is the loss of income due to a partial or total loss of 
work-related income. If a compensation system is based 
totally on impairment, two persons suffering precisely the
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same anatomical loss would receive equal benefits. The loss 
of a single finger would be valued the same for a concert 
pianist as it would be for a real estate salesperson. By con 
trast, a pure disability system would provide equal benefits 
to workers with precisely the same economic losses, even if 
their impairments are vastly different. The loss of a finger 
for a professional pianist could conceivably be considered 
totally disabling, and comparable to the loss of both legs or 
both eyes for a laborer. Indeed, compensation might be 
greater for the pianist if that person's income loss was 
greater than that of the laborer.
Workers' compensation systems were originally conceived 
of as disability- and not impairment-based. 55 As such, the 
movement by a number of states in recent years toward a 
purer "wage loss approach" should perhaps be considered 
less a revolution than a return to the basics. In any case, 
there are numerous elements in workers' compensation 
systems within the U.S. and abroad that compromise the 
strict "disability principle," with added elements of an "im 
pairment approach."
Just as workers' compensation systems are impure 
disability schemes, so too is the Social Security Disability In 
surance (SSDI) program. In broad terms, the disability 
elements of SSDI are found in at least three features of the 
scheme. First, benefits are paid only where there has been a 
loss of earnings. Second, benefit levels are related to the ap 
plicant's previous level of earnings. Third, SSDI benefits are 
terminated when the recipient achieves retirement age (and 
retirement benefits are paid thereafter). The source of the 
disability, however, must be a "severe" impairment. Thus, 
SSDI deviates from a strict disability approach, since 
benefits would not be provided where a "non-severe" im 
pairment results in a serious disability (loss of earnings).
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This very cursory review of these concepts should clarify 
at least one other difference between impairment and 
disability. Medical and health specialists are better equipped 
than anyone to evaluate the extent of impairment. Disability, 
however, is best judged by nonmedical people, such as voca 
tional and labor market experts, economists, or others train 
ed to assess the degree of economic loss. Since many com 
pensation jurisdictions leave the assessment of "disability** 
to physicians, it is little wonder that confusion has arisen 
over the basis for compensation benefits, much less over the 
terminology.
A critical distinction in compensation systems exists be 
tween those that provide benefits for partial disability, and 
those that do not. Partial disability benefit programs are 
complicated and difficult to administer. All of the states ad 
minister such programs under their workers' compensation 
laws, as does the federal government under the Federal 
Employees' Compensation Act. One of the inherent 
challenges of a partial disability system turns out to be a 
source of a certain strength. Where compensation or benefits 
are available only for total disability, there is little or no 
room for compromise or for legitimate uncertainty. For ex 
ample, under the SSDI system with its all or nothing ap 
proach, decisions that are "wrong" are totally wrong. In a 
total disability-only program, benefits are paid to a person 
with 100 percent disability, but not to a person judged to be 
only 95 percent disabled (or some other appropriate 
threshold point). By contrast, compensation for partial 
disability allows the administering agency some room for 
movement, whether this be done to achieve compromise or 
to deal with uncertainties. "Errors" in judgment by the 
agency need not be of an "all or nothing" character.
All of this serves as background to the black lung pro 
gram, which, in theory at least, compensated living ap 
plicants solely for totally disabling pneumoconiosis. Had the
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program been designed instead to compensate for partial 
disability, many of the program's difficulties would have 
been eliminated, though other problems undoubtedly would 
have surfaced. The question arises why Congress did not 
design a partial disability program. The record provides little 
to answer this question. One of the major supporters of the 
legislation in 1969,1972 and 1977 was Congressman John H. 
Dent (D-Pennsylvania) who explained:
The reason we rejected the partial basis was 
because we knew that they (Great Britain) paid it 
on a partial basis because they did not want to pay 
it on a final basis. They pay you so much—a couple 
of dollars more a week if you are in the first stage, 
and a couple of dollars more a week if you are in 
the second stage. In other words, they want to keep 
you in the mines so they decided to pay partial 
benefits. It is wrong and that is why it is wrong in 
Pennsylvania and it would be wrong here to do so.'56
Dent's argument can be attacked on several grounds, the 
most obvious of which is that a partially disabled miner 
would more likely be able to leave the mines if he received a 
partial benefit than if he received none at all. Moreover, the 
level of total disability benefits under black lung was low 
enough to keep mine work relatively attractive, even to 
seriously impaired miners. 37
It seems likely that Congress did not want to tackle the dif 
ficult chore of creating a partial disability program for a pro 
gram that was to revert over (or back) to the states in a few 
years. Also, the language in the original Senate and House 
bills that went to the Conference Committee in 1969 dealt 
with complicated pneumoconiosis. Since a widely held view 
was that this condition was usually totally disabling, there 
was no need to provide for a partial disability system.
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The distinction between impairment and disability 
highlights one of the special difficulties encountered in the 
program. Total disability implies a complete loss of earnings 
or earnings capacity due to injury or disease. Consequently, 
persons who have not worked because of advanced age, and 
who suffer no earnings loss when disease develops, can hard 
ly be considered totally disabled, though they may suffer 
significant impairment.
The entire issue of work, retirement and disability takes on 
a special character when applied to coal mining. As noted in 
chapter 1, the huge loss of jobs in that sector in the 1950s and 
1960s created many retirements that were essentially 
premature and involuntary. The location of the mining 
regions, especially those in the East where employment 
declines were greatest, were in regions that provided few 
alternative sources of employment. Generally, displaced 
miners found few opportunities, either in the mining areas or 
elsewhere. For these miners, loss of earnings was linked 
more to the economics of coal than to the result of an im 
pairment. Additionally, miners with obvious impairments 
were handicapped in competing for any vacant positions that 
might open in the mines. To what extent was the loss of in 
come suffered by these miners a result of economic cir 
cumstances and to what extent was it a result of the impaired 
condition?
The original law of 1969 dealt with the issue simplistically. 
Section 402(f) stated: "The term 'total disability* has the 
meaning given it by regulations of the Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare, but such regulations shall not pro 
vide more restrictive criteria than those applicable under sec 
tion 223(d) of the Social Security Act." That section referred 
to the SSDI program, with which SSA had considerable ex 
perience.
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The interpretation of the Conference Committee's think 
ing differed in each chamber. The analysis in the Senate 
stated, "The parameters of the term * total disability* will be 
established from time-to-time by the Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare, but he must not establish more 
restrictive criteria for determining disability than the criteria 
applicable under section 223(d) of the Social Security Act, as 
amended, for purposes of disability under that Act. It is ex 
pected that initially this criteria [sic] will be followed. As 
time goes on, the Secretary may develop more liberal criteria 
consistent with the purpose of this title." 58
In the House of Representatives, the analysis made no 
mention of eventual liberalization of the criteria. It did state, 
however: "Such standards would, among other things, re 
quire that the administrators of this program apply the best 
medical means available for ascertaining the disease in the 
miner." 59 It seems clear from this statement that the House, 
in particular, and likely the Senate as well, confused ques 
tions of diagnosis with those of disability. A working miner, 
for example, could be diagnosed as impaired with CWP, but 
would not be considered disabled under SSDI because of his 
employment status. A 65-year-old retired miner would nor 
mally not be eligible for SSDI, because of his age. By making 
the black lung benefit one based on impairment, it created a 
new sort of entity for SSA to administer. The agency was to 
apply the impairment criteria of section 223(d), but not 
necessarily the disability tests which were based on any loss 
of earnings and being below retirement age.
At least one issue involving disability was made perfectly 
clear, although its medical basis might have been shaky. 
Where a (former) miner was diagnosed as having com 
plicated pneumoconiosis, section 411(c) (3) created an ir- 
rebuttable presumption that he was totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis. In this case, continued work in coal mining
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could not be used to deny benefits since the presumption was 
irrebuttable.
Where the miner was found to have some impairment 
from pneumoconiosis, benefits could be paid if that condi 
tion prevented the worker ". . . from doing coal mining 
work and from engaging in any other type of substantial 
gainful activity consistent with his vocational 
competence." 60 This left open the issue that SSA normally 
did not face under SSDI, that is, what to do with the 65-year- 
old applicant who was no longer employed. Essentially, what 
SSA did was to waive, effectively, any work test and base 
benefits solely on impairment criteria. For older miners short 
of retirement age, the work test was applied liberally: 
". . .the older, long-term miner with minimal education 
and skills, who is shown to be unable to do heavy work 
because of pneumoconiosis, will ordinarily be found to be 
totally disabled." 61
SSA's handling of the total disability question proved to 
be unsatisfactory and unacceptable to the supporters of the 
program and led to a change in the definition of total 
disability in the 1972 amendments. Under SSDI, a continua 
tion of work by an applicant demonstrated the absence of 
total disability. Further, if an applicant's impairment was 
judged to be no deterrent to the person's taking gainful 
employment, SSDI benefits would be denied also. In apply 
ing these familiar concepts and regulations, seemingly con 
sistent with the legislative requirement that the agency be no 
more restrictive in evaluating total disability than under 
SSDI, SSA earned the enmity of the congressional sup 
porters of the program.
The Committee believes that experience in the ad 
ministration of the black lung benefit provisions to 
date reflects the need to modify the definition of 
disability applied in the adjudication of claims
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under these provisions. The Committee makes no 
judgment on whether the test in title II of the Social 
Security Act 'inability to engage in any substantial 
gainful activity,' is an appropriate definition of ap 
plication to the total universe of workers in the na 
tion. But, it is unrealistic when applied to coal 
miners, if it results in the denial of claims of miners 
who for medical reasons can no longer be expected 
to work in the mines and for whom there is, too 
often, no other realistic employment opportunity, 
or for whom the only opportunity for employment 
may be at wages far less than they would have earn 
ed had they been able to continue to work in their 
usual jobs."
The Committee's report went on to provide a much 
broader definition of total disability and to snipe at SSA for 
disregarding the intent expressed by Congress in 1969. 
Ultimately, something short of the Committee's proposed 
redefinition was passed, but it substantially widened the 
scope from that applied by SSA until 1972. This new version 
defined total disability in a miner as "when pneumoconiosis 
prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requiring 
the skills and ability comparable to those of any employment 
in a mine or mines in which he previously engaged with some 
regularity and over a substantial period of time." 63
This revised definition carried in the 1972 amendments 
meant that working miners (even aside from those with com 
plicated pneumoconiosis and covered by the irrebuttable 
presumption) could be considered totally disabled. So long 
as the miner's work no longer was in his usual line of coal 
mining employment, his working could not be used as 
grounds for denying the claim due to a finding of no total 
disability. It is necessary to note, however, that the awarding 
of benefits did not necessarily mean that payments would be
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made to working miners. Under the Part B program, SSA 
was able to offset, partially at least, black lung benefits paid 
where miners continued to have earnings. However, no such 
offset existed in the Part C program, so that total disability 
benefits could be paid to working miners. This practice was 
eliminated by the insertion of an offset provision under Part 
C in the 1981 amendments. 64
The 1977 amendments reflect the realization by Congress 
that it had not satisfactorily solved the total disability issue 
in 1972. A number of matters arose that persuaded Congress 
that it had not gone far enough in 1972. First, some working 
miners were denied benefits for total disability due to 
pneumoconiosis because they continued to work in their 
long-term employment. Their continuing employment 
reflected the need they had for some source of income, com 
bined with the long delays in processing and adjudicating 
claims in the Labor Department. Black lung supporters 
argued that the impaired miner was "carried" by fellow 
miners who assisted the person in doing his work. To deny 
benefits for total disability simply because the worker was 
still working at his long-term employment seemed unfair to 
them, and smacked of a Catch-22. Consequently, one of the 
changes in the rather lengthy definition provided by the 1977 
amendments provided that, if a miner's employment condi 
tions were changed, indicating the miner's reduced ability to 
do his usual coal mine work, such employment could not be 
used as conclusive evidence that the miner was not totally 
disabled. This meant that a working miner could file a claim 
and receive a positive benefit determination while still 
employed in a coal mine. However, in order to receive 
benefits, the miner would have to terminate that employ 
ment within one year after the eligibility determination had 
been made. (From section 413(d).)
A second matter dealt with by the 1977 amendments was 
the treatment by program administrators of certain sur-
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vivors' claims. A number of complaints had reached con 
gressional supporters of the program, that survivors' claims 
were being denied where the miner still had been employed in 
coal mining at the time of death. Presumably, such evidence 
was interpreted by the Department of Labor to mean that the 
miner was not totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the 
time of death. Such an interpretation seriously jeopardized 
the survivors' chances of obtaining benefits.
The argument for liberalizing the treatment of such claims 
was based on two factors. First, as we have just seen, Con 
gress was prepared to accept the argument that a miner 
might be totally disabled but still employed in coal mining. If 
it insisted on this for living miner claimants, consistency 
compelled Congress to accept that some deceased miners 
who worked in the mines until they died also might have 
been totally disabled. Second, had that miner succeeded in 
obtaining black lung benefits while still alive, his survivors 
would have been entitled to benefits, regardless of the cause 
of his death (section 412(a) (2)). The result of this line of 
argument was that Congress pushed ahead in 1977 with, 
"... a deceased miner's employment in a mine at the time 
of death shall not be used as conclusive evidence that the 
miner was not totally disabled. . . .""By making this deci 
sion, Congress greatly enhanced the chances for success by 
claimants wishing to invoke either the 15-year presumption 
(section 411(c) (4)), or the 25-year presumption (section 
411(c) (5)). 66 The latter presumption, added in 1977, was the 
only place in the law, as amended, that ever made any 
reference to partial disability. It provided that for certain 
survivors' claims, benefits were to be paid if the miner, at the 
time of death, was either partially or totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis. Partial disability was not defined in the 
statute.
Under SSDI, benefits for total disability are frequently cut 
off when the recipient's condition improves, either medically
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or in terms of the labor market. SSA and the Labor Depart 
ment, accustomed to that approach, did not treat benefits to 
living miners as automatic lifetime awards. When some reci 
pients returned to work, for example, or when some incident 
occurred to suggest that the miner's impairment was not 
severe enough to cause total disability, the miner might be 
subject to reexamination.
While very few recipients actually had their benefits ter 
minated, the possibility that this could occur upset black 
lung supporters. In response to regulations proposed by the 
Labor Department that had appeared earlier in the Federal 
Register, Congressmen Perkins, Simon and Dent wrote the 
Labor Department:
We believe that the new rule in Part 718 relating to 
the reexamination of beneficiaries for the purpose 
of reaffirming a miner's continued eligibility for 
benefits represents a dangerous threat to the mental 
and physical well-being of the beneficiaries, and 
can easily be construed as an ill-conceived and 
miscast attempt by the Department of Labor to 
strip deserving individuals of their hard-won rights 
to benefits. 67
This pressure, along with the statement that "the over 
whelming majority of comments on this section suggest that 
it be stricken," 68 forced the Labor Department to back off. 
Once benefits were awarded the miner could expect them to 
continue for life.
The problem with reexamination, as with most of the 
troublesome issues, was that the agencies continued to har 
bor notions of disability, while Congress was more intent on 
paying for impairment. By making such a choice, Congress 
allowed currently employed persons, even some still 
employed in the mines, to successfully pursue claims. More
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significantly, the impairment approach opened the door for 
thousands of older, nonworking, former miners to file 
claims and receive benefits. That characteristic of the pro 
gram is clearly reflected in the available data on the ages of 
applicants and beneficiaries. For the first two full years of 
the program, 77 percent of living applicants under the Part B 
program were 60 years or older, and over 60 percent were 65 
years or older. 69 Almost 73 percent of the allowed claims 
came from persons aged 65 years and older. Indeed, 70 per 
cent of the miner beneficiaries were also collecting retirement 
benefits under Social Security.
The Labor Department's experience under Part C also 
reflects the tendency for the program to benefit older ap 
plicants. For example, by the end of 1975, more than 83 per 
cent of the successful applicants were 61 years of age or older 
at the time of filing, and 46 percent of the living beneficiaries 
were 70 years or older at the time they filed. 70 The average 
age of miner beneficiaries under Part C was 67.4 years as of 
December 1979. 71
Once the Part C program brought mine operators into the 
picture, they challenged the notion that total disability could 
exist where the claimant was still employed. Ultimately, the 
matter was dealt with by the U.S. Supreme Court, which ap 
peared to identify the core issue: "... destruction of earn 
ing capacity is not the sole legitimate basis for compulsory 
compensation of employees. We cannot say that it would be 
irrational for Congress to conclude that impairment of 
health alone warrants compensation." 72
The Supreme Court's decision addressed the issue of the 
authority of Congress to associate some degree of impair 
ment with total disability. The Court found that Congress 
had acted within its powers, though it did not speak to the 
matter of the wisdom of doing so. Evidence of 
pneumoconiosis, even of the complicated categories, does
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not by itself mean the employee is disabled. "The chest 
X-ray is not a useful means of assessing the functional status 
of the lung nor of determining disability." 73 Nevertheless, 
with many retired miners showing some evidence of impair 
ment, the intent of Congress was absolutely clear, as ex 
emplified by the 1972 amendments and by the 1977 changes 
that followed.
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Presumptions and Evidence
Workers or survivors seeking state workers' compensation 
benefits for disability or death due to occupational diseases 
typically encounter significant difficulties. 1 There is no need 
to dwell here on the results of this pattern. Suffice it to point 
to the difficulties for compensation purposes posed by 
diseases of long latency or of unknown etiology, or by 
diagnostic uncertainties, exposures to multiple hazards both 
on the job and away from it, limited information regarding 
the extent of the hazardous exposure, and so on. The special 
difficulty that the worker or survivor must contend with is 
that, with very rare exceptions, the claimant must shoulder 
the burden of proof. Providing the proof necessary to win 
benefits in state proceedings can be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible. Some workers' compensation laws seek to 
reduce or to shift some of that burden away from claimants 
in order to increase the likelihood of their winning benefits. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the manner in 
which the legislation dealt with these issues of providing 
proof and adequate evidence for black lung claimants.
Presumptions
The 1969 legislation and the amendments in 1972 and 1977 
sought to provide benefits to miners or to survivors where 
coal mine employment was responsible for death or disabili 
ty due to pneumoconiosis. Beginning in 1969, and with the
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next two sets of amendments, Congress attempted to ease the 
customary burden of proof on claimants, thereby increasing 
the probability of benefits being awarded. What all 
claimants needed to prove, minimally, was that:
• the disease arose out of coal mine employment;
• the disease was pneumoconiosis;
• the disease was totally disabling or was the cause of 
death.
In 1969, and even more so subsequently, supporters of the 
law understood at least some of the challenges to claimants 
posed by the need to prove these matters. The whole matter 
of how to diagnose the presence of pneumoconiosis was wide 
open in 1969. Compounding this, facilities to provide 
sophisticated examinations to miners were inadequate at that 
time. Moreover, with the decision by the Congress to com 
pensate old cases, how would the law cope with deaths that 
occurred in earlier years, particularly where no autopsy had 
been performed? The probative value of death certificates 
was recognized as being extremely limited. Finally, what 
would it take for the miner or his survivor to prove that the 
disease was caused by coal mining employment?
To deal with these issues and to ease, if not remove, the 
burden on the claimant to prove one or more of these dif 
ficult matters, Congress provided a number of presumptions 
in the original law. It is important to note that a presumption 
does not assure a claimant of being compensated. First, the 
presumption may involve only a single element of a claim, 
and where it is employed, the claimant must invariably prove 
other points as well in order to be compensated. (Some of 
those other matters to be proven can involve different 
presumptions.) Second, since most of the presumptions in 
this law simply shifted the burden of proof to the other par 
ty, i.e., the employer or the government, they could be rebut 
ted. As such, the claimant might lose even on a matter where 
the presumption was invoked.
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In another section, the issues of claimant eligibility are 
described. For purposes of understanding the presumptions 
in the law, it is sufficient to note that three sets of en 
titlements exist under the law. The original law provided that 
benefits were to be paid, "in respect of total disability of any 
miner due to pneumoconiosis and in respect of the death of 
any miner whose death was due to pneumoconiosis." (Sec 
tion 411 (a).) Thus, benefits were paid where there was an 
appropriately disabled living miner or where a claimant show 
ed that a miner's death was caused by the disease. In the 1972 
amendments, a third source of entitlement was added involv 
ing any deceased miner "who at the time of his death was 
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis." This addition 
meant that a widow could receive benefits even where the 
miner had not made a claim for black lung by the time of his 
death and whose death could not have been caused by the 
disease, e.g., he died in an auto accident. 2 Moreover, this 
new entitlement meant that where a living miner had suc 
cessfully pursued a black lung claim, his dependent survivors 
were assured of benefits upon his death, regardless of the 
cause of death.
Until the 1981 changes in law, there were seven presump 
tions that had been employed to aid the claimant in receiving 
benefits. Three of these are found in the 1969 law (sections 
411(c)(l), (2) and (3)); a fourth was added in 1972 
(411(c) (4)) and a fifth was added with the 1977 amendments 
(41 l(c) (5)). A sixth presumption was added by the Secretary 
of Labor's administrative regulations of 1978. Finally, Con 
gress imposed a set of "interim presumptions" to be used in 
the 1977 amendments. Each is examined below. They are 
significant in several respects, the most important perhaps 
being that they reflect the attitude of the Congress towards 
the matter of compensating miners and their dependents.
Sections 411(c) (1) and (2) of the original law are broadly 
similar, though they have two significant differences. In
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41 l(c) (1), the law establishes that "if a miner who is suffer 
ing or suffered from pneumoconiosis was employed for ten 
years or more in one or more coal mines there shall be a 
rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of 
such employment."
Note that in order to invoke the presumption, the miner 
must have had ten or more years of coal mine employment. 
(With the 1972 amendments these years could have been 
spent in surface as well as underground mining.) This 
presumption, by itself, still left the claimant with the burden 
of proving that he did have pneumoconiosis. As long as the 
ten-year period of coal mine employment was shown, the 
presumption was invoked, essentially making the miner's 
other employment history irrelevant as a defense against the 
claim. Successful rebuttal of the presumption is difficult and 
rare in practice.
The Labor Department specifically identifies four lines of 
argument that are not sufficient to rebut the 411(c) (1) 
presumption: 3
1. The presence of other lung conditions.
2. The presence of respiratory-pulmonary impairment 
prior to coal mine employment.
3. Additional dust exposure in other employment, either 
prior to or subsequent to the miner's coal mine 
employment.
4. Evidence that the mines where the miner worked were 
relatively dust-free.
Section 411(c) (2) provides that "if a deceased miner was 
employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines 
and died from a respirable disease there shall be a rebuttable 
presumption that his death was due to pnneumoconiosis." 
This section differs from 411(c) (1) in several respects. First, 
it is meant to be invoked only in death claims. Second, its
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focus is on the cause of death and not on whether it arose out 
of coal mine employment. To invoke the presumption, the 
claimant must show only that the miner's death was due to a 
respirable disease, e.g., emphysema, etc. Having shown that, 
the presumption is that the disease was pneumoconiosis.
If the claimant can use this presumption, and it is not suc 
cessfully rebutted, the claimant must also prove that the 
presumed pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mining employ 
ment. This is particularly simple since the ten or more years 
of coal mine employment that permit the use of 411(c) (2) 
can then be used to invoke 411(c) (1), allowing the claimant 
to presume also that the disease arose out of this employ 
ment.
It is difficult to rebut the section 411(c) (2) presumption. 
To do so requires that the government or the employer prove 
either of two rather difficult things. The rebuttal can be that 
the disease does not suggest a reasonable possibility that 
death was due to pneumoconiosis. The other available rebut 
tal is to prove that the respirable disease made a minimal or 
insignificant contribution to the miner's death. Where death 
is due to multiple causes including a respirable disease, and it 
is not medically feasible to distinguish which disease caused 
the death, death shall be found due to respiratory disease. At 
one point the Labor Department tentatively proposed ex 
cluding lung cancer and diseases of bacteriological or viral 
origin from diseases covered by the section 411(c) (2) 
presumption. 4 The proposal was not contained in the final 
regulations "since it is possible that a relationship between 
these diseases and exposure to coal mine dust and death may 
be established by medical evidence in a particular case." 3
The Labor Department has interpreted section 411(c) (2) 
to apply to chronic respiratory diseases only. It was found 
that lung cancer is not chronic and, hence, the presumption 
has not been invoked where no other disease is present.
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However, where the worker is found to have had 
pneumoconiosis or another chronic respiratory illness in ad 
dition to the lung cancer, the claimant may be able to employ 
this presumption. It seems clear that the Labor Department 
has had consistent difficulties in dealing with lung cancer 
cases in disabled or deceased miners.
For the claimant with less than ten years of coal mine 
employment, neither 411(c) (1) nor 411(c)(2) serve as 
negative presumptions, i.e., it is not to be presumed that the 
pneumoconiosis did not arise out of coal mine employment, 
nor that the respirable disease that killed the worker was not 
pneumoconiosis. The inability to invoke these (and the 
other) presumptions simply means that the claimant 
shoulders the burden of proof.
The third of the presumptions enacted in 1969 is unlike 
any of the other presumptions described here. Section 
411(c) (3) states that where the miner suffers or suffered 
from complicated pneumoconiosis, there is an irrebuttable 
presumption that the miner is totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis, that his death was due to pneumoconiosis, 
or that at the time of death he was totally disabled by 
pneumoconiosis (added in 1972). The claimant still has the 
burden of proof that the disease arose out of the coal mine 
employment. However, where the miner was in coal mine 
employment for ten or more years, the section 411(c) (1) 
presumption can be invoked to meet this test.
The presence of complicated pneumoconiosis must be 
established as a fact by the administrative law judge. 6 Sec 
tion 411(c) (3) provides some very limited guidance in defin 
ing three methods of establishing its presence, including the 
size of the opacities found in the miner's chest X-rays. Even 
where the miner remained employed in his usual coal mining 
job for four years after his X-ray revealed the existence of 
complicated pneumoconiosis, he was found totally disabled
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due to pneumoconiosis for this entire period because of sec 
tion 411(c) (3). 7 The Supreme Court has upheld the use of 
this irrebuttable presumption in Usery v. Turner-Elkhorn 
Mining Co. 8
The prevailing attitude in the Congress between 1970 and 
1972 was one of considerable unhappiness among the pro 
gram's advocates regarding the difficulty that miners and 
their survivors were encountering in obtaining benefits. 
Evidence accumulated by SSA as well as grass roots rum 
blings persuaded the law's principal supporters from the 
mining states that entitlements were too difficult to achieve 
under the existing administration of the act. As a result, the 
1972 amendments created a new presumption, 411(c) (4), to 
make benefits available to more applicants.
The newer presumption is more complicated than those 
created in the original law. It states that where (1) a miner 
was employed for 15 years or more in undergound coal 
mines, and (2) where a chest roentgenogram submitted in 
connection with the claim is interpreted as negative, and 
(3) where other evidence demonstrates the existence of total 
ly disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, there 
shall be a presumption (rebuttable) that the miner is totally 
disabled to pneumoconiosis or that his death was due to 
pneumoconiosis. Where the claim involves a living miner, a 
wife's affidavit may not be used by itself to establish the 
presumption, according to the statute. The presumption, the 
subsection continues, may be used by miners employed in 
other than underground mines where the Labor Department 
finds that the employment conditions "were substantially 
similar to conditions in an underground mine." Unlike the 
earlier presumptions that appear in the law (411(c) (1) (2) 
and (3)), the 1972 addition specifies how the presumptions 
may be rebutted. To do so requires establishing that the 
miner does not or did not have pneumoconiosis or proving
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that the respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise 
out of or in connection with coal mine employment. The 
presumption was to be available only in old cases, where all 
15 years or more of employment ended by July 1, 1971, and 
with certain limits on filing imposed by a statute of limita 
tion. These time rules were dropped in the 1977 amendments 
and are therefore not considered here. July 1, 1971 was the 
date that certain, more restrictive dust standards went into 
effect under the coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.
The newer presumption must be understood as being a 
significant extension of the intent of 411(c) (2), which ap 
plied only in death claims. It created an entitlement in living 
(former) miner claims for "presumptive pneumoconiosis." 
In death cases it went well beyond 411(c) (2) in widening 
eligibility since the earlier presumption required death due to 
a respiratory or pulmonary disease. Under 411(c) (4), the 
deceased miner with 15 years or more of coal mine employ 
ment could have died of any cause at all. For example, even 
if a miner died in an automobile accident, the presumption 
could be invoked to show that the miner was totally disabled 
from pneumoconiosis at the time of death, thereby creating 
an entitlement for his survivors.
For living claimants, this presumption cannot be used un 
til it has been shown that the miner had a totally disabling, 
chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease. To do this, the liv 
ing miner claimant must present some medical evidence of 
the existence of the disease, not solely lay testimony. 9 This 
requirement could be satisfied by the medical conclusion of 
at least one examining physician. In contrast to the living 
miner claim, lay evidence alone can establish that the miner 
was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the time of 
death. Evidence such as a surviving spouse's affidavit is suf 
ficient to trigger the presumption, where no other evidence 
exists or is brought forward to shed light on the claim. That
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the Congress intended this to be the case was clear. It was ac 
complished by explicitly providing that such an affidavit 
could not be used by itself to establish the presumption in liv 
ing miner claims. The implications of this provision were 
that such an affidavit could be used in conjunction with 
other supportive evidence in living miner claims, and that it 
could be sufficient by itself where the miner was deceased. 
The rather minimal need for evidence to invoke 41 l(c) (4) in 
deceased miner claims became extremely controversial. Pro 
ponents argued, however, that survivors ought not to be 
denied benefits where the worker did have pneumoconiosis, 
but died at a time when there was little or no concern about 
establishing proper medical evidence.
The claimant must show, in order to use the presumption, 
that the miner is totally disabled, was totally disabled at the 
time of death, or died due to pneumoconiosis. Evidence that 
the miner died of a myocardial infarction and that he worked 
full-time without being "carried" by his co-workers until the 
mine closed prior to his death, would cause the Benefits 
Review Board to deny the survivor/claimant the use of the 
411(c) (4) presumption. 10 The Board would find the miner 
not to have been totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, nor 
to have died because of it.
As with 411(c) (2), there has been an inconsistent pattern 
of decisions involving lung cancer under 411(c) (4). In a re 
cent decision, a survivor was permitted to invoke 411(c) (4) 
since lung cancer was a "totally disabling respiratory or 
pulmonary impairment.'* 11
The two lines of argument that can be used to rebut 
411(c) (4) are that the claimant does not or did not have 
pneumoconiosis, or that the impairment did not arise out of 
coal mine employment. Negative X-rays alone cannot be us 
ed as evidence of the absence of disease. Pulmonary function 
tests that do not meet the standards for total disability are
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not adequate to rebut the presumption. Negative X-rays and 
pulmonary function tests may be used to form a reasoned 
medical opinion that the disease is not present and, 
therefore, rebut the presumption. 12 An autopsy may also 
provide evidence of the absence of pneumoconiosis and per 
mit the presumption to be rebutted. This leads to a con 
siderable burden on the government or the employer to 
prove that there is no pneumoconiosis present.
Proving that the impairment did not arise out of coal mine 
employment can be difficult also. Even where a miner ex 
perienced a 30-year interval between his last coal mine 
employment and his initial effort to seek medical treatment 
for a lung condition, the employer was unable to rebut the 
presumption. 13 A number of cases exist where the employer 
failed to rebut on grounds that the impairment did not arise 
out of coal mine employment since there was no reasonable 
degree of medical certainty that the miner's emphysema was 
due to his cigarette smoking. 14
The law allows surface miners to invoke 411(c) (4) where 
there is environmental comparability with an underground 
mine. The burden of proving comparable working condi 
tions, which rests with the claimant, is discussed later in this 
section. However, an aboveground miner working at an 
underground mine is considered for these purposes to be an 
underground miner. Such a miner can use the presumption 
without having to show any appropriate dust exposure.
Following the 1972 amendments, black lung supporters in 
the Congress sought to extend entitlements even beyond the 
existing presumptions. They had recognized the enormous 
leverage that presumptions provided to claimants. Yet, they 
remained dissatisfied with the rate of claims approvals, so 
that they considered other presumptions to include in the 
law. Particularly attractive in this regard were presumptions 
that were made irrebuttable or, even more attractive,
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benefits based solely on the number of years employed in the 
mines. Numerous efforts were made to push through such 
broadened entitlements. In doing so, supporters of a more 
liberalized approach often gave up even the sheerest pretense 
that this was a disability or compensation scheme and, in 
stead, in some instances manifested their preference for a 
straight pension scheme. A few examples of these are noted:
1. HR 8 was introduced by Congressman Dent and signed 
by Congressmen Perkins, Flood, et al. on January 14, 
1975. Among other things, it provided that if a miner 
was employed for 25 years or more in underground 
mines, there was a rebuttable presumption that he was 
totally disabled, or at the time of his death was totally 
disabled, or his death was due to pneumoconiosis. Fur 
ther, with 35 years or more in underground coal 
employment, there would be an irrebuttable presump 
tion of total disability or death due to pneumoconiosis.
2. In February 1975, 17 congressmen introduced HR 
2913, which would have created an irrebuttable 
presumption that a miner is totally disabled or has died 
due to pneumoconiosis after 15 years employment in 
underground coal mining. It would be applicable to 
surface miners who had worked in conditions substan 
tially similar to underground miners.
3. HR 10760 was introduced much later in the first ses 
sion of the same 94th Congress, November 14, 1975. 
Sponsored by Congressmen Dent, Flood, Perkins, 
Burton, et al., it provided that benefits be paid to 
miners or survivors after 30 years of underground 
employment; if the work was in anthracite mines, the 
period was shortened to 25 years. The familiar passage 
about substantially similar conditions would have 
brought many surface miners in under these proposed 
entitlements. The reasons for the position were spelled
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out in the House Report that accompanied the bill 
from Perkin's Committee:
On June 23, 1973, pursuant to growing complaints 
regarding eligibility determination inequities, the 
Subcommittee conducted an oversight hearing in 
Eastern Kentucky, a major coal-producing area, 
and received testimony from more than 100 miners 
and widows who generally alleged wrongful denials 
of the benefit claims. Virtually all who appeared 
testified with regard to claims involving coal min 
ing work exposures well in excess of 30 years. It was 
immediately apparent to the Subcommittee that the 
greatest number of the miner witnesses were severe 
ly and dramatically handicapped by respiratory dif 
ficulties. And it was equally apparent that the 
widows were testifying about the disabilities of 
husbands arising out of work experiences identical 
to those of the miners who appeared before the 
Subcommittee. Subsequent investigation revealed 
that the Eastern Kentucky universe was not unique 
in that respect; indeed, that many seemingly 
allowable claims involving miners with extended 
coal mining work experiences were curiously being 
denied. The justifications given in individual cases 
more often turned on disputed or unavailable 
medical evidence; and proved ultimately un 
satisfactory to the Subcommittee, and thereafter to 
the full Committee as well. 15
Having explained the source of their discontent, the Com 
mittee explained their proposed remedy:
In recognition of the historically demonstrated and 
exceedingly high probability of total disability 
(80.89 %), and out of concern for an equally prob 
able risk of error in the remaining cases, an objec-
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tive test was established to simply provide part B 
benefits payments to all claimants whose claims 
had been denied and who could demonstrate 30 or 
more years of underground coal mining experience. 
This assertedly rational and reasonable approach 
was elected over discretely restructuring the 
eligibility determination process in order to reach 
such legitimate and compelling cases: a restructur 
ing, incidentally, which would have produced a 
complex, unmanageable, and enormously costly 
approach to ascertaining benefit entitlements. 16
In short, the committee was expressing its anger with the 
executive branch's handling of black lung claims. (The 80.89 
percent was the approval rate under Part B as of 1975.) 
Evidence that deserving miners and survivors were not being 
compensated was based on personal observation during the 
course of hearings held in Congressman Perkins' district. By 
limiting the presumption, at that point at least, to Part B 
claims, the higher program costs would have fallen on the 
U.S. Treasury, and not on the mine operators. Clearly, even 
411(c) (4) had not gone far enough to suit the supporters of 
enlarged entitlements during this period.
Considerable resistance was encountered to adding any 
presumptions that would have conferred entitlement solely 
on the basis of years worked in coal mining. To have done 
this would have stripped away any semblance of a disability- 
based compensation program. The 1975 legislation (HR 
10760) cleared the House by only 27 votes and no accom 
modation with the Senate could be worked out. Sensitive to 
this, Congressman Dent spoke on both sides of the issue in 
his testimony on the 1977 amendments:
Now I am hoping that we will not get into the ques 
tion of carelessly saying only because of the 
number of years that this person worked in a mine,
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that person is totally disabled.We cannot simply 
write that as a principle of law. When we establish 
ed the 30 years, we did it on the basis of very 
thorough research. 17
The presumption that was added in the 1977 amendments 
was 411(c) (5). It dealt only with miners who had worked 25 
or more years prior to June 30, 1971 (the date that stricter 
coal mine dust standards went into effect), and who died on 
or before March 1, 1978, the effective date of the new law. 
For such miners, the survivor claimant would receive 
benefits unless it could be proven that at the time of death 
the miner was not partially or totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis. It is notable that this is the only instance in 
the law's history where partial disability is compen- 
sable—though the level of benefits is no different from that 
awarded if death was due to pneumoconiosis.
The rationale for this presumption can be found in the 
Legislative History:
Widows have perhaps been more adversely and 
wrongfully affected by black lung claim denials 
than living miners, for in all too many instances the 
probative value of the widow's evidence submitted 
in support of a claim is not good. It is not her fault. 
Medical records may have been lost or destroyed. 
The miner may have been lost forever in an 
underground mine explosion. He may have died so 
long ago that clinical knowledge of the day did not 
include pneumoconiosis—the cause of death was 
simplistically attributed to "heart failure." For 
these and other reasons the committee believes that 
concerns for the welfare of these widows, whose 
husbands gave their physical strength, their bodies 
and their lives to this most difficult occupation, 
should override any professed need to demonstrate
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a clinically precise association between years work 
ed and totally disabling lung disease. 18
Since partial disability became an issue under 411(c) (5), 
defining it became necessary. This was done in the Labor 
Department's regulations. Partial disability was said to exist 
where the miner had a reduced ability to engage in his usual 
coal mine work or comparable and gainful work. 19
In order to make use of this presumption, the survivor 
needed only to show that the miner was employed for 25 
years or more in coal mining—underground or other 
wise—prior to June 30, 1971, and that the miner died on or 
before March 1, 1978. The claimant was obliged to make 
available any existing medical evidence, but did not need to 
show that the miner was partially or totally disabled at the 
time of death. Instead, it was the other party's burden to 
prove that partial or total disability did not exist. Actually, 
there are three possible rebuttals to the presumption:
1. The miner did not have pneumoconiosis.
2. The miner was not partially or totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis.
3. The miner's partial or total disability was not caused 
by pneumoconiosis.
The regulations spelled out four types of evidence that, 
alone, would be insufficient to rebut the presumptions: 20
1. Evidence that the deceased was employed in the mines 
at the time of his death.
2. Evidence pertaining to the deceased's level of earnings.
3. An X-ray that is negative.
4. A death certificate that contains no reference to 
pneumoconiosis.
However, the Benefits Review Board decided that two or 
more of these may be sufficient to rebut the 25-year 
presumption. 21
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The sixth presumption created under the law is essentially 
different from the ones noted above. Its focus is primarily on 
coverage under the act. It bears directly on 411(c) (1-5), 
however, as it may be used to determine whether or not these 
presumptions are applicable. The 1977 amendments con 
sidered a person who worked in coal mine construction or 
transportation as a miner "to the extent such individual was 
exposed to coal dust as a result of such employment." 22 It 
also differs from each of the presumptions described above 
since only this one was promulgated by regulation. The 
Secretary of Labor created a rebuttable presumption that 
"such individual was exposed to coal mine dust during all 
periods of such employment occurring in or around a coal 
mine or coal preparation facility. . . ," 23
The presumption can be rebutted in two ways, according 
to the regulations. The employer or government must prove 
either that the miner was not regularly exposed to coal dust 
during the employment, or that the individual was not 
employed in or around a coal mine or preparation facility.
The final set of presumptions examined here is the so- 
called interim presumptions. The evolution of these stan 
dards for evaluating claims has already been described in this 
study. It is sufficient to observe here that they were 
developed by SSA in response to the 1972 amendments and 
the intense pressure from certain congressmen and senators 
to raise the approval rate under Part B claims. This result 
was accomplished through the implementation of the interim 
presumptions. The Labor Department sought to use these 
presumptions as well in administering Part C claims, but was 
prevented from doing so by the legality that prevented the 
Secretary of Labor from establishing the medical standards 
for purposes of determining the outcome of claims.
As an ultimate irony, by 1977 the Labor Department had 
become convinced that the interim presumptions that SSA
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continued to use were not medically sound, erring on the side 
of awarding benefits when that was unwarranted. However, 
the congressional mood in 1977 was to have the program fur 
ther liberalized and, in particular, to raise the claims ap 
proval rate in the Labor Department. The House version of 
the bill would have imposed the application of the interim 
presumptions to all claims, forthcoming and previously filed 
but denied or pending that were to be reviewed again under 
the new criteria. The Senate version of the bill allowed the 
Secretary of Labor to draw up his own medical standards. 
The compromise that emerged from the Conference Com 
mittee imposed the application of criteria that were not more 
restrictive than the interim presumptions on the Labor 
Department for all reviewed claims (see Section 401 (f) (2)), 
until that time that the Department promulgated a new set of 
standards. Claims filed until that time would be evaluated 
under the interim presumptions.
In August of 1978, the Labor Department published 
regulations implementing the criteria imposed on it by the 
1977 law. 24 Basically, the presumptions are invoked where 
the miner had 10 or more years of coal mine employment 
and any one of five types of evidence are established:
1. A chest X-ray, biopsy or autopsy establishes the ex 
istence of pneumoconiosis.
2. Ventilatory studies establish the presence of a chronic 
respiratory or pulmonary disease.
3. Blood gas studies demonstrate impairment in the 
transfer of oxygen from the lung alveoli to the blood.
4. "Other medical evidence*' establishes the presence of a 
totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 
This can include the documented opinion of a physi 
cian using reasoned medical judgment.
5. Where the miner is deceased and where no other 
medical evidence is available, the affidavit of the sur-
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vivor or other persons with knowledge of the condition 
can demonstrate the presence of a totally disabling 
pulmonary or respiratory impairment.
Where any of these five conditions is found alongside 10 
or more years of coal mine employment, the miner "will be 
presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or to 
have been totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the time 
of death, or death will be presumed to be due to 
pneumoconiosis, arising out of that employment. . . ."" 
This served to presume three critical elements for claimants: 
total disability, the presence of pneumoconiosis, and the 
disease having arisen out of coal mining employment. One of 
the keys to the presumptions was the ventilatory standards, 
which were set so high that many claimants would now be 
considered impaired and thereby able to invoke the presump 
tions. The use of "other medical evidence" and the widow's 
affidavit were also extremely important in aiding claimants.
There were four ways to rebut the interim presumptions:
1. Where the evidence establishes that the miner is doing 
his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful 
work.
2. Where, in the light of all evidence, it is established that 
the individual is able to do his usual coal mine work or 
comparable and gainful work.
3. Where the evidence establishes that the total disability 
or death of the miner did not arise in whole or in part 
out of coal mine employment.
4. Where the evidence establishes that the miner does not 
or did not have pneumoconiosis.
Solomons discusses the controversy that developed within 
the Congress over the application of the interim presump 
tions by the Labor Department. He suggests that SSA had 
treated the presumptions de facto as irrebuttable, and that
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some, such as Senator Javits, insisted that this not be done 
by the Labor Department. Moreover, there was the related 
issue of whether the entire medical record should be con 
sidered by the administrative law judge in permitting the 
presumption to be invoked. The Department's position can 
be seen in Secretary Marshall's letter to President Carter, 
recommending that he sign the 1977 amendments:
We are opposed to provisions making the use of the 
"interim standards" mandatory for the determina 
tion of total disability under Part C. . . . While we 
still believe the "interim standards" are inap 
propriate, the limitation of their use to reviewed 
and pending claims in conjunction with the require 
ment that all other relevant evidence be considered 
reduces our concerns substantially. 26
The regulations that the Department issued subsequently 
were consistent with Marshall's concerns: "In adjudicating a 
claim under this subpart, all relevant medical evidence shall 
be considered." 27 The implication of this is that the interim 
presumptions were administered in a manner somewhat 
more restrictive than that of SSA. Nevertheless, the interim 
presumptions under either Parts B or C made many 
claimants' positions far simpler to sustain than had the pre 
existing presumptions.
The publication of the Secretary of Labor's regulations on 
February 29, 1980 (effective date 3-31-80) meant that the in 
terim presumptions could not be invoked in claims filed 
thereafter. In the 1981 amendments, the three other most 
controversial presumptions were dropped from the law: 
411(c) (2) (10 years coal mine employment—death from 
respiratory-pulmonary cause presumed black lung); 
411(c)(4) (15 years coal mine employment—presumptive 
pneumoconiosis if evidence of totally disabling respiratory- 
pulmonary disease); and 411(c) (5) (25 years coal mine
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employment—survivors presumption unless proven that par 
tial or totally disabling pneumoconiosis not present). 28
The presumptions under black lung are significant for 
several reasons. They provide a precise record of the extent 
to which Congress, SSA and the Labor Department sought 
to aid claimants. Second, the presumptions appear to have 
been the most pronounced feature of this federal program, 
at least among people involved with state workers' compen 
sation systems. No other elements of the law seem to have 
deviated as much from existing practices under established 
state systems. Treated collectively, the presumptions under 
black lung have been widely viewed as the epitome of 
political manipulation of the pork barrel process, under the 
guise of operating a workers' compensation scheme.
Evidence
With hundreds of thousands of claims for benefits under 
the black lung program, SSA and the Department of Labor 
were forced to wrestle with numerous issues regarding the 
type and quality of evidence they would accept. It was one 
thing to set certain standards for determining whether a 
miner was disabled due to pneumoconiosis, but quite 
another to have the evidence to allow the determination to be 
made. If it was not clear in 1969, it became totally apparent 
by 1972, and certainly by 1977, that Congress did not wish to 
place major burdens of proof on the claimants. Consequent 
ly, the evidence required of claimants would be of a less 
demanding character than one could expect to find under 
typical state workers' compensation programs or in the SSDI 
program.
To highlight some of these issues, it is useful to separate 
claims that came from living miners from those of survivors. 
In the case of living miners, SSA basically followed the 
system that was familiar to it. Many claimants had had
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previous dealings with SSA, having applied for disability, 
retirement, or survivor benefits, and the agency had access to 
and used these data sources. SSA also sought and received 
access to state workers' compensation claims files, and it 
also used data from the Welfare and Retirement Fund of the 
United Mine Workers of America. 29 These steps permitted 
"a large number" of claims to be allowed with no need to 
obtain new evidence from applicants. Where miners did need 
to obtain medical examinations or reports, SSA either reim 
bursed applicants or paid the providers directly. Where the 
existing records were inadequate for SSA to make an assess 
ment, the state agencies used for SSDI purposes were used 
also for black lung. These agencies arranged to have 
claimants examined by physicians and qualified facilities 
close to the claimants' residence. Unlike the situation in 
SSDI, this presented unusual problems for the agency 
because the claimants were so concentrated in a few areas, 
generally far removed from urban locations with their 
greater number of health care specialists and facilities. For 
example, over two-thirds of all pulmonary function tests 
scheduled for SSA applicants in the first 15 months of the 
program were in three states: Pennsylvania, West Virginia, 
and Kentucky. 30 The use of local providers was continued by 
the Labor Department when it took over the administration 
of the program.
In developing evidence to determine whether living 
claimants were totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, a 
substantial set of obstacles was encountered. Some of the 
testing of pulmonary function involves physical exertion by 
the claimant. For some of these people, they and/or their 
physicians believed that such effort could not be safely 
undertaken due to the claimant's condition. Other tests 
depended on the individual's complete cooperation. Half 
hearted effort could lead to test results similar to those found 
where there was severely impaired lung function.
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Blood gas testing has remained a problem over much of 
the life of the program. Facilities that could accurately assess 
the ability of the individual to move oxygen from the lungs 
to the blood were scarce or unavailable in many of the mine 
regions. The inability to administer this test to many ap 
plicants was given as one reason why ventilatory function 
test standards should be set at liberal levels, i.e., allowing 
larger numbers of applicants to be compensated.
The most critical issue of evidence dealt with the X-rays 
used to determine the presence of pneumoconiosis. It was 
noted earlier that substantial problems arose due both to the 
poor quality of many of the X-rays used and to the inter 
pretation of the X-rays. The "B" reader program developed 
by Johns Hopkins University and NIOSH was designed to 
overcome these difficulties. Routinely, X-rays that had been 
interpreted by physicians in the field were sent to "B" 
readers for a rereading. These "B" readers found very large 
numbers of errors, based on misreadings by field readers or 
readings of such poor quality films that no interpretation 
was possible. (See table 3.1.)
While this sort of scrutiny could be considered laudable 
under most circumstances where it did not substantially 
delay the process, it created special difficulties in the black 
lung program. The overwhelming type of error found by the 
"B" readers was one where the field readers incorrectly 
reported the presence of pneumoconiosis. Though Congress 
had reduced the significance of the negative X-ray in the 
1972 amendments, positive X-ray evidence of the presence of 
pneumoconiosis was extremely helpful to claimants, 
especially after 1972. Program supporters were angered to 
learn that the "B" readers were undermining claimants who 
might have been told by a local physician that their X-rays 
demonstrated the presence of pneumoconiosis. Presumably, 
some miners had had their expectations raised that they
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would be entitled to benefits, only to have them cruelly dash 
ed by some distant unknown "B" reader.
The Senate and House chose to take somewhat different 
routes in dealing with the rereading problem. At the time of 
the 1977 amendments, the House bill required the Secretary 
of Labor to accept the opinion of the claimant's physician 
regarding the miner's X-ray, unless the Secretary had good 
cause to believe that the X-ray was of unreadable quality or 
was being fraudulently represented. It is noteworthy that this 
could have caused some claimants to be denied compensa 
tion in those rather rare instances where the "B" reader, 
unlike the initial reader, found pneumoconiosis present. It 
also seems striking that the House version did not impose 
any type of quality control on the claimant's physician, that 
is, the local doctor could have been a dermatologist by 
specialty or without any special training in any field of 
medicine, much less in radiology or chest diseases.
The Senate version provided that where a miner had work 
ed 25 years or more in the mines, and where other evidence 
existed of pulmonary or respiratory impairment, the 
Secretary of Labor was required to accept the interpreta 
tion of the X-ray given by a board-certified or board-eligible 
radiologist, if the X-ray was of adequate quality and was 
taken by a qualified individual, and if there was no reason to 
believe that the claim was fraudulently misrepresented. The 
Senate version of this provision was adopted. However, the 
House conferees were able to drop the Senate's requirement 
that eliminated the rereading only in cases where miners had 
worked 25 years or more. (Section413(b).)
This amendment essentially eliminated the role played by 
the "B" readers where there was "other evidence" that a 
miner had a pulmonary or respiratory impairment. The con 
ferees actually went beyond that by inserting in their report: 
"In the case of X-rays read by a board-certified or board-
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eligible radiologist, it is the intention of the conferees that 
the Secretary shall accept, for whatever evidentiary value 
X-rays generally may have, the evaluation of such X-rays 
read by a board-certified or board-eligible radiologist 
without submitting them to a further rereading." 31 The new 
administration supported the principle of rereading X-rays, 
but the Congress simply rode roughshod over the position 
taken by Donald Elisburg, the Assistant Secretary for 
Employment Standards in the Labor Department. 32
Though substantially reduced, the role of the "B" reader 
was not fully eliminated by the 1977 amendments. Before an 
X-ray report was used as evidence in a claim, a "B" reader 
had to determine that it met evidentiary standards. The 
claims examiner in the Labor Department had to accept the 
"B'* reader's findings as to the acceptable quality of the 
film. If the film was of acceptable quality, taken by a 
registered radiographic technician (as of March 31,1980 and 
later, but waived for X-rays taken before that date), and 
read by a board certified or board-eligible radiologist, the in 
terpretation had to be accepted as valid X-ray evidence. 
When the "B" reader evaluated film quality, he was permit 
ted to read the X-ray, but if there was a conflict in interpreta 
tion, the one most favorable to the claimant was to be used. 33 
Where there were multiple X-ray reports and some were in 
conflict, doubt was resolved in favor of the claimants. A 
responsible coal mine operator was free to challenge the 
X-ray finding and to ask for additional X-ray examination.
As a matter of practice, the administrative law judge plac 
ed greater weight on the X-ray most recently taken. In claims 
involving the Trust Fund, there was no challenge to X-ray 
evidence presented by claimants where the film was judged 
to be of acceptable quality by the "B" reader. Section 413(b) 
was changed in the 1981 amendments so that the prohibition 
on rereading of X-ray films was removed, except for claims 
filed before the effective date of the law, January 1, 1982.
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When the Labor Department determines that medical 
evidence is needed to determine the compensability of a 
claim, the miner is sent a letter with the name of a local doc 
tor who is to examine him. The claimant can use this doctor 
if he wishes, but has the right to request that his own physi 
cian be used. The Labor Department is not required to per 
mit the latter doctor to conduct the physical or X-ray ex 
amination, but it generally has allowed this. Individual 
physicians in the mining areas soon developed reputations as 
being sympathetic to or tough on claimants. With some 
choice in the matter and with the predilection of some physi 
cians well known, the quality of physician reporting has been 
suspect throughout the life of the program.
Where doctors are thought to be biased, the Labor 
Department's procedures allow it to order an independent 
examination. In practice, such independent review has not 
been utilized by the Department.
The role of the examining physician is extremely impor 
tant in determining the outcome of the claim: "The reasoned 
opinion of a physician exercising sound medical judgement 
carries great weight as medical evidence in a claim. A 
doctor's reasoned opinion can establish the presence of 
pneumoconiosis (CWP), total disability due to 
pneumoconiosis (based on medical criteria), and causal rela 
tionships of pneumoconiosis to CME (coal mine employ 
ment)." 34 The Labor Department's manual spells out what 
the physician must do to establish the presence of disease 
where the X-ray evidence is negative. The physician need on 
ly state that he is aware that the X-ray is negative, describe 
the symptoms and the test results, demonstrate a knowledge 
of the worker's employment and medical history, and rule 
out other causes for the miner's condition.This suggests that 
physicians sympathetic to the position of the claimant can 
play very instrumental roles in helping the applicant. Where 
there is a responsible coal mine operator to challenge this
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position with conflicting medical testimony, the claimant 
may have some difficulty in winning compensation. Where 
the responsible operator does not vigorously challenge a 
claim, or where no challenge exists, as in Trust Fund cases 
after 1977, the claimant*s doctor's evidence is likely to go un 
challenged.
Early in 1982, the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
issued a report that evaluated the Labor Department's deci 
sions based upon a sample of 450 claims. 33 The GAO found 
that 205 claims (45 percent) had been approved. It argued 
that only 33 claims had provided adequate medical evidence 
to allow a positive determination of disability or death due to 
pneumoconiosis. Virtually all the claims had been submitted 
prior to the permanent standards being imposed by the 
Labor Department in 1980. Only 7 of the 172 claims that the 
Labor Department accepted based upon evidence described 
as inadequate by the GAO were successful because of the 
opinion of physicians. GAO does not provide data on the 
number of other successful claims where evidence was found 
to be inadequate and where a physician's opinion existed 
alongside some other medical evidence. In its report on 
SSA's re-review of denied claims after 1977, GAO reported 
no instances where physician opinion by itself was sufficient 
to permit benefits to be awarded. 36
A number of other sticky issues arose in claims from sur 
vivors. A recurring problem that appeared very early in the 
life of the program was one of survivors being unable to ob 
tain evidence useful to their claims. The problem was 
especially severe in older cases, since, prior to 1969, few doc 
tors in the United States appeared to diagnose or report the 
presence of CWP or to attribute death to it. The 10-year 
presumption (section 411(c) (2)) was partially helpful to sur 
vivors, but some survivors apparently found it difficult to 
establish their claims. As of December 31, 1971, SSA had 
allowed 71,400 "widows" claims and denied 38,000 others. 37
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To ease the burden of proof for survivors, the 1972 
amendments added: "In determining the validity of claims 
under this part, all relevant evidence shall be considered, in 
cluding, where relevant... his wife's affidavits, and in the 
case of a deceased miner, other appropriate affidavits of per 
sons with knowledge of the miner's physical condition, and 
other supportive material." (Section 413(b).)
The intent of this section apparently escaped both SSA 
and the Labor Department, who rejected claims routinely if 
there was no other support for them except such affidavits. 
In the 1977 amendments, Congress clarified what it wanted, 
which was to strengthen the hand of claimants. The House 
version provided flatly that where no relevant medical 
evidence existed in the case of a deceased miner, affidavits 
were to be considered sufficient to establish eligibility. The 
Senate version was somewhat less munificent and the Con 
ference Committee settled on: "Where there is no medical or 
other relevant evidence in the case of a deceased miner, such 
affidavits shall be considered to be sufficient to establish that 
the miner was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or that 
his death or her death was due to pneumoconiosis." 38 By ad 
ding "or other" to the House version, the Conference Com 
mittee provided some opportunity to challenge a claim that 
was based solely on affidavits where no medical evidence was 
available. The extent to which challenges arose depended on 
whether or not a responsible coal mine operator was iden 
tified. The Trust Fund was far less likely to challenge sur 
vivor claimants than were the mine operators.
The GAO found that affidavits were particularly impor 
tant in SSA's re-review of previously denied claims after the 
1977 amendments. 39 In its sample of 131 survivor awards, 78 
claims had disability established solely by affidavits. In 43 of 
these 78 awarded claims, the length of coal mine employ 
ment was also established by affidavits. According to GAO, 
in 68 of the 78 cases, the person signing the statement about
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the miner's impairment was the party filing the claim and 
seeking the benefits. In its study of Labor Department 
claims, however, GAO reported that only 7 claims were 
awarded benefits based solely on affidavits. The study does 
not provide information on the instances where affidavits 
were supported by other evidence, such as a personal physi 
cian's letter, that itself might be regarded as soft or ques 
tionable evidence.
The 1981 amendments tightened up this provision of the 
law. Beginning January 1, 1982, affidavits from parties with 
a financial interest in a claim (survivors) are not sufficient to 
establish that the miner was either totally disabled or died 
due to pneumoconiosis. The impact of this change was prob 
ably quite small, however, since most of the claims involving 
death had been filed by the effective date of the 1981 amend 
ments. Moreover, in cases involving more recent deaths, 
medical evidence was more likely to exist. Additionally, even 
if a widow's affidavit was no longer determining, friends or 
fellow workers of the miner or of the survivor who would be 
willing to supply a supportive affidavit would not be difficult 
to find.
The 1977 amendments also strengthened the position of 
survivors in another respect. Section 413(b), emerging from 
the House bill, required the agencies to accept autopsy 
reports concerning both the presence of pneumoconiosis and 
the stage of its advancement, unless there was good cause to 
believe that it was inaccurate or fraudulently misrepresented. 
In fact, this was not the way the law has been administered, 
nor did Congress mean what the amendment said. If taken 
literally, a negative report by a pathologist would leave the 
agencies no choice but to deny a claim. In fact, where an 
autopsy report did not find that pneumoconiosis was present 
at the time of death, the claim could still have been approved 
if other supportive evidence was forthcoming. By contrast,
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where pneumoconiosis was said to have been present, the 
agency was obliged to accept the finding, unless fraud or 
misrepresentation were evident.
Dr. W. Keith Morgan, a critic of the black lung program, 
has testified: "It has been my experience, moreover, that cer 
tain pathologists indeed regularly record the presence of 
complicated coal workers' pneumoconiosis when other 
pathologists with wider and broader experience have been 
unable to be certain that the histological specimens come 
from a coal miner." 40 At a minimum, Morgan's charge in 
dicates something about the lack of certainty inherent in 
autopsy evidence. Beyond that, it suggests strongly that the 
integrity of some pathologists is open to serious question.
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The black lung legislation sought to provide protection to 
disabled miners or their survivors. Supporters of the law 
consistently argued that they had left the primary respon 
sibility for compensation of victims of occupational illnesses 
or injuries to state workers' compensation agencies except 
for one disease, and the single occupational group—miners. 
Yet, consistent with the other changes that led to expanding 
the scope of the law from 1969 to 1981, the meaning of the 
term "miner" took on broader meaning from 1969 forward.
Coverage under the 1969 act was limited explicitly to 
underground coal miners or their survivors. In large 
measure, this reflected the view that coal workers' 
pneumoconiosis was a disease caused by exposure to dust 
within the mines. In the deliberations prior to the passage of 
HR 9212 in 1972, Representative Michel (R-Illinois) in 
troduced an amendment to strike the reference in the 1969 
law to "underground." Michel argued in the floor debate in 
the House on November 10, 1971
. . . the fact of the matter is that we have no idea 
whether or not those who work only in surface 
mines can contract the disabling disease. While the 
very limited prevalence studies conducted by the 
Public Health Service have shown little incidence of 
pneumoconiosis among surface miners generally,
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and no evidence of it among those miners who had 
worked exclusively above ground, no one has ven 
tured to contend that strip miners are not subject to 
the disease. On the contrary, it would seem 
reasonable to assume that those strip miners who 
have worked in extremely dusty situations—at the 
tipple, for example—for long periods of time, 
might be subjected to conditions similar to those 
which result in the development of black lung 
among underground miners. 1
Speaking in favor of the Michel amendment, Represen 
tative Railsback, another Illinois Republican, explained: "1 
know that (Michel) has many strip miners in the district 
which he represents. There are also many in the 19th Con 
gressional District, which I represent and which happens to 
be contiguous to that of (Michel). Such strip miners deserve 
to be protected. " 2
John Erlenborn also spoke in favor of the amendment. 
His support of it symbolizes the basic dilemma in evaluating 
its justification. On one side, it is difficult to argue that vic 
tims of black lung ought not be compensated simply because 
their exposure to coal did not arise in underground coal 
mines. Yet support of the amendment on these grounds 
quickly leads one to support compensating black lung vic 
tims who were employed anywhere that coal dust is found, 
or for that matter, any person suffering from disabling, oc 
cupational diseases generally. The other side of the argu 
ment, however, is that black lung disease was rarely, if ever, 
a consequence of dust exposure outside the underground 
mines. To the extent that a variety of claimant-supportive 
rules and presumptions enabled persons to receive compen 
sation where benefits could easily have been denied other 
wise, this extension of coverage enlarged the pool of poten 
tial applicants far beyond the pool of those who actually had 
been damaged by the disease.
Coverage & Administration 143
In 1977, Fairman et al. published a paper describing the 
incidence of pneumoconiosis in 1,438 surface coal miners in 
8 surface mines based on U.S. Public Health Service surveys 
in 1972-1973. 3 Of these, 59 persons (4 percent) showed roent- 
genographic evidence of some degree of pneumoconiosis, 
and only 7 (.005 percent) had films classified as category 2 or 
higher. Five of the 7 showed large opacities consistent with 
complicated pneumoconiosis. Of the 7, 5 had considerable 
work experience in underground mines, 1 worker had 
pulmonary tuberculosis, and one with no underground ex 
perience had worked previously in a coal preparation plant. 
The incidence of bronchitis was relatively high, but signifi 
cant airway obstruction was uncommon (below 7 percent) in 
the nonsmoking miners. In summary, complicated 
pneumoconiosis was extremely rare in surface miners and 
virtually nonexistent if one credits the few cases found to the 
miners* previous work in underground mining or (in one 
case) in a coal preparation plant. Simple pneumoconiosis 
was also found to be quite uncommon, especially category 2 
or 3. Moreover, the previous work histories of those with 
simple pneumoconiosis were not described.
That coal workers' pneumoconiosis is rare among those 
with only surface mining exposures is not surprising. Dust 
levels in surface mining operations are less than one-half of 
those found in underground mines. 4
The distinction between surface and underground mining 
also appeared in the presumptions. One of the presumptions 
established by the 1972 amendments, and described in detail 
in chapter 4, was the 15-year rule, i.e., where the miner has 
or had disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, but 
where the X-ray evidence is negative, there is a rebuttable 
presumption of pneumoconiosis where the miner was 
employed 15 years or more in underground mining. 
However, the 15-year presumption could be employed by 
claimant surface miners or their survivors, if the miner's
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employment was "substantially similar" to conditions in an 
underground mine, i.e., some exposure existed to coal dust 
(see sec. 411(c) (4)). Clearly, Congress chose to maintain a 
line separating the underground miners from those employed 
in surface mining. The line was obviously very thin, 
however.
From 1972 until the passage of the 1977 amendments, con 
siderable controversy swirled around the parties who ad 
ministered the law regarding the extent of coverage under the 
act. Section 402(d) defined a miner as any individual who is 
or was employed in a coal mine. The regulations added that a 
miner performed functions in extracting coal or preparing 
the coal so extracted.' This led to a two-pronged test of 
eligibility that examined the issues of situs and of function. 
The situs matter itself involved two separate questions: Was 
there a common law employer/employee relationship and 
was the employment in a coal mine? Where no 
employer/employee relationship was found, coverage did 
not exist. Since self-employed miners or independent con 
tractors were deemed not to be employees, they were not 
covered by the law during this period. Where a claimant leas 
ed a mine from the government, compensation was denied, 
in part, because he was not an employee. 6 The other question 
involving situs depended on the miner having worked in a 
coal mine. The regulations treated the term coal mine in a 
manner that was identical to the definition found in the 
original law.
The second test was based on regulations requiring that a 
miner be someone who performed a function in extracting or 
preparing coal. Was the employee's activity an integral part 
of the coal extraction or coal preparation process? The 
following are examples of functions that the Benefits Review 
Board has found met this test. Where an employee:
—worked in a mine operator's foundry molding replace 
ment parts for mining machinery;
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—was a mechanic repairing and maintaining strip mining 
equipment;
—supervised a prospecting team;
—was a draftsman;
—was a weightmaster in an office and was required to 
make occasional visits to the tipple;
—was a federal mine inspector;
—operated a grader maintaining haulage roads at a strip 
mine.
Claims that were denied by the Benefit Review Board prior 
to the 1977 amendments, because the work was judged not to 
be integral to coal extraction or coal preparation, involved 
work as:
—a training specialist preparing audio-visual material and 
giving lectures on mine safety;
—a negotiator for mineral rights and as a title searcher;
—a truck driver hauling coal from the tipple to private 
customers;
—a grocery clerk in a mine store located on the town's 
main street, one mile from the mine. (The Department 
of Labor had supported compensation in this case.)
The 1977 amendments to the law extended the scope of 
coverage considerably beyond the 1972 amendments. First, 
in defining the word "miner" (sec. 402(d)), "any individual 
who is or was employed in a coal mine" the term 
"employed" was replaced by "works or has worked." 
Through this seemingly minor change, coverage was extend 
ed beyond employees, to include the self-employed and in 
dependent contractors.
In the 1977 amendments, "in a coal mine" was replaced 
by "in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility in 
the extraction or preparation of coal." The addition of coal 
preparation facility simply codified what had been included 
by the Department of Labor in its regulations and practices.
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The "in or around" language, however, represented a 
significant extension of coverage under the law. Further, the 
definition was expanded so as to provide coverage to 
workers involved with coal mine construction or transporta 
tion in or around a mine. Clearly, Congress sought to extend 
protection under the law on a much broader scale to cover 
anyone exposed to coal dust in or near the mines.
As a consequence of the 1977 amendments, five types of 
work became covered under the law; extraction, prepara 
tion, mine maintenance, construction and transportation. 
Persons performing such work and those who provide 
necessary support functions and performing work which 
bears a reasonable and necessary relationship to the overall 
process are covered. As a measure of the sweep of coverage, 
the regulations add: "An individual employed by a coal mine 
operator, regardless of the nature of such individual's 
employment, shall be considered a miner unless such in 
dividual was not employed in or around a coal mine or coal 
preparation facility:." 7
The Department of Labor deals with the "in or around" 
provision by adding:
... in or around a coal mine or coal preparation 
facility includes, in addition to mines and coal 
preparation plants, the mine or plant offices, 
storehouses, repair facilities located on, or adjacent 
to or in the vicinity of the mine property, access 
roads, refuse banks or dumps resulting from the ex 
traction and/or processing of coal at the site on or 
near the mine property, adjacent railroad or dock 
ing facilities providing access to the mine or 
preparation plant, and may extend to structures 
and facilities located at some distance from the ac 
tual place of extraction or preparation provided 
such structures or facilities are used in the extrac-
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tion or preparation of coal or are intended to be us 
ed in or result from such processes. 8
The coverage since 1977 of transportation and construc 
tion workers has led the Department of Labor to insert its 
own presumption into the regulations it issued. Before then, 
presumptions had emerged directly in the legislation, but in 
the August 1978 regulations to implement the 1977 amend 
ments, the Secretary of Labor added one other presumption. 
A rebuttable presumption was created that coal mine con 
struction or transportation workers were exposed to coal 
mine dust during all periods of employment in or around a 
coal mine or a preparation facility. The burden of proving 
exposure to coal mine dust thereby shifted from the worker. 
The responsible coal mine operator or the Trust Fund can 
rebut this only by showing either that the worker was not 
regularly employed in or around a mine or preparation facili 
ty or was not regularly exposed to coal mine dust in the 
course of such employment.
In summary, a law designed to provide benefits for coal 
miners and their families began with coverage limited to 
underground miners. By legislation and regulation, the con 
cept of what a miner is has been extended well beyond 
workers in underground mines. That coverage would be ex 
tended beyond the form that it took in 1969 is hardly surpris 
ing, in retrospect. Carl Perkins made it perfectly evident in 
the floor debate in 1969 that he would eventually extend it. 
In late October 1969, speaking of the black lung provisions, 
he said:
My only reservations about the provisions in the 
bill go to what is now obvious from the debate and 
that is—we have not provided broad enough 
coverage for those miners who have serious 
respiratory diseases—nor are the benefits adequate 
for the miner and his dependents. I fully intend that
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the Education and Labor Committee will continue 
to study this problem and the administration of 
these provisions to assure that they are effective in 
meeting the needs. 9
It is clear that Perkins meant these remarks seriously and 
that coverage, in several senses of the term as he used it, 
would be widened eventually. The line has been drawn, 
however, at that point where the finished coal product, that 
is, after extraction and preparation, has been shipped to the 
ultimate customer. Thus, a maintainer of a railroad line run 
ning out from a mine was compensated on the grounds that 
his work was an ancillary activity necessary to the extraction 
or preparation of coal. 10 Benefits were denied, however, 
where a claimant was exposed to coal dust while employed 
for a coke producer. 11 Another claimant was awarded 
benefits by an administrative law judge in the Labor Depart 
ment in 1977, based on his exposure while crushing coal for a 
cement manufacturer. On appeal, the claim was denied. 12
Claims Administration
Social Security Administration
The passage of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act forc 
ed SSA to develop and place into operation with virtually no 
lead time procedures to administer an entirely new entitle 
ment program. While the Labor Department had over 3.5 
years before it was to receive its first claim, SSA had almost 
no opportunity to plan how it would operate such a scheme. 
The advantages that SSA had, however, were that it did have 
its massive field system in place, and that for a number of 
years it had administered a disability program, Social Securi 
ty Disability Insurance. An enormous problem for the agen 
cy, however, was the inability to guess how much claims ac 
tivity might develop under the law and what the pace of the 
flow of claims would be.
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The initial burst of claims was not short of amazing. In the 
first two weeks of the program, 45,000 claims were filed. 
During the first seven months of 1970, 190,000 claims were 
received from miners or their survivors by SSA. As a conse 
quence of the 1972 amendments that extended the time under 
the Part B program and delayed the time of the Labor 
Department's Part C program responsibilities, SSA con 
tinued to be the recipient of new claims until July 1, 1973. 
Even after this date, SSA handled new claims in two cir 
cumstances. If a miner died prior to January 1, 1974, SSA 
would process any claim filed within six months of the date 
of death. Second, SSA handled claims filed by survivors of 
those who had successfully filed as living miners under Part 
B, where the survivors filed within six months of the date of 
death.
Claims filed with SSA could be made at any of the nation 
wide offices of SSA. 13 The claims process was broadly 
similar to that used in the disability insurance program. The 
claim was initially dealt with by a claims or hearing ex 
aminer. At this level there was an "initial determination" 
which could result in the claim being granted or denied. If 
the claimant was dissatisfied with the initial determination, 
there would be a "reconsideration" based upon reexamina- 
tion of the existing administrative record by a different in 
dividual from the one making the initial determination. If 
the claimant was still not satisfied, the next level was a hear 
ing conducted by an administrative law judge. The decision 
at that level could be reviewed by an Appeals Council which 
had the discretion to grant or deny a review. The next step of 
the appeal process, which was rarely employed, was U.S. 
federal district court.
The claims process at SSA differs in one very special 
respect from the one found in state workers' compensation 
systems or in some of the Part C cases. The process used in
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Part B claims is nonadversarial. The employer plays virtually 
no role in the case and the claimant need not be prepared to 
assert his claim against a party seeking to block the entitle 
ment to benefits. As such, the United Mine Workers of 
America (UMWA) consistently maintained a preference for 
the Part B approach to claims over that of Part C, which 
might involve the presence of a responsible mine operator. 
The union expressed considerable dissatisfaction with 
aspects of SSA's administration of its program, but it viewed 
the adversary process in Part C claims with even more 
distaste.
Appeals of the initial determination were made by 
claimants only, and not by the agency. In correspondence 
with Carl Perkins, Secretary Califano wrote in 1977, "I want 
to inform you that the Department does not, and has not in 
the past, appealed approved black lung claims at the initial 
reconsideration level, and do not plan to do so in the future. 
However, we will reconsider this course of action if we find 
over time that hearing decisions contain an excessive number 
of errors.'* 14
Claims processing in SSA eventually was handled speedily. 
One estimate in 1974 was that claims were processed from 
filing to completion in approximately 10-12 weeks.
Department of Labor
The Labor Department was not involved in handling black 
lung claims until mid-1973. A task force set up within the 
Department to plan for the assumption of responsibilities for 
the program had projected that the average time needed to 
process a claim would be 90 days. Later, that estimate would 
be revised upwards to 180 days. This proved to be completely 
unrealistic as well. In 1976, another departmental task force 
reported that a survey of 10,000 claims had found that the 
average time in processing a case was 630 days. 15
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There were several reasons why the Labor Department 
found it so difficult to respond to claimants in any 
reasonable amount of time. Much of the problem was said 
by the Labor Department to be caused by improper or inade 
quate claims development by the local SSA offices where the 
claimants went to file their claims. Much of the time in the 
630 days was spent securing the needed medical evidence to 
allow an initial determination to be made. The task force 
report should have, but did not place any of the responsibili 
ty for the problem on the quality of the staff assigned to 
operate the program, or on its lack of experience in ad 
ministering an entitlements program.
Some of the Labor Department's difficulties can be traced 
specifically to the period immediately after the 1972 
presidential election. The newly reelected President Nixon 
requested that all political appointees make available their 
resignations to the White House and promptly shocked the 
Labor Department by accepting almost all of them. The in 
security of the very few remaining appointees was under 
standable and served as a backdrop to other events related 
specifically to black lung.
Somewhat earlier, the Labor Department had delivered its 
request to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for 
new positions to staff the program. OMB personnel ruthless 
ly cut the request, primarily due to its displeasure with the 
quality of Labor's justification. OMB's goal was not to cut 
the request as fully as it had, but to force the Department to 
better justify its request. OMB was prepared to restore 
much, though not all, of the original request, once Labor 
made its case more convincing. OMB and Labor Department 
personnel even met to work out this familiar bureaucratic 
game. The argument was then prepared by Labor Depart 
ment staff. However, the Department's surviving leadership, 
with a view toward currying favor with the White House in
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its campaign to rein in federal spending, chose not to for 
ward the appeal to OMB. Indeed as the weeks passed OMB 
was put into the peculiar position of asking where the 
Department's appeal of its decision was. However, DOL did 
not make the appeal and the black lung program began with 
a skeletal staff.
Aside from these difficulties, the Labor Department 
discovered that, beginning in January 1,1974, it had run into 
a buzz saw in dealing with employers. Unlike the SSA pro 
gram and the Department's transition program that ended 
December 31, 1973, here was a situation where employers 
had to be identified as responsible operators, if possible, and 
liability assessed against them. This proved to be no easy 
task.
By December 31, 1976, the Department had approved 
3,801 claims where a responsible operator had been iden 
tified, yet only 123 of these were being paid. The balance 
were being controverted by the employer, a testimonial to 
the reluctance of employers to accept the Labor 
Department's handling of cases.
The Department's sorry record of administration in terms 
of the prompt resolution of claims eventually caused it to 
press for a major personnel commitment from Congress and 
the Carter White House. The Department's argument was 
strengthened by the massive task handed it with the 1977 
amendments—primarily, the need to re-review the pending 
and denied claims under Part C and some of those under 
Part B. When Assistant Secretary Elisburg made a request 
for a supplemental appropriation to raise his black lung staff 
from 185 to 843 positions, this represented a massive jump 
for a single program in one of the smallest cabinet agencies. 
(Actually, the Department had had authorization to fill 270 
positions, but 85 had been unfilled for budget reasons.) This 
would have added about 350 more claims examiners, 75 new
Coverage & Administration 153
administrative law judges (over the 22 on staff) and 26 new 
attorneys to an existing staff of 9. Congress granted the full 
measure of Elisburg's request and in August 1978, President 
Carter signed the supplemental appropriation giving the 
Department the funding for the 564 new positions.
At the same time, the Department yielded to the miners 
and the congressional pressures and established eight district 
offices and 33 satellite offices, with the bulk of these and the 
jobs they created, in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, West Virginia 
and Ohio. Eventually, all claims would be processed in one 
of these district offices. This, also, created the need for more 
personnel to process claims.
Focusing on the delays and huge backlog of claims in the 
Labor Department in 1974-76 is not to expose a poorly 
managed public program. Instead, it is to serve as a basis for 
understanding the reaction by Congress and the Department 
itself to the difficulties involved with the program in the first 
years.
The Claims Process. Individuals seeking benefits under 
the Part C portion of the law may file a claim at any of the 
various Labor Department field stations or district offices or 
with a local SSA office. Initially, that claim is placed under 
the control of a deputy commissioner (DC). The DC is a 
supervisory claims examiner, who is empowered to delegate 
most of his responsibilities to a claims examiner. The DC has 
the authority to make "initial findings" concerning en 
titlements to compensation and medical treatment, to order 
medical tests, to determine the identity of the responsible 
operator (RO), to determine the fact of disability or death 
due to pneumoconiosis, to preside at conferences (see below) 
and to execute orders for the payment or denial of benefits.
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The claims examiner (CE) takes the evidence submitted 
and develops it where necessary with a view toward 
establishing whether five criteria are met:
1. The claimant has filed a valid and timely claim.
2. The claimant must have been a coal miner or a survivor 
of one.
3. The claimant must have or have had pneumoconiosis.
4. The claimant must be totally disabled or the miner 
have died due to pneumoconiosis.
5. The pneumoconiosis must have arisen out of coal mine 
employment.
If all five of these criteria are met, in fact or presumptive 
ly, the CE must determine the date from which benefits are 
payable, the amount and to whom benefits are payable, and 
who is responsible for payment.
Miners submitting claims are eligible to receive complete 
pulmonary examinations at no cost. Appointments are 
scheduled for consenting miners with physicians located 
within 50 miles of the miner's home. While reluctant to de 
pend upon the miner's personal physician, the Labor 
Department will pay for examinations by such doctors, 
depending upon the physician's specialty and location.
The DC or CE is supposed to notify the potential responsi 
ble operator who may be liable as soon as the claim is filed. 
Where a claim that was denied prior to March 1,1978 was re- 
reviewed under section 435, the operator was notified at the 
time an initial finding was made. The operator has 30 days in 
which to respond. If the operator accepts identification as 
the potentially liable operator, it must develop its evidence 
promptly. The operator has the right to have the claimant ex 
amined by a physician it chooses, and the miner must 
cooperate in the operator's efforts to develop evidence. In 
practice, the operator may not have scheduled the physical
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examination until after an initial finding in the claimant's 
favor, partly as a way to avoid incurring an unnecessary 
medical expense.
If the initial finding is that there is an entitlement and the 
responsible operator is identified, the operator has three 
possible responses. The operator may (1) send the Labor 
Department an agreement to pay, (2) provide a notice of 
first payment, or (3) choose to controvert. If the operator 
does choose to controvert and begins to develop evidence, 
the claimant may also add evidence to the file to support the 
claim. When both sides have submitted their evidence, the 
DC has three options available. The DC may schedule a con 
ference for the parties in order to resolve the issues in 
dispute. This is usually done within 60 days of the submis 
sion of all evidence. If the DC believes the conference will 
not serve a useful purpose, he may simply approve the claim 
and issue an "initial determination." Finally, the claim may 
be denied by the DC and a proposed "decision and order" is 
issued.
The DC presides over the informal conference. No 
transcript is prepared and the DC aims to have the parties 
reach a voluntary resolution of the issues. If the claimant is 
not represented, the DC must advise the miner or survivor of 
their rights under law. New evidence usually is not introduc 
ed at such conferences.
The "initial determination" is significant inasmuch as the 
1977 amendments required that benefits must be paid to the 
claimant within 30 days of the initial determination. If the 
responsible operator does not agree to make such payment, 
the Trust Fund must do so, possibly to be reimbursed at a 
later time by the RO, with an interest penalty as well. If the 
claim is denied by the DC, reasons for that are given to the 
claimant. The miner or survivor has 60 days in which to re 
spond to the denial.
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Subsequent to the DC's decision on the claim, either party 
may request a formal hearing. A request for such a hearing 
cannot be denied. The formal hearing is conducted by an ad 
ministrative law judge (ALJ). Each hearing is de novo and 
the DC's findings on contested issues are not considered. 
The ALJ has the sole authority to determine the issues to be 
considered and the evidence to be admitted. Within 20 days 
after the hearings end, the ALJ issues a "decision and 
order," giving findings and an order. The "decision and 
order" becomes final within 30 days of its issuance unless it 
is appealed. The appeal may be either a motion to reconsider 
or an appeal directly to the Benefits Review Board (BRB). 
Unless the ALJ's decision is stayed pending the appeal, the 
responsible operator must begin payments—if found 
liable—even as the appeal awaits action by the BRB.
Any party in interest dissatisfied with the ALJ's "decision 
and order" may appeal to the BRB, which derives its 
authority from section 21(b) (3) of the Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Workers' Act. This section authorizes the BRB to 
hear and determine appeals on matters that raise a substan 
tial question of law or of fact. It reviews the case record as 
well as briefs and memoranda submitted by the parties. No 
new evidence is introduced and no testimony is heard. The 
BRB is able to find facts as well as to consider questions of 
constitutionality. 16 A party adversely affected by the BRB 
may seek review in the U.S. Circuit Court with jurisdiction 
for the area where the miner was last employed. As of 
mid-1981, the average time between a filed appeal with BRB 
and a decision was about two and one-half years.
In approved claims involving alleged responsible 
operators, the controversion rate was estimated to be about 
90-95 percent during most years of the Part C program. 
Reasons for the high rate of controversion can be found at 
several levels. In a Labor Department survey of 10,000
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claims, the four principal reasons why cases were referred to 
ALJ's were disputes over:
1. The existence of pneumoconiosis.
2. The causal relationship.
3. The issue of total disability.
4. The named employer as the responsible operator. 17
At a different level, reasons for the high controversion 
rate by employers were enumerated by John Kilcullen, an at 
torney for several large mine operators, in his testimony on 
behalf of the National Independent Coal Operator's 
Association. 18 First, he argued that the 550 pages of ad 
ministrative regulations issued regarding black lung made 
controversy a likely outcome. Some of his clients were first 
notified of claims made against them in 1973 or 1974 as late 
as 1977. Frequently, he argued, the employers' first notice 
that there was a claim involving them might have occurred 
after an initial determination was made (and payment 
begun). This matter was contested and in 1979, the Fifth Cir 
cuit Court upheld the procedures whereby the Department 
had notified the responsible operator only after the claim 
had been developed and an initial determination of entitle 
ment had been made. 19 The court found that the Depart 
ment's procedure did not violate the operators' due process 
rights.
According to Kilcullen, some operators were forced to 
controvert as the only way for them to obtain any informa 
tion about the claim or the basis for the granting of benefits. 
These employers might then wait months or even a year or 
more to learn that the matter had been referred to a hearing 
officer. But Kilcullen also implied that many employers con 
troverted what they regarded as the unjustified granting of 
benefits to persons not disabled due to pneumoconiosis.
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Finally, employers could have resisted paying claims so 
long as the constitutionality of various portions of the law 
was in doubt. To do otherwise might have meant making 
payments to miners and survivors that would not have been 
recoverable, effectively, at a later time.
The success rate of operators in appealing claims is 
unclear. Various estimates exist, generally ranging in the 10 
percent range, of the operator appeals upheld by ALJ's. In a 
prepared statement by the United Mine Workers at public 
hearings in 1981, it was estimated that 10-15 percent of the 
cases controverted by RO's were overturned and that claims 
controverted through the AL J level resulted in employers be 
ing successful about 30 percent of the time. 20 These estimates 
were immediately disputed by Mark Solomons, a former 
Labor Department attorney who had become a defense at 
torney retained by some coal mine operators. According to 
him, an appropriate range for reversals obtained by RO's 
was about 35-60 percent. "One major coal mine operator 
has a reversal rate of 78 percent." 21
One rather direct, if not arbitrary and potentially un 
constitutional, manner for dealing with employer controver- 
sion appeared in the House version of the 1977 amendments. 
It provided, quite directly, that no coal mine operator could 
participate in the adjudication of any claim. The provision 
was not retained by the Conference Committee.
In contrast to the claims where liability was assigned to an 
operator, claims were not appealed by the Trust Fund. In 
deed, it is the Secretary of Labor only, and neither the Trust 
Fund nor an employer, who can defend a claim that involves 
the Trust Fund. In practice, where a claim was granted at 
any stage of the claim process, initially or on appeal, there 
would be no appeal by the Secretary to seek to deny benefits, 
comparable to the practice in SSA under the Part B pro 
gram. In the light of the employers' ability to successfully
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controvert initial findings or initial determinations, the 
absence of appeals by the Secretary or the Trust Fund was 
especially disturbing to some, including John Erlenborn. Yet 
the Reagan administration explicitly rejected as unnecessary 
giving the Trust Fund the right of participation and appeal, 
arguing that the claims approval rate by late 1981 had fallen 
to the range of 10-12 percent. 22 Moreover, Secretary Collyer 
forecast that the proposed amendments would cut this accep 
tance rate in half, further reducing the need for the Trust 
Fund to defend itself. The point remains, however, that an 
active defense by or of the Trust Fund between 1978 and 
1981 would have obtained some reversals of entitlements 
likely in the same general range that operators were being 
successful in their appeals of claims. Indeed, knowing that 
claims involving the Trust Fund would not be appealed, 
while those involving responsible operators probably would 
be challenged, the Labor Department staff might have been 
somewhat more lenient in claims involving the Trust Fund.
Aside from the strong likelihood that some benefits were 
awarded where a defense of the Trust Fund would have led 
to denials, there were several other costly aspects of the 
Department's method of administering claims. For one 
thing, the Department found it difficult to identify where 
other offsettable payments were being made to beneficiaries. 
As such, it was widely understood that overpayments were 
being made to miners and survivors who did not notify the 
Labor Department of their circumstances. On this point, 
John Erlenborn testified: "I asked the General Accounting 
Office some years ago to examine how many workers may be 
drawing state as well as federal black lung benefits. The 
answer was that nobody had ever looked, neither social 
security nor the Department of Labor, and they were not cer 
tain that they had a method to find out who was drawing il 
legally these double benefits." 23
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Additionally, a very large problem revolved about the 
payments to claimants where an operator's appeal led to a 
subsequent denial of the claim. Since many of these claims 
might have involved benefits to be paid as of a much earlier 
date, a large payment would have been made shortly after an 
initial determination of entitlement. Lump sum retroactive 
benefits of $10,000 or more were commonplace. The practice 
and amounts became especially significant when denied or 
pending claims were re-reviewed because of the 1977 amend 
ments. Many of these were first filed years earlier, and 
retroactive benefits were paid if the claim eventually was ap 
proved. The essential problem was that once a payment was 
made, the Department was hard-pressed to recover the 
money if the claim was subsequently denied. In practice, the 
Department made very little effort to recover these moneys 
until recent years, putting virtually no staff into the process.
The Department of Labor had few options as to how it 
would deal with the problem. It was being subjected to con 
siderable public criticism regarding the delays in its process 
ing of claims. Congressmen from the mining regions were 
swamping the Department with inquiries regarding the status 
and circumstances of constituents' claims. Once an initial 
determination was made, the appeals process could drag on 
for months or years. Claimants were unable to understand 
why the granting of a claim left anything to be resolved, par 
ticularly since Part B had not involved any such delays or 
subsequent dispute. The 1977 statute required that prompt 
payment be made after initial determination of entitlement, 
though the Labor Department might have been able to delay 
making initial determinations in the process itself. Where the 
Labor Department made some efforts to recover payments 
due to claims reversals, errors in benefits computation, 
duplicate payments, or the death of a miner or change in 
someone's entitlement status, complaints to Congress 
followed. In turn, the Department was accused of harassing
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widows and disabled miners. Simply in terms of the 
pressures coming from the legislative branch, the Depart 
ment had no incentive to seek vigorously to recover over 
payments. Moreover, it was easy to rationalize such practices 
by arguing that the money had already been spent and could 
not be recovered, no matter how energetically the matter was 
pursued.
Aside from the revenue implications, this practice weaken 
ed the integrity of the claims process. There was a view that 
ALJs might be reluctant to reverse decisions where benefits 
had been granted and paid already. To do so, it was argued, 
would have been simply pro forma, as the money was not 
recoverable. Moreover, that would have left the Trust Fund 
with the payment since the responsible operator's appeal had 
been successful. The Department, however, has denied that 
the appeals process was affected by the payments procedure.
The 1981 amendments sought to end the practice. The 
Trust Fund is no longer obligated to pay retroactive lump 
sum benefits where an initial determination of entitlement is 
made but where the operator contests the award.
An evaluation of the performance of the Labor Depart 
ment in administering the black lung program depends both 
on the criteria employed and the vantage point of the 
evaluator. The Department has received very harsh criticism 
from both the employer and the labor sides, with additional 
displeasure registered by Congress, the GAO and even 
groups inside the Department.
The basis for much of the criticism has been described 
above. In the earlier years of the program, the delays and 
enormous backlog were the single most visible aspect of the 
program to the critics. Promptness of payment or claim re 
jection, long a bellwether of well-managed workers' com 
pensation programs, was a test that the Labor Department 
badly failed, whatever the ultimate source of the difficulty.
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From the vantage point of the miners and their 
spokesmen, the Labor Department was seen as too strict and 
unsympathetic an administrator. Testifying in 1978, a UM- 
WA official said that the union had preferred never to have 
the black lung program move out of SSA and to the Labor 
Department. In part, this was because it made the program 
too much like a workers' compensation program and sub 
jected claimants to an adversary process. Beyond this, 
however, was the Labor Department's handling of the claim. 
"The DOL thus far has administered the black lung program 
with a restrictive vengeance rarely encountered elsewhere. It 
is punitive to require more than 600 days for processing a 
claim." 24
Prior to the enactment of the 1977 amendments, Con 
gressman Perkins described the Labor Department's ad 
ministrative procedures as "outright discrimination" against 
the claimants. 23 His assertion was in response to a witness' 
description of the adversary process employed in Part C 
claims.
For the administration that ran the Labor Department 
from 1977 through 1980, the goal was to reduce the enor 
mous disparity between claims entering the system and case 
closings. This has been spelled out unhesitatingly and 
without equivocation by Department spokesmen: "It is im 
portant to point out here that part of what the Department 
of Labor has been trying to do the last two years is to get out 
of this enormous backlog of cases. In less than two years, we 
have decided over 300,000 cases, and we process them at 
something close to 3,000 decisions a week to get this 
monstrous backlog which has been clogging this system for 
over a decade into a manageable process. I think we are do 
ing that, and that is why you see cases moving into the 
system and into the Trust Fund process." 26
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The obvious question that follows is, to what extent did 
this very large movement of claims come at the expense of er 
rors in claims outcomes? A report issued in September 1981 
by the Labor Department's Inspector General's Office 
addresses this directly:
We recognize that program personnel have been at 
tempting to resolve an extremely large backlog of 
claims, generated by recent changes to the enabling 
legislation. However due to the fact that so many 
of the identified losses could have been easily 
detected and prevented, without extensive or 
sophisticated technical resources, we contend that 
there is clearly a need for better balance between 
program production and program integrity.
We stress that although substantial loss and loss 
vulnerabilities within the payment systems have 
been identified, our greater concern related to the 
Division of Coal Miners' Workers' Compensation 
almost total lack of historical interest in and com 
mitment of resources to the prevention of losses, 
and causal factors and implications of such inade 
quacy.
In our view, since the passage of the Black Lung 
Benefits Reform Act of 1977, the Employment 
Standards Administration and Division of Coal 
Miners' Workers' Compensation Management 
have treated the rapid processing of claims and the 
efficient, responsible management of financial 
resources as mutually exclusive objectives, and 
have focused available resources on the processing 
of claims and delivery of payments.
Finally, the Inspector General cited the agency's 
failure to move expeditiously to correct known
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problems in finding, ". . . major historical and 
continuing overpayments generated by faulty and 
inadequately designed and implemented payment 
procedures and systems, is a clear failure to fulfill 
elementary management responsibilities. 27
Responsible Operators
At the beginning of 1974, coal mine operators assumed 
financial liabilities for miners who were disabled or deceased 
due to black lung. For a variety of reasons, identification of 
responsible operators was no simple matter for the Depart 
ment of Labor. First, the nature of the industry's labor 
market is such that workers frequently change jobs. Com 
pounding this was the reality that so many claims under Part 
C stemmed from mine employment that ended many years 
earlier. A further complexity was the frequent turnover of 
ownership of particular mines, along with the leasing of 
mines from owners who did not operate the mine or employ 
any miners. Self-employment of miners complicated matters 
further. It is not surprising that by the time of the 1977 
amendments, DOL was unable to identify a responsible 
operator in 75-80 percent of the claims filed under Part C of 
the law.
The 1977 amendments that created the Black Lung 
Disability Trust Fund helped to clarify, if not eliminate, 
some of these issues for DOL. Our focus here is on the iden 
tification of the liable party since 1978. Responsibility for 
identifying a particular employer as the responsible operator 
rests with the claims examiner. Where the claims examiner 
encounters any difficulty in making this identification, the 
matter is passed on to a "Responsible Operator Section" 
that makes extensive use of state regulatory agency records, 
Bureau of Mines Legal Identity Reports or private sector 
market sources such as Dun and Bradstreet.
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The Trust Fund takes liability in claims where a miner's 
last coal mine employment ended prior to January 1, 1970. 
This represented a significant change in the law inasmuch as 
financial responsibility for claims was previously based on 
the date the claim was filed and not on the date of last 
employment. The Trust Fund also takes liability for claims 
involving employment subsequent to January 1, 1970 where 
the DOL does not identify a responsible employer. Thus, the 
government was able to shift some financial liability to the 
coal industry, which was paying for the Trust Fund, and 
away from itself, even where it could not place the burden on 
a specific employer.
In defining a responsible operator, DOL extends several 
tests. First, it defines a coal miner operator as:
. . . any owner, lessee or other person who 
operates, controls, or supervises a coal mine or any 
independent contractor performing services or con 
struction at such mine. In accordance with Sections 
402(d) and 422(b) of the Act, certain other 
employers, including those engaged in coal mine 
construction, maintenance, and transportation, 
may also be considered to be operators for pur 
poses of this part. An independent contractor or 
self-employed miner, construction worker, coal 
preparation worker, or transportation worker may 
also be considered a coal mine operator. Any 
employer of a miner may be considered a coal mine 
operator, based on the circumstances in the par 
ticular case. 28
For a coal mine operator to be deemed a responsible 
operator, a variety of conditions must be met. First, the 
miner's disability or death must have occurred, in part at 
least, as a result of employment by that operator. In a situa 
tion where a claimant was employed by a coal mine operator
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(and other tests are met), there is a rebuttable presumption 
that the employee was regularly and continuously exposed to 
dust during his employment with the employer. 29 An 
employer may successfully rebut this by proving the 
employee was not exposed to coal dust for significant 
periods during his employment. 30 An employer was able to 
rebut this presumption, thereby avoiding liability, by show 
ing that the claimant suffered from complicated 
pneumoconiosis prior to his first employment with the 
employer. 31
A second necessary condition to be established is that the 
employer must have operated a coal mine after June 30, 
1973, the period when the interim Part C program began. 
Where this condition is not met by the operator, DOL must 
identify another responsible operator or assign liability to 
the Trust Fund.
A third test consists of two parts. The employee must have 
been employed by the (potential) responsible operator for at 
least one year. By regulation, DOL has determined that one 
year means 125 days of work. Further, the one year can have 
occurred over any period of time, e.g., only 25 days 
employed each year for the past five years. Aside from the 
one-year minimum employment criterion, the miner also 
must have worked for the operator at least one day after 
December 31, 1969.
A final criterion for designating an employer as the 
responsible operator is that the employer must be capable of 
assuming liability. According to the regulations, this can be 
established where there is insurance, including self- 
insurance, where the firm has sufficient assets to assume 
potential costs of liability, or even where the operator has an 
existing business. If none of these is demonstrated, the 
operator may avoid being identified as the responsible 
operator, but may be subject to penalties for failure to insure 
under the act.
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The criteria listed above could conceivably be met by more 
than a single operator in a specific claim. The Labor Depart 
ment's practice is to assign liability to the most recent of the 
employers meeting these essential qualifications. Generally, 
if the mine ownership changes hands, which appears to occur 
frequently in this industry, liability moves with it to the suc 
cessor operator. The 1977 amendments changed this in one 
respect. Where a mine operator, assuming all other criteria 
are met, sells the mine where the disabled or deceased miner 
was employed, liability is retained by that operator if the 
employer remains as an operator in the coal mining industry. 
Where that condition is not met, the successor operator is 
liable for the costs of the claim.
Identifying a responsible operator may involve some dif 
ficulties for the DOL in establishing the facts involved. For 
example, to find a cumulative year of employment may re 
quire delving into some ancient history. Further, the respon 
sible operator may not sit still while being so designated, par 
ticularly when another operator may be shifting the burden 
away from itself. The temptation for the agency is to shift 
the liability to the Trust Fund, avoiding the controversy but 
not jeopardizing the claimant's rights to compensation. In 
deed, the claimant will face less of an adversary situation 
where the Trust Fund has potential liability than where a 
mine operator (or its insurance carrier) is the potential source 
of benefits. While the temptation may be strong to pursue 
this path of least resistance, the DOL has made it clear to its 
Deputy Commissioners that "it is the intent of Congress that 
liability for payment of benefits be assigned to a coal mine 
operator whenever possible." 32
The lines demarcating the liability of a responsible 
operator (and its insurer), the Trust Fund, and the U.S. 
Treasury through either Social Security under Part B or 
DOL for some Part C claims were not always clear. Aside 
from the obvious confusion that this generated for all the
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parties concerned, the 1977 amendments created a subse 
quent furor with a seemingly innocuous change in the law. 
The 1977 law forced a review of all previously pending or 
denied claims. This included claims filed between January 1, 
1970 and June 30, 1973, which were, of course, claims filed 
under Part B for benefits from SSA. The 1977 amendments 
caused the date of application for reopening to be considered 
as the filing date of the claim. As such, this made these 
former Part B claims to be Part C claims and the respon 
sibility of mine operators and their insurers or the Trust 
Fund. Of course, mine operators were liable only if the 
criteria described above were met, including the one 
stipulating that the claimant be employed for at least one day 
after January 1, 1970. Approximately 8,000-10,000 
claimants who were awarded benefits under this review, had 
been turned down originally under Part B, and now became 
the burden of responsible operators.
Congressman Perkins introduced HR 7745 in the second 
session of the 96th Congress to shift these claims to the Trust 
Fund. Congressman Erlenborn expressed suspicion that the 
motive behind the Perkins move was that the Trust Fund was 
less likely to controvert a claim than was a private employer. 
Not surprisingly, the UMWA was a major supporter of the 
bill. When the Act was amended in 1981 the insurance in 
dustry effectively rallied behind this provision, and benefits 
were made the liability of the Trust Fund and not of the in 
dividual operators—and their insurers.
This change ended a potentially nasty battle that was 
brewing over who had liability in these cases. Insurers had no 
intention of paying claims against their insureds when they 
had collected no premiums for this. 33 Mine operators were 
not readily prepared to accept financial responsibility fully 
and let insurers off the hook. Ultimately, as a Trust Fund 
liability, the coal industry had to pay, even though the claims 
originally had been the responsibility of the federal govern 
ment.
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Statutes of Limitation
One of the serious barriers to compensation for victims of 
occupational disease can be a statute of limitation. In state 
workers' compensation laws, a variety of such rules has serv 
ed to deny potential claimants an opportunity to be compen 
sated. 34 The three most common types of these barriers are 
the recent exposure rule, the minimum exposure rule, and 
the filing date-disability rule. The first such limit bars certain 
classes of claims, often involving pulmonary-respiratory ill 
nesses, where the employee has had no occupational ex 
posure to the hazard in question for some period of time. 
The minimum exposure rule requires that the worker has 
spent sufficient time—usually measured in years or shifts of 
work—being exposed to the hazard in question. Short of 
meeting this minimum, the claim would be barred. The last 
rule stipulates that the claim for compensation must be filed 
within some time period after the disability began, or after 
the worker knew or should have known of the disability, or 
some variation of this.
Statutes of limitation or other time-related barriers to fil 
ing claims can pose serious difficulties for the claimant, par 
ticularly in the case of long-latent diseases. Under the black 
lung law, however, minimum exposure and recent exposure 
concepts do not serve to bar any claims. Instead, where they 
are found (as for example in sections 411(c) (1), (2), (4) and 
(5)), they serve as criteria for allowing the claimant to invoke 
presumptions that ease the burden of proof. As such, the re 
cent exposure or minimum exposure usage under black lung 
is not similar to the application found in certain state laws.
The 1969 law, which was unchanged in this respect in the 
1972 amendments, did contain a restrictive statute of limita 
tion. Specifically, it required that any claim for benefits 
under Part C be filed within three years of the discovery of 
total disability due to pneumoconiosis or, in the case of a
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death claim, within three years of that occurrence. (Given 
the temporary character of Part B, there was no need for a 
statute of limitation under the Social Security Administra 
tion portion of the law.) The law created a special difficulty 
for widows in some of the older cases that were filed as Part 
C claims. The Department of Labor estimated in 1977 that 
90 percent of the survivors' claims denied until then had been 
barred by this statute of limitation, and not by any review of 
substantive evidence. 35 In fact, the statute of limitation was 
probably more important even than this record of denials 
suggests, since some widows probably submitted no claims 
due to this barrier.
The 1977 amendments made three significant changes in 
the law with respect to the time limitation on the filing of 
claims. First, the three-year time limit on filing for survivors 
was eliminated. Thus, there is no longer any statute of 
limitation in death claims. Second, in the case of claims by 
living miners, a more liberal rule was enacted allowing claims 
to be filed within three years of a medical determination of 
total disability due to pneumoconiosis, or within three years 
of the effective date of the amendments (March 1, 1978), 
whichever was later. As such, no claim filed by a living miner 
until after March 1, 1981 could be barred by a statute of 
limitation.
The final change in the 1977 amendments eliminated a 
specific time-based barrier to miners or survivors seeking to 
invoke the section 411(c) (4) presumption (the 15-year 
presumption). This change simply widened the applicability 
of the presumption.
The Department of Labor regulations, as adapted from 
section 20 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act, establish a rebuttable presumption that 
every claim for black lung benefits is timely filed. (See 20 
CFR 725.308(c).) The regulation adds, however, that the
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time limits on filing are mandatory and cannot be waived. 
The import of these two rules is that where any dispute oc 
curs regarding a possible late filing, the burden of proof rests 
with the Trust Fund or the responsible operator to show that 
the claim is not timely.
Attorney Fees
The manner and substance of employee representation 
under the black lung law have not been without controversy. 
Some attorneys and other worker representatives, including 
officials of Black Lung Associations, have purportedly made 
very large sums of money under the program. Some inter 
views with persons close to the program reveal a view that 
for little more work than preparing claim forms for miners 
or their survivors, and by doing this in volume, some in 
dividual representatives have collected hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in fees per year. This section describes 
the process of setting and paying legal fees for claimant 
representation. There are no special procedures in place with 
respect to fees for defense representation.
There is no requirement that a claimant's representative be 
an attorney. Where the representative is not an attorney, the 
adjudication officer, where one is involved, must give ap 
proval of the individual designated. Fees to representatives 
are set by the appropriate adjudication officer (or by the 
Benefits Review Board). Any prior agreement or contract 
between the claimant and the representative regarding fees is 
not valid since the fee is set by the adjudication officer when 
the claim is resolved. Fees are awarded only where a claim 
has been prosecuted successfully. The claimant will not pay a 
fee for legal services where a claim is rejected and there are 
no benefits granted.
In the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Har 
bor Workers' Compensation Act, Congress adopted the
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principle that the attorney's fee could be added on to the 
claimant's award. 36 In terms of representation, those provi 
sions have been incorporated into the administration of the 
black lung program. Thus, there are circumstances where the 
representative's fee is paid by the employer, over and above 
the benefits payable to the black lung claimant. Essentially, 
where the employer declines to pay any benefits within 30 
days after receipt of written notice of liability, the subse 
quent fees incurred by the successful claimant are the defen 
dant's liability.
Where the claimant's representative is not an attorney in a 
controverted case, the fee must be paid out of the claimant's 
award. The reason for this special treatment of such 
representatives is that the Department of Labor believes that 
the language of the Longshore Act imposes it.
Where an attorney's fee for services is set by an adjudica 
tion officer, it becomes a lien against the claimant's award 
unless it is the defendant's responsibility. Where the 
representative of the claimant is not an attorney, no lien is 
made against the benefits award. Again, DOL's belief is that 
the Longshore Act would not allow such a procedure in the 
latter situation.
At the time the regulations were approved by DOL in 
August 1978, it was the Department's opinion that the Black 
Lung Disability Trust Fund was not able legally to pay a 
claimant's legal fees. This practice has been changed, so that 
where the Fund does controvert a claim and benefits are 
subsequently awarded, the Fund is liable for the attorney 
fees, over and above the claimant's award.
On what basis is the claimant's representation fee set? The 
regulations provide the following guidelines:
Any fee approved under . . . this section shall be 
reasonably commensurate with the necessary work
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done and shall take into account the quality of the 
representation, the qualifications of the represen 
tative, the complexity of the legal issues involved, 
the level of proceedings to which the claim was rais 
ed, the level at which the representative entered the 
proceedings, and any other information, which 
may be relevant to the amount of fee requested. 37
The DOL acknowledges the policy that rates are not to be 
set so low as to drive competent attorneys from the field. The 
adjudication officer may take into account the risk taken by 
the attorney in representing a claimant where no fee at all 
would be paid if there are no benefits awarded. Lay 
representatives of claimants are to receive lower hourly rates 
than are attorneys. Attorneys experienced and familiar with 
black lung claims procedures may receive higher hourly rates 
than those who are less experienced. 38
Representation fees have been a continuing source of con 
flict involving DOL, attorneys and employers. In 1980, 
about 40 percent of the appeals of black lung claims to the 
Benefits Review Board involved the matter of attorneys 
fees. 39 It has been the single issue most frequently appealed 
at this level. Employers and insurers have appealed 
"add-on** awards to attorneys that they regard as excessive, 
and the attorneys have been active in appealing claims where 
DOL has cut the fee the attorney sought to charge.
The attorney fee allowed by DOL is discretionary. If the 
employer challenges the award, it has the burden of 
demonstrating that the assessment "is arbitrary, capricious 
or an abuse of discretion.*' 40 If the employer fails to object 
to the fee application before the adjudicating officer, the 
Benefits Review Board has held that the employer cannot 
later object or appeal.
Where the attorney's fee is substantially reduced from the 
requested amount, the adjudication officer must provide suf-
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ficient reasoning to support the reduction. If the reasoning is 
insufficient, the Benefits Review Board will vacate the deci 
sion and remand the case for more specific findings. The fee 
can be reduced through either of two means. First, the 
amount of time for services may be viewed as excessive. The 
attorney is required to provide some detail to the ad 
judicating officer on the hours of each of the services provid 
ed. Second, the adjudicating officer may find the hourly rate 
to be unacceptable, and reduce it. Either or both of these 
methods have been employed frequently by DOL to reduce 
fees, and have often been appealed by the dissatisfied at 
torney. The matter appears to have occupied considerable 
time and energy of parties in the hearings and appellate pro 
cesses.
Insurance Arrangements
In order to understand the black lung program, one needs 
to be sensitive to the ambitious goal set by Congress that pro 
vided for private insurance arrangements. Probably aiming 
at a close replication of existing state workers' compensation 
laws and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, the 
Congress permitted coal mine operators to privately insure 
themselves against claims for black lung. In allowing the 
operators to choose the method of insurance they wished, 
Congress opened the door to yet another interest group that 
could be expected to develop a stake in the program. It also 
meant that a tangled web of relationships emerged among in 
surers, state agencies, mine operators, miner representatives 
and federal authorities.
The Part C program initially made individual mine 
operators the principal source of money to support benefit 
payments. With one significant exception, the operators 
were required to be insured for worthy black lung claims, 
should they be designated as the responsible operator. In 
surance could be secured in one of two ways. First, upon ap-
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proval of the Secretary of Labor, a mine operator could self- 
insure. Group self-insurance was also permitted. Alter 
natively, the operator could purchase black lung insurance in 
the market place, either from a private carrier licensed by the 
state to sell workers' compensation in that jurisdiction, or, if 
available, from a state insurance fund. Operators that did 
not secure themselves in one of these ways could be subject 
to a civil action with fines of up to $1,000 for each day of 
noncompliance, and possible criminal action.
The significant exception to the insurance requirement in 
volved those employers in either the coal transportation or 
construction sectors. While the law made such employers 
potentially responsible to pay black lung claims, they are not 
coal mine operators. As such DOL has no requirement that 
they maintain black lung insurance, except that they must 
secure the payments of benefits for specific claims against 
them at the time they incur a liability.
A recent DOL annual report describing the black lung pro 
gram summarizes the existing insurance arrangements under 
the law. 41 There are approximately 4,500 coal mine operators 
required by the law to maintain insurance. About 90 percent 
of these operators had secured insurance through either 
private carriers or a state fund. Ninety-six applications had 
been authorized for self-insurance covering approximately 
200 companies. In calendar 1981, 14 applications were made 
to self-insure, of which 4 were approved, 2 denied and the re 
mainder were pending at the end of the year.
The provision of black lung insurance has been highly con 
centrated in the insurance industry. In 1978, a single private 
carrier, Old Republic Insurance Company, wrote 31 percent 
of all the insurance policies for black lung written in that 
year. The next largest private carrier was the Travelers In 
surance Company with 7 percent of the policies sold. 42 
Almost 90 percent of the coal mine operators that are in-
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sured purchase their coverage from only 12 carriers. 43 In 
Ohio and West Virginia, exclusive state fund states, workers' 
compensation cannot be sold by private insurance carriers.
Rate-making for black lung is especially complicated 
because of the multiple sources of benefits. More specifical 
ly, the rate applied to the payroll of coal mine operators in 
different states will reflect the likelihood that a disabled 
miner or survivor will file a claim initially at the state level 
and subsequently at the federal level, or in one jurisdiction 
only. In several instances at the state level, compensation for 
dust diseases may be partly or fully the liability of a state 
fund and, hence, not reflected in the premiums paid under a 
workers' compensation black lung policy. Since benefits 
paid by such a fund will reduce the operator's individual 
liability, the premium paid by the operator will be lower, all 
other things being equal. Since state benefits remain at a con 
stant level once benefits payments have begun, but the 
federal benefit level is indexed to federal employee salary 
levels, persons drawing only state benefits or state and 
federal benefits are expected to depend increasingly in the 
future on federal payments, raising the potential liability of 
mine operators and their insurers. 44
It has been noted that rates on insurance purchased from 
private carriers vary because of different state practices, e.g., 
the provision of some or all state benefits through a special 
state fund, and because of decisions by state insurance com 
missions in rate filings. Yet another reason for differences is 
that the rate reflects an estimate of the number of compen- 
sable responsible operator claims in the state related to the 
total number of actived miners in the state. Thus, rates will 
be higher, all other things held constant, where employment 
in earlier years was higher—or current levels of mine 
employment are now depressed relative to former times. 
Also, rates will be higher where there have been more ac-
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cepted claims on responsible operators. Numerous claims for 
black lung involving private insurers have been accepted by 
the states of Pennsylvania, Kentucky and Virginia, the latter 
being the only state which typically compensates for partial 
disability due to black lung. By contrast, Colorado, Illinois 
and Indiana have regularly rejected most state claims for 
black lung. 45 The customary policy provided is simply a 
black lung compensation endorsement attached to a 
workers' compensation policy. Such a policy protects the 
operator from claims brought in either the state or federal 
jurisdiction.
Why did the insurance industry decide to write policies for 
black lung insurance? In several respects the decision to do 
so was not a simple one. The industry had virtually no ex 
perience in dealing with such a phenomenon as black lung, 
where the determination of eligibility for benefits was sub 
ject to such a high degree of variability, based on shifting 
policies and politics involving both the executive and 
legislative branches of government. Further, future benefits 
under black lung were indexed both in new claims and where 
benefits had already been established, creating uncertainties 
as to appropriate reserve practices and rates. And quite 
unlike virtually all forms of conventional insurance, the in 
surers were covering a condition that had already existed for 
many of the prospective claimants. The contingency for 
which insurance was being sold was not the development of 
disabling or killing disease, since in most cases these events 
had already occurred. Instead, the event that was being in 
sured was that a claim would be filed and benefits granted by 
DOL. This clearly represented an unconventional, insurable 
risk.
The decision to provide black lung insurance reveals a good 
deal about the industry's concerns at that time. One industry 
source who has been very close to this program has explained 
it in this way:
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First, and perhaps foremost, the federal govern 
ment was playing a very active role in evaluating 
workers' compensation in 1972. Considerable 
discussion of federal standards for state laws under 
the threat of federal intervention was prevalent in 
1972. We all know of the 19 essential recommenda 
tions of the National Commission that set 
minimum standards for state laws and caused much 
state legislative action in the 1970's. The industry 
was looking for a chance to prove its usefulness and 
cooperate with the federal government. We were 
not anxious to see the federal government continue 
as providers of insurance in any form. 46
The threat to the insurance industry from federal en 
croachment into state workers' compensation programs may 
or may not have been real, but Congress had considered the 
creation of a federal insurance fund. Indeed, the 1977 
amendments created the authority for DOL to establish such 
a fund should it find that insurance was not available at 
reasonable cost to coal mine operators. At that time the con 
gressional conferees made it clear that such a fund was not to 
become a pool for high risk operators, as some state funds 
appeared to have become under workers' compensation. If 
such a fund were to be created, it was to charge rates consis 
tent with accepted actuarial practices. A federal black lung 
insurance fund would have been viewed with concern by the 
insurance industry, primarily as it might serve as the vehicle 
to expand beyond black lung into other lines of coverage.
Two additional reasons were given for the industry's will 
ingness to underwrite black lung insurance. The industry 
thought that the vast bulk of the old claims had been dealt 
with under the Part B program, and that they were insuring, 
effectively, those miners still employed. Further, the in 
dustry believed that rates would be adequate to deal with 
eventual claims. "We had the liberty of charging a substan-
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tially high rate with a large margin for error. A 40% load 
was included in the initial rate to handle contingencies. The 
rates exceeded $25 per $100 of payroll in some states, surely 
that would be enough.'* 47
The process of rate-setting for black lung appears to have 
been far more complicated than for state workers' compen 
sation schemes. First, while benefits and eligibility criteria 
are set federally, rates are generally subject to approval by 
the individual state insurance commissioners. The varying 
degrees of success in having proposed rates approved by 
these agencies partly explains the very large interstate dif 
ferences in the black lung rates being paid by the mine 
operators.
Table 5.1
Occupational Disease Premium Rates
by Major Coal Producing States, Underground Exposure,





















































SOURCE: Cols. 1 and 2, DOL Annual Report for 1979, p. 37, and Col. 3 from DOL An 
nual Report for 1981, p. 4. 
'Federal black lung increment only.
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As noted above, historic data were of no use in the initial 
rate-making efforts in 1973. By way of reducing the risks im 
posed on the insurance industry, the 40 percent surcharge 
was imposed. To further reduce the risks of any single car 
rier, the bulk of the insurance was placed in reinsurance 
pools. Estimates of the potential for claims were based in 
part on NIOSH studies of the incidence of black lung 
disease.
From 1974 until the end of the decade, insurers found this 
line of business to be highly profitable. Because of delays in 
claim processing, along with employer resistance when 
designated as responsible operators, very few black lung 
benefits were actually paid to claimants. As Table 5.1 
demonstrates, from July 1, 1973 until 1980, the majority of 
the major coal producing states actually reduced their rates. 
The industry's windfall ended suddenly in 1979-80 for two 
reasons, First, the enormous backlog of unresolved claims 
that had built up in DOL since 1974 had been processed. 
Partly because of the 1977 amendments liberalizing eligibili 
ty for benefits, a significant share of these were accepted and 
became the responsibility of an insurer. Second, the 1977 
amendments allowed for a review of all previously denied 
claims under Part B and C, swelling further the applicant 
pool. Many of these claims eventually resulted in 
employer/insurer liability.
Making matters even worse was the inability of the in 
dustry to obtain up-to-date and reliable data on claims and 
awards, due largely to DOL's inability to develop an effec 
tive information system. Operating in the dark, the industry 
was hard-pressed to evaluate the dimensions of the liabilities 
it faced. Further, inadequate data meant that evidence could 
not be developed so as to obtain adequate rate increases in all 
the various states in which they operated. The industry 
would have had little problem with a growing liability for
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black lung, had it developed gradually and in a manner that 
allowed rates to be adjusted accordingly. Moreover, the 
earlier experience of considerable profitability from this line 
may have made the industry's plight less compelling to state 
insurance commissions.
As noted elsewhere, the industry was also embroiled in a 
controversy with both DOL and some employers over those 
reviewed claims that had been initially filed prior to July 1, 
1973. While these claims were originally denied under Part 
B, they became the potential liability of responsible 
operators after the 1977 amendments. The industry argued 
that no premiums had ever been paid to provide insurance 
for these applicants.
The result of the 1977 amendments and the DOL's speed 
in moving claims was a suddenly dismal condition for the in 
dustry. The culmination of all this was two widely circulated 
reported by a securities analyst spelling out the industry's 
plight. 48 Emanating from an insurance specialist operating 
from Hartford, the later report estimated that the industry 
was seriously under-reserved. Specifically, it estimated that 
the insurance pool held only $520 million in reserves as com 
pared to a present value of reserves required of from $599 
million to $999 million based on a projection of successful 
claims reported through 1980 (using a discount rate of 3-1/2 
percent). On this basis, the pool was under-reserved by 
somewhere between $79 million and $479 million—in present 
value terms—which Conning calculated as being 0.6 to 3.4 
percent of all earned premiums for workers' compensation 
in 1980. Conning's report described how this situation had 
developed so suddenly by pointing out that DOL had ap 
proved, overall, 59,425 claims from July 1,1973 until March 
14,1980, of which 21,919 claims were approved between Oc 
tober 19, 1979 and mid-March of 1980. As opposed to a 
gradual and easily recognized growth of claims to which the
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industry (and rates) could adjust, black lung insurers instead 
were overwhelmed by a tidal wave of claims. The industry's 
response was to push vigorously for higher rates and to lob 
by for legislative relief culminating in the 1981 amendments.
The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund
Background
For a variety of reasons, a coalition of the interest groups 
formed around the concept of a Trust Fund to pay benefits 
under the Part C program. Legislatively, the origin of such a 
fund was HR 10760, in the 94th Congress, which passed in 
the House of Representatives in 1975. This version created 
an insurance trust with coal operators serving as trustees of 
the fund. In 1976, the Senate studied a somewhat different 
version than the one approved in the House in 1975 that used 
a tax mechanism to support such a fund. The end of the ses 
sion arrived before the Senate took any final action on the 
bill.
In the 95th Congress, a Trust Fund bill, HR 4544 cleared 
the House. A similar bill with a different type of tax from the 
one approved by the House cleared the Senate in S 2538 
resulting, ultimately, in Public Law 95-227, the Black Lung 
Benefits Revenue Act of 1977.
As noted, support for a trust fund emerged from several 
sources. In testimony before the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, Arnold Miller, President of the UM- 
WA, endorsed a trust fund approach and urged that all new 
black lung claims, where worthy, be compensated from such 
a fund. 49 His preference for a trust fund approach stemmed 
from his displeasure with the adversarial approach taken by 
most of the coal mine operators who were named in specific 
claims as responsible operators. Miller's aim, quite openly, 
was to replace the adversarial process by one device or
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another, and the trust fund would be an acceptable means to 
accomplish that.
Carl Bagge, president of the National Coal Association, 
testified at the same set of hearings as Miller and, while not 
endorsing the trust fund approach, he made precise recom 
mendations as to how the fund should be financed. John J. 
Kilcullen, speaking for the National Independent Coal 
Operators Association, endorsed the trust fund as an accept 
able alternative, // there had to be a federal black lung pro 
gram. Kilcullen argued that the fund should be used solely 
where no responsible operator was identified. He also warn 
ed that unless approvals for payments were made by fund 
trustees, presumably coal mine operator representatives, 
DOL's Office of Workers' Compensation programs would 
err on the side of excessive generosity in approving payouts 
from the fund.
The coal mine operators who supported a trust fund 
believed it allowed for greater certainty or predictability in 
terms of their costs. From their vantage point, claims had 
been assigned to individual operators on an almost 
haphazard basis.
Donald Elisburg, only recently confirmed as Assistant 
Secretary for Employment Standards in the DOL, testified in 
favor of using a trust fund. He argued, with Arnold Miller 
and with Rep. Perkins, that the adversary process was 
detrimental to the administration of the program, and he 
seemed to support the possibility of eliminating it entirely.
Overall then, the UMWA and the new Carter administra 
tion endorsed some type of trust fund approach, as did at 
least some significant portions of the coal mine operator 
community. Additionally, with Perkins solidly behind the 
idea, and with little opposition save for some warnings by 
Erlenborn about the potential for abuse, the success of the 
legislative initiative was assured.
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Trust Fund Responsibilities
The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund created under the
1977 legislation was primarily responsible for paying benefits 
(both medical expenses and cash compensation) to eligible 
miners and their dependents in two situations. First, it was 
the source of funds in Part C claims where DOL was unable 
to identify a responsible operator. Up until then, these 
claims had been paid out of general revenues; as of April 1,
1978 they would be paid out of the Trust Fund. Second, the 
Trust Fund was to pay for worthy claims where the last coal 
mine employment occurred prior to January 1, 1970, i.e., 
before the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act took effect. 
With many such old claims still being filed with DOL, along 
with many others pending determination as to entitlement or 
liability at the time the bill was enacted, it is clear that these 
old cases constituted a sizable potential expense for the Trust 
Fund.
Prior to the 1977 law, Part C claims were to be the liability 
of responsible operators, where they existed and could be 
identified, even when the last coal mine employment occur 
red before 1970. Only a tiny handful of these claims were ac 
tually being paid by the operators, who controverted virtual 
ly all such claims for old cases. Given the delays in DOL and 
the Benefits Review Board in adjudicating such claims, 
claimants were paid by DOL and not by the coal mine 
operators, at least until liability was resolved on a case by 
case basis. Since the 1977 law now made the Trust Fund the 
source of payment for claims based on last coal mine 
employment prior to 1970, it made sense to no longer extract 
continuing payment from the few operators who were paying 
such claims at the time of the amendments. Instead, the law 
had the Trust Fund reimburse those few operators who 
already had incurred some expenses in paying for these 
claims.
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The Trust Fund's other financial responsibility was to 
reimburse the government for payments made under Part C 
claims between January 1, 1974 and March 31, 1978, along 
with the administrative expenses incurred by the agency. 
Based upon these charges and the reimbursement of the coal 
mine operators who paid claims where the last employment 
preceded January 1, 1970, the Trust Fund incurred an im 
mediate, one-shot expense of over $90 million, about 30 per 
cent of which represented a repayment of government ad 
ministrative expenses.
The 1977 amendments required a review of thousands of 
claims that were pending at that time or had been denied 
previously by DOL and SSA. Where a Part C claim was 
found worthy upon review and originated from a last coal 
mine employment that preceded 1970, this was to be a liabili 
ty of the Trust Fund. Since such benefits were payable as of 
the date of filing the claim or January 1, 1974—whichever 
was later—many of the reviewed claims that were accepted 
involved sizable retroactive benefit payments in lump-sums 
to miners of dependents.
A final responsibility of the Trust Fund was the obligation 
to pay interest charges on any advances from the U.S. 
Treasury, if and when revenues proved inadequate to meet 
fund obligations. This, along with the less significant but 
symbolic charge to the Trust Fund of expenses incurred in 
program administration, revealed the interest by Congress in 
pushing as much of the cost of black lung onto the coal in 
dustry as possible. To some extent, it reflected congressional 
anger over the industry's earlier reluctance to accept the 
financial burdens of the program in the period 1974 to 1977.
Trust Fund Revenues
The decision to create a trust fund that was to be fully paid 
for by the coal industry must be viewed as a political expe-
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dient. If the decision had been instead to tap general 
revenues, political reaction to the program generally, and the 
liberalizing amendments of 1977 in particular, would have 
been more difficult to overcome. By appearing to place the 
direct burden on the coal industry, Congress seemed to 
satisfy the traditional conservative goal of "internalizing" to 
the industry the social costs that emerged from coal produc 
tion. It also seemed to promote the notion that individual 
operators might operate less dusty and hazardous mines in 
order to keep future Trust Fund obligations lower. The Trust 
Fund satisfied an even vaguer notion that, since the industry 
had profited in the past from operating disease-producing 
mines, some punitive action of this sort could be justified.
A variety of problems are involved with each of these 
views. Yet, the Trust Fund concept, based on a charge to 
mine operators, can be defended on the most significant 
grounds of all, that is, in 1977 it was a politically acceptable 
scheme to fund benefits. In a search for someone to pay for 
claims emerging from pre-1970 coal mine employment or in 
the absence of any identifiable responsible operator, the coal 
industry was an available source of "deep pockets." The in 
dustry bore sufficient guilt in the public mind for permitting 
the disease, and its uncooperative approach until 1977 did 
little to cast it in a more favorable light.
What are the major objections to a trust fund based on 
coal industry funding? First, the coal industry of 1978, or of 
subsequent years, is not the industry of 1969 or of earlier 
decades. In theory, internalizing costs would force a pro 
ducer to bear the social as well as the private costs of produc 
tion. In turn, product prices would reflect the full costs of 
production, both public and private costs, thereby encourag 
ing users to purchase alternative products that are now 
relatively cheaper.
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These conventional arguments have been used to justify 
workers' compensation insurance systems. 30 Where they 
have merit is in cases involving injuries due to accidents. The 
theory is not acceptable, however, when applied to long- 
latent occupational diseases that are derived from hazardous 
exposures of earlier periods. One cannot justify internalizing 
a cost today, except perhaps in a punitive sense, for a pro 
duct that was priced and sold 5, 10, or 20 years ago.
As a punitive or socially vindictive approach, the coal in 
dustry's responsibility to be the sole source of support for 
the Trust Fund is equally hard to justify. Many of the coal 
mine operators of 1978 had not been in the industry at the 
time that earlier exposures to dust were causing black lung. 
Many of those operators who had been responsible for 
dustry or hazardous mines were long since removed from the 
coal scene. Profits made as a consequence of such practices 
years or decades ago could hardly be tracked down and 
reclaimed for such a trust fund. Some of those profits had 
been distributed to stockholders with little or no long-term 
commitment to the shares of ownership that they held at one 
time. Higher profits conceivably helped fuel demands by 
miners for higher wages and benefits, making them partial 
beneficiaries of practices that enlarged the profits of earlier 
coal mine operators. Additionally, if unhealthy mines per 
mitted coal to be sold at lower prices than would have occur 
red if sanitary and healthful conditions had been maintain 
ed, then benefits from such practices also accrued to coal 
users in the form of lower prices for electrical or heating ser 
vices, as well as steel and other coal-using products. The 
failure to internalize coal costs in earlier years when miners 
were being exposed to coal mine dust meant that the public, 
consisting of individuals and businesses outside of the coal 
industry, in those years were beneficiaries also. As such, it 
seems difficult to justify limiting the financial supporters of 
the Trust Fund to the existing coal industry of 1978 and
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beyond, except on the grounds that it would be acceptable 
politically.
In theory, once the coal industry is identified as the source 
of funds, there are three possible types of taxes that could be 
levied. The nature of the coal business is such that there are 
enormous intraindustry effects of the different types of tax 
selected.
One approach could have involved a payroll type of tax, 
with some limited justification based on the notion that the 
more employees there are in a mine, the higher the potential 
source of future claimants. This would have moved the fund 
ing mechanism somewhat into line with the basis for 
workers' compensation benefits. Such a tax would be most 
costly to labor-intensive mining operations, putting them at 
a competitive disadvantage with more capital-intensive pro 
ducers. The more labor-intensive mines tended to be in Ap- 
palachia, where considerable disemployment had been oc 
curring already, and were also in the areas that were most 
unionized. Such an approach could be expected to hasten the 
substitution of capital for labor in the labor-intensive mines 
or to simply shut them down, a circumstance that was unac 
ceptable both to members of Congress from underground 
mining regions and to mine workers' unions.
The other two approaches to an industry tax could involve 
a levy on the sales price of coal, or a tax on the coal tonnage 
sold. In 1977, the Senate bill provided for the former while 
the House version created a tax based on the latter. A ton 
nage tax had a type of precedent with the UMWA health and 
pension plans having been funded, through collective 
bargaining, with a tonnage charge.
The significance of each of these approaches derives from 
the large price differences that exist for coal. Strip mine coal 
and western coal usually sell for considerably less than do
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underground mined coal and eastern coal. Coal burned by 
utilities is of different quality and price than metallurgical 
coal. Thus the form of the tax can differentially impact 
various parts of the industry. Examples of this are evident 
from table 5.2.
Table 5.2
1979 Average Prices, FOB Mine, 






















SOURCE: Provided by the Department of Energy, Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Ways and Means, House of Representatives, July 27, September 28, 1981, Serial 97-32, 
1981. 
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The congressional conferees settled on a hybrid tax that 
represented something of a compromise in the positions of 
the two houses. The 1977 act provided for a fixed tax per ton 
of coal sold, with the rates set so that underground mines 
paid $.50 per ton while strip miners paid only $.25 per ton. 
Additionally, if these rates resulted in a tax that would ex 
ceed 2 percent of the sales price of the coal, the 2 percent rate 
would apply.
Another consideration in the method of taxation selected 
by the Congress involved the nature of sales contracts in the 
industry. Some coal is sold under long-term contracts to ma 
jor consumers. An excise tax levied on the sale is (initially) 
paid by the consumer, while a tonnage tax is paid by the 
seller. Economists know that the ultimate incidence of the
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tax may fall on either or both parties to the transaction ac 
cording to underlying conditions of the supply of and de 
mand for coal. Where there are long-term contracts in place 
however, and there is no renegotiation of them, a tonnage 
tax will fall entirely on the coal supplier and not on the pur 
chaser. The mine operator whose coal tended to be sold 
under these long-term contracts preferred an excise tax ap 
proach, but the idea was unacceptable to Congress. The 
legislators wanted the tax to fall, and appear to fall, squarely 
on the coal mine operators.
At the time that Congress was considering a change in the 
Trust Fund coal tax in 1981, one industry spokesman gave 
the following demonstration of the differential impact of the 
1977 tax. Martin White, vice president and general manager 
of the Western Energy Company, a Montana surface mining 
company, pointed to the following: for the second calendar 
quarter of 1981, underground mines produced 10.2 
tons/man-day; at $.50/ton, they paid $5.10 tax/man-day. 31 
On average, surface miners produced 35.2 tons/man-day 
and at a rate of $.25/ton, paid $8.80 tax/man-day. In Mon 
tana, average surface mining production was 119.6 
tons/man-day, at $.25/ton, or a Trust Fund tax of $29.90 
tax/man-day. Thus, the Montana operator paid almost six 
times the tax rate per worker that an average underground 
operator did, despite the fact that the health risks of 
underground mining were considerably greater than of sur 
face operations."
Trust Fund Adequacy
In the light of the earlier experience under the black lung 
program, it was hardly surprising that the Trust Fund's 
needs were very badly underestimated and, therefore, under 
financed. The Trust Fund's inadequacy stemmed from 
several sources. The volume of new incoming claims was 
underestimated, as was the forecast rate of acceptance of
Coverage & Administration 191
new and reviewed claims by DOL. Interest payments to the 
Treasury to repay advances were required by the statute to be 
based on market interest rates, and these became quite high 
after 1977. 33 More important, they were considerably higher 
than the 6 percent rate charged to coal mine operators who 
were required to repay the Fund for payments to a claimant. 
The 6 percent rate was set by DOL regulation. 54 Further, 
benefits paid by the Fund were indexed and rose somewhat 
with the inflation rate. The tax, however, being a flat-level 
tonnage tax, was unaffected by inflation (except as the 2 per 
cent of selling price maximum was affected) and varied only 
with coal output. Even the absence of recession in 1980-81 
would have found the Trust Fund in difficulty, but the 
economic circumstances of the industry totally undermined 
the original approach.
The actual experience of the Trust Fund is indicated in 
table 5.3.
Table 5.3













































SOURCES: Adapted from Black Lung Benefits Act, Annual Report on Administration of 
the Act during Calendar Year 1981, U.S. Department of Labor, Table 4, and Background 
Material and Dates on Major Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways 
and Means, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, February 18, 1982, p. 241.
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The table shows that the Trust Fund was very badly under 
financed in each of the years it existed and that it rapidly in 
curred a cumulative debt to the Treasury of over $1.5 billion. 
During this relatively short time period, the Fund had taken 
in from taxes under $825 million and had expenses of over 
$2.3 billion. By the end of FY 1981, the Fund was paying 
almost $110 million/year in interest expenses (roughly 40 
percent of revenues) on the debt it had accumulated in under 
four years of operation. By early 1981, sources in DOL were 
estimating the future liability of the Trust Fund to be in ex 
cess of $6 billion, and there were some private actuarial 
estimates that were twice as large. Even the smaller number 
was well in excess of original cost projections. It was clear 
that steps had to be taken, but the administration chose to 
delay any move until after the election in November 1980.
A serious issue that the Trust Fund faced was its ap 
propriate role in claims processing. The law creating the 
Trust Fund gave it no role in challenging Labor Department 
determinations. Its role had been simply to pay any claim in 
volving Trust Fund liability approved by DOL. Conser 
vatives in Congress, including John Erlenborn, and coal in 
dustry representatives urged that the Fund play a larger role 
than given to it in 1977, that is, to defend itself against 
claims. Yet liberal support for the Trust Fund and that from 
the UMWA developed primarily because it avoided an 
adversarial process for claimants. The worthiness of claims 
involving the Trust Fund was to be evaluated by DOL, serv 
ing as both a fact finder and as a judge. The Trust Fund's 
financial inadequacy was so overwhelming that no 
reasonable degree of defense against claims could have kept 
it out of debt. It is likely, however, that its financial position 
would have been strengthened, could it have disputed DOL 
determinations that resulted in obligations for the Fund.
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1981 Amendments
The Reagan administration's 1981 amendments to the 
black lung law contained several important changes involv 
ing the Trust Fund. First, as of January 1,1982, the tax rates 
were all doubled, i.e., a tax per ton set at $.50 for surface 
mines, at $1.00 for underground mines, and a 4 percent max 
imum based on sales price. The increase has been described 
as interim, since the tax is scheduled to revert to pre-1981 
rates on January 1,1996 or sooner if the Trust Fund pays off 
all its cumulative debt to the Treasury. It was anticipated 
that advances from the Treasury would no longer be needed 
by FY 1984 and that the debt to the Treasury would be 
repaid entirely by FY 1993. 55 Another source forecast that 
the Trust Fund would have to continue to borrow until at 
least 1987. 56
Whether the tax increase will prove sufficient is not 
known, but the prognosis is unfavorable. 57 Virtually all pro 
jections associated with this program have been badly flaw 
ed. Most projections have tended to underestimate future 
program utilization and costs. A possible exception to this, 
bearing directly on the Trust Fund, was Assistant Secretary 
Elisburg's testimony in late 1980 where he forecast that the 
Fund's costs over its first 20 years would be $20-22 billion, 
with a Trust Fund cumulative debt of $9.2 billion by 1995. 58 
In contrast to these DOL projections, Congressman Perkins 
and a UMWA official agreed in conversation that the Fund 
would "come out of the red within the next year and 
especially two or three years from today, the Trust Fund 
would be, I would say, within five years, the Trust Fund 
could easily be solvent, so no one knows for certain, but that 
could easily be the case with the increased production of 
coal." 39 This has proven to be unusually wide of the mark in 
the first 2-3 years of the new tax.
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Aside from doubling the tax in 1981, the amendments pro 
vided that interest rates charged to operators by the Fund be 
based on market conditions. This made the rates consistent 
with those paid by the Fund on its debt to the Treasury.
The 1981 amendments also shifted to the Trust Fund 
10,200 accepted cases that previously had been the respon 
sibility of the individual operators and their insurers. These 
cases, described in more detail earlier, were claims that were 
initially denied and then approved upon review resulting 
from the 1977 amendments. The Congressional Budget Of 
fice estimated that these cases would increase the Trust 
Fund's expenditures by over $120 million between FY 1982 
and FY 1986, exclusive of the debt service generated by this 
new obligation. An insurance industry trade association 
testified in 1981 that the present value of the 10,200 cases, as 
of that time, was $1.5 billion. 60
State Laws
The original concept of the black lung legislation was to 
have the federal government accept the existing pool of 
potential cases of death or disability due to CWP and, after a 
transition period, turn claims for currently developing cases 
over to the states. Subject then only to certain federal stan 
dards, the states would incorporate such claims into their 
own workers' compensation laws.
The state's role in administering and paying for black lung 
claims was not solely limited to the post-transition period. 
Section 413(c) of the 1969 law mandated that no claims were 
to be considered under Part B unless the claimant also had 
filed a claim under the applicable state's workers' compensa 
tion law prior to or at the same time the federal claim was fil 
ed. An exception to the requirement was that no state claim 
had to be made where the filing was clearly a futile matter. 
Such a case would occur for several reasons, including that
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the state did not provide for such benefits, or that the timing 
in the case exceeded some statute of limitation making the 
particular filing futile.
The plan did not appear to be unreasonable in 1969 or in 
1972 in light of what Congress had been led to believe. First, 
the greatest expense of compensating for black lung derived 
from disabilities and fatalities that had occurred already and 
would be paid under Part B of the program. By the time Part 
C became effective, these claims were to have been resolved 
and payments made on them by SSA. The view that Part C 
would not involve many claims was strengthened by a hope 
that the post-1969 federal dust standards would lead to a 
lower incidence of pneumoconiosis. Second, most parties in 
volved with state workers' compensation laws, i.e., state ad 
ministrators, insurers, employers, some health providers, 
were known to want to retain program administration at the 
state level. Organized labor was an exception to this, but not 
uniformly or emphatically so. A federally administered pro 
gram for compensating an occupational disease was a threat 
to state sovereignty over such programs, as it represented a 
possible model for further federal control. Turning such a 
federal program back to the states appeared consistent with 
the national movement from a Great Society to a New 
Federalism, where the latter entailed a return to the states of 
control that had previously been moved to the central 
government.
The Secretary of Labor was responsible for certifying that 
the states met the federal standards so as to move program 
administration from Washington back to state agencies. Sec 
tion 421(b) (2) spelled out the criteria by which the Secretary 
would evaluate state laws so as to assure that they provided 
"adequate coverage for pneumoconiosis." Essentially, these 
provisions required that the cash benefits be "substantially 
equivalent to or greater" than federally provided benefits
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under Part B, and that the criteria used to determine eligibili 
ty be "substantially equivalent" to the federal ones that had 
been legislated and established through regulation by the 
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
A number of states made some movements to receive such 
certification. In 1973, four states—Kentucky, Maryland, 
Virginia, and West Virginia—submitted plans to the 
Secretary of Labor. Ultimately, certification was not given, 
the plans were withdrawn, and the program never was 
returned to the states. The impediment to carrying out this 
transfer of responsibility from DOL to state workers' com 
pensation agencies was the requirement that even those new 
ly filed claims based on last employment prior to state 
assumption be a state's responsibility. Thousands of claims 
continued to pour into DOL based on last employment dates 
prior to July 1, 1973, and in many cases ymuch earlier than 
that, and these would have to be dealt with by state agencies. 
In many cases, no employer would be found to pay such 
claims, resulting in a need for the states to raise sizable funds 
to do so. Ultimately, these "old" cases kept the plan for the 
assumption of responsibility by the states from succeeding.
The intent of Congress to have the federal government get 
out of the business of running the black lung program was 
expressed again in the 1977 amendments. Section 
421(b) (2) (A) was amended to allow the Secretary of Labor 
to certify a state law's compliance with the federal standards 
where benefits are provided for death or disability due to 
pneumoconiosis, except that "such law shall not be required 
to provide such benefits where the miner's last employment 
in a coal mine terminated before the Secretary's approval of 
the state law pursuant to this section."
This amendment did not absolve the mine operator of 
liability for claims where the last employment had occurred 
prior to the Secretary of Labor's certification. It meant that
Coverage & Administration 197
these earlier cases would be administered by DOL and paid 
for by either a designated responsible operator or the Trust 
Fund. The coal mine operator was still required to obtain in 
surance under the federal scheme and be subject to the ton 
nage tax that supported the Trust Fund. The 1977 amend 
ment did not succeed in having states seek certification.
In 1981, Deputy Undersecretary of Labor Robert Collyer 
was asked by Senator Nickels whether the Reagan ad 
ministration would seek to turn black lung back to the states, 
in conformance with the original concept of the law and as 
John Erlenborn continued to urge. 61 Collyer said the ad 
ministration opposed such a move on grounds that the states 
had had the opportunity to pass acceptable black lung 
legislation and had not done so. As such, black lung had 
become a permanent federal program and should be 
operated as such.
Though the states had lost any enthusiasm for assuming 
the black lung program, they did not entirely neglect the 
issue. It goes beyond the scope of this study to describe the 
various activities by each of the states with regard to their 
compensation programs for disabled miners or their sur 
vivors." Yet some of the state programs had a substantial 
impact on the federal program, in part because of the offset 
issue. They also had an impact on rate making procedures 
for insurance carriers providing coverage to coal mine 
operators. An example of this can be found in Kentucky's 
activity. 63 Between January 1,1973 and June 30,1976 miners 
totally disabled with black lung or survivors were eligible for 
cash benefits of $60 to $877week. Benefit payments were 
limited to 425 weeks. A Special Fund paid 75 percent of these 
benefits; the balance was the responsibility of the mine 
operator or an insurer. There was no requirement that the 
claimant also file for federal benefits, which were generally 
lower than state benefits. The statute of limitation in Ken 
tucky forced some claimants to seek only federal benefits.
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From July 1, 1976 until July 14, 1980, state benefits rang 
ed from $87 to $13I/week for totaly disability or death due 
to pneumoconiosis. Benefits became payable for the miner's 
lifetime and were not limited to a maximum of 425 weeks. 
Another significant change required the claimant to file for 
benefits under the federal black lung program and make a 
good faith effort to obtain such compensation. Such federal 
benefits would initially be fully or largely offset so that only 
state benefits were provided. However, given the escalation 
built into the federal benefits, and the unindexed nature of 
state payments, federal payments would eventually begin 
and gradually represent an increasing and significant frac 
tion of the miner's total benefits. During this period, 80 per 
cent of the benefits paid in Kentucky were paid by state 
funds (40 percent from the Special Fund, 40 percent from a 
CWP Fund created by amendments in 1976). The remaining 
20 percent of the benefits paid under Kentucky law was the 
responsibility of the coal operator or insurer.
After July 14, 1980, the Special Fund paid 75 percent of 
the benefits while the employer or insurer paid 25 percent. 
(The CWP Fund was rolled into the Special Fund.) Benefits 
paid to disabled miners were $2177week unless federal 
benefits were being obtained, in which case the benefit was 
reduced to $163/week. (Note that this effectively represented 
a state offset against a federal benefit that itself offsets 
against the state benefit.) According to the estimates of the 
National Council on Compensation Insurance, the present 
value of reserves needed in a Kentucky claim resulted in costs 
split 51 percent to the Special Fund and 49 percent to the 
responsible operator. 64
While the Kentucky law requires that beneficiaries under 
the state law apply for benefits under the federal law, not all 
persons have done so. Some individuals have benefits solely 
from the federal program after having been denied at the
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state level, or because of some barrier to pursuing a state 
claim such as a statute of limitation. A survey of the leading 
coal mine insurers in Kentucky revealed that among benefit 
recipients, about 20 percent receive only state benefits and 10 
percent receive only federal benefits." The remaining 70 per 
cent initially receive state benefits and will receive sup 
plemental federal benefits subsequently.
To summarize, some states, including Kentucky, Virginia, 
West Virginia and Pennsylvania, have made considerable ef 
forts to build black lung into their state workers' compensa 
tion programs. They have not supplanted what has become a 
permanent federal black lung program under Part C, despite 
the original vision that this would be a temporary federal 
role. State benefits are interwoven with federal benefits, 
creating complications for those setting insurance rates for 
black lung, or those attempting to evaluate the component 
costs of the black lung program.
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Benefits
Benefits are conferred under the law in three basic cir 
cumstances. First, benefits can be paid where the living 
miner is determined to be totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment. Sec 
ond, there are survivor benefits where the miner was totally 
disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the time of death. This 
category of benefits, which was added in 1972, eliminates the 
need for the survivor to prove that the cause of death was 
associated with coal mine employment or any particular type 
of disease. Indeed, the 1977 amendments eliminated the re 
quirement that a survivor file a claim where a miner who had 
received benefits died. An automatic entitlement is conferred 
on eligible survivors. The third category of benefit exists 
where a miner's death has resulted from pneumoconiosis 
arising out of coal mine employment.
Almost certainly as an oversight, the 1969 law excluded 
certain possible survivor beneficiaries, the "double orphan" 
issue, and was the initial source of pressure to amend the 
1969 act. Conservatives in Congress later expressed anger 
that this worthy set of changes in the law was used by the 
act's liberal supporters as a way to bring up the law again, 
serving to further broaden it through a wide range of amend 
ments. In any event, living miners or survivors are entitled to 
benefits, which are increased as the number of dependents
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rises. Surviving dependents can include not simply spouses 
and children, but may extend to dependent parents or sib 
lings of the miner. If the surviving widow remarries, she 
loses her benefits as a survivor. In the regulations regarding 
benefit eligibility, the Labor Department announced that it 
would not discriminate because of sex in setting entitlements. 
However, surviving spouses are expected to be overwhelm 
ingly female for many years. (See the paragraph preceding 
the regulation spelled out in 20 CFR 725.201, August 18, 
1978.)
In addition to cash benefits, eligible living miners are en 
titled to medical benefits for expenses arising out of their 
black lung condition. Prior to 1978, eligibility for such 
benefits was limited to Part C beneficiaries. The amend 
ments of 1977 allowed a Part B miner beneficiary to file a 
Part C claim with the Department of Labor and, if allowed, 
to collect medical benefits under the program. The 1977 
change required the Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare to notify all past Part B recipients of their oppor 
tunity to seek such benefits under the Part C program, and 
that they had up to six months to file such claims. The Labor 
Department has essentially accepted all such claims in a pro 
forma manner where a Part B claim already has been ac 
cepted. 1
There is no benefit for burial expenses under the program. 
Awards under Part B or C are tax free. Benefit levels are 
changed if any dependent status changes, if the miner's earn 
ings change (see section on offsets) or to reflect cost-of-living 
changes. Unlike the vast majority of awards under state 
workers' compensation laws, past award levels are 
automatically increased in this law, albeit somewhat indirect 
ly, to reflect price inflation.
Benefits under the Part B program are paid to recipients 
from the first day of the month in which the claim was filed
Dimensions of the Program 207
or the claimant becomes eligible for benefits. No benefits are 
paid for the period prior to the date of filing.
Under Part C, benefits are based on the date the claim was 
filed or the date of death or total disability due to 
pneumoconiosis, whichever is earlier. In no case, however, 
are benefits to be paid under Part C for the period prior to 
January 1,1974. Accrued benefits are based on the rates that 
prevailed at the time that the worker or survivor was 
covered. If the Labor Department is unable to establish a 
date at which total disability began, the date the claim was 
filed is used.
It is possible for a miner to be given a black lung entitle 
ment while still in coal mining employment or comparable 
work. (The usual case would involve the 411(c) (3) irrebut- 
table presumption.) Cash benefits, however, are not paid or 
are temporarily halted so long as the miner continues or 
returns to such type of work. When the work ceases benefits 
are reinstated.
In the U.S., though by no means universally, workers* 
compensation benefit levels are linked to the disabled or 
deceased worker's level of earnings. To do this in the case of 
black lung would have been problematic. Some of the poten 
tially eligible claimants had ceased coal mine employment or 
any employment years earlier. This would have presented a 
problem as to what would be the appropriate earnings level 
to which one could link benefits. For this reason, there was 
little disagreement on the position that a flat benefit payment 
be made to recipients that was independent of the level of 
previous earnings. The level of compensation was set in 1969 
at 50 percent of the minimum monthly payment which a 
federal employee of the GS-2, step 1 level, who is totally 
disabled and entitled to benefits under the Federal 
Employees Compensation Act, would receive.
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There appears to have been little controversy about the ap 
propriate level of benefits to be paid under black lung since it 
was set into place by the original statute. Of all the different 
issues raised since the passage of the act in 1969, the level of 
benefits has been remarkably absent from the field of con 
flict. Because the basic benefit level is linked to the wage 
level of a class of federal employees, periodic increases in 
these wage levels automatically lift both new and existing 
payments under black lung.
The basic benefit amount paid to an eligible living miner 
without dependents is the same as the benefit paid to a sur 
viving spouse who has no dependents. Aside from spouses, 
other dependent family members of the deceased miner also 
can be eligible for survivor's benefits. Table 6.1 lists the level 
of benefits paid under the act from 1969 through 1984.
Table 6.1
Basic Black Lung Monthly Benefit Amounts 




















































































SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor Program Manual and Annual Reports.
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The basic benefit amount, paid to the living miner or sur 
viving spouse without dependents, is increased by 50 percent 
with one dependent, by 75 percent with two dependents, 
e.g., a living miner, his wife and one child present, and by 
100 percent with three or more dependents.
Table 6.2 shows the actual average monthly sums paid to 
individual recipients from 1970 to 1984.
Table 6.2
Average Monthly Benefits Paid 


































































SOURCE: Social Security Bulletin, August 1985, p. 80.
a. Includes benefits for dependent wife and/or child.
b. Includes benefits for dependent child of widow, surviving child, parent, brother and
sister.
One way to roughly gauge the generosity of the payments 
under the black lung program is to compare them to other 
transfer payment programs of the same time period. Table
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6.3 lists average actual monthly payments under the retire 
ment and disability portions of OASDHI and a welfare pro 
gram. Benefits paid under the black lung program appear to 
be in line with social security benefits, though growing at a 
slower rate than OASDHI, and well above benefits paid 
under the old age assistance welfare program (SSI since 
1974). Moreover, the President's Commission on Coal 
estimated in 1980 that a miner receiving black lung benefits 
plus a miner's pension and social security retirement benefits 
could earn up to $1,000 per month, most of it in tax free in 
come. 2
By an alternative measure, black lung benefits do not look 
particularly generous. Table 6.4 shows the benefits available 
under state workers' compensation laws in the seven major 
beneficiary states for two years of the program compared 
with black lung benefits. While direct comparisons are dif 
ficult, the table indicates that in almost all cases, in all of the 
seven states, workers would have been better off receiving 
state legislated benefits, assuming they could have collected 
them. The state and federal benefits are indicated for claims 
involving death or permanent and total disability. In most 
state workers' compensation laws, such cases would involve 
compensating workers or survivors at two-thirds of the 
workers' previous wages, subject to a benefit minimum and 
maximum. Typically, these benefits can be paid for the 
workers' lifetime or that of the survivor, except where there 
is remarriage. For purposes of comparison, all benefit levels 
in table 6.4 are based on the assumption that there are no 
dependents. Federal black lung benefits are larger than the 
minimum benefits in three states (Kentucky, Virginia, 
Alabama) in 1982 and above the minimum in those three and 
Pennsylvania and West Virginia in 1976. However, the 
federal benefit is consistently far below the maximum benefit 
levels in all these states in both years. Where miners were 
working regularly, their wages would have made most of
Table 63
Average Monthly Benefits-Current Payment Status 




































































































SOURCE: Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1984-85, tables 108 and 167.
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them eligible for maximum, or near maximum, benefits 
under the state workers' compensation programs.
Table 6.4
Minimum and Maximum Weekly Benefits
State Workers' Compensation Programs

















































Federal black lung 68- 68 68- 68 45- 45 45- 45
SOURCES: Analysis of Workers' Compensation Laws, 1976 and 1982 editions, prepared 
by U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Federal black lung, see table 6.2 
a. Spouse only, 
b. No dependents.
Miners or survivors were eligible to collect retroactive 
benefits in several instances under black lung. Under Part C, 
if the death or disability preceded the date the claim was fil 
ed, the earlier of the two was the entitlement date, but not 
prior to January 1,1974. In a case where a claim was initially 
denied but later was determined to be compensable, a long 
time gap may have been involved. This was particularly im 
portant where the law forced SSA and the Labor Depart 
ment to re-review claims previously denied. For example, 
where a miner's claim was made between January 1, 1970 
and December 31, 1973, where there were three dependents, 
and where the claim was accepted as of January 1, 1979, the 
miner received $24,000 in retroactive benefits along with his
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first monthly check. In 1979, a year many previously denied 
claims were re-reviewed and awarded, the average retroac 
tive benefit, including those for new Part C claims, was 
about $14,000 per claim. During FY 1981, about one-half of 
all Part C benefits paid were retroactive payments.
Thus far, benefits under the program have been con 
sidered in terms of monthly or annual sums. An alternative 
way to view the value of a successful black lung claim is as 
the value of the future stream of benefits, appropriately dis 
counted and taking consideration of future benefit level 
changes. A 1980 actuarial estimate was that a successful 
claim would be worth $106,000-176,000 using a 3.5 discount 
rate. Undiscounted, a successful claim would be valued be 
tween $150,000-250,000 (a point estimate of $210,000), 
assuming a 17-year life expectancy and a 7 percent annual 
escalation factor. 3 An unpublished estimate in 1982, using 
Virginia as the state of residence, a 6 percent annual escala 
tion factor and a 3.5 percent discount rate estimated the pre 
sent value of a claim that year as $215,000. 4
The disbursement of benefits on an interstate basis clearly 
reflects the uneven distribution of beneficiaries nationally. 
There are several ways of demonstrating this. Column one of 
table 6.5 is the portion of total payments made to recipients 
in different states on a monthly basis, in December 1981 
under the Part B program. On this basis, recipients in two 
states, Pennsylvania and West Virginia, received almost half 
the payments made and persons from five states received 
about 70 percent of the funds disbursed. Under the Part C 
program about 60 percent of past benefits went to recipients 
from five states.
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Table 6.5
Benefit Payments Under Black Lung 
Selective States



























Column 1. Monthly Benefits Paid, December 1981. Social Security Bulletin, Annual 
Statistical Supplement, 1981, p. 246 (Part B only).
Column 2. Benefits paid July 1, 1973-December 31, 1981, cumulative, except responsible 
operator payments. Black Lung Benefits Act, Annual Report for 1981, Employment Stan 
dards Administration, p. 19 (Part C only).
That benefit payments under the black lung program were 
so highly concentrated in a few states is not surprising. In 
1960, 1965, and 1970, between 88 percent and 95 percent of 
all bituminous coal employment in the U.S. was in the seven 
states shown in table 6.5. (See table 6.6.) Although com 
parable data are not available for West Virginia for 1950 and 
1955, it seems likely that these seven states accounted for ap 
proximately 90 percent or more of the bituminous coal 
employment in those years. Within these seven states, the 
three that are clearly most important are Pennsylvania, West 
Virginia and Kentucky. Table 6.6 also indicates the earlier 
importance of Pennsylvania's anthracite mining employ 
ment and its phenomenal decline from 1950 to 1970. Recall 
that the evidence seems clearly to indicate a higher incidence 
of complicated and simple CWP in anthracite miners than in 
bituminous miners. For both reasons, Pennsylvania's
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predominance over West Virginia and Kentucky in terms of 
beneficiary payments in table 6.5 is reasonable.
Table 6.6
Employment in Bituminous and Lignite Coal Mining 

























































U.S. 368 219 169 132 140
SOURCES: Employment and Earnings, States and Areas, 1939-74, U.S. BLS, Bulletin 
1370-11, and Employment and Earnings, U.S., 1909-75, U.S. BLS, Bulletin 1312-10. 
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are employment in bituminous and lignite coal mining in the 
state as a percentage of U.S. total employment in bituminous and lignite coal mining, 
a. Anthracite coal employment, 
b. 1951 data.
Offsets
The black lung program is an exceedingly complicated 
one. There is probably no more challenging portion of it to 
describe than the treatment of offsets. While there is an easy 
temptation to neglect this issue entirely, to succumb to it 
would be a mistake. An examination of how offsets have 
been treated reveals a great deal about this law, including the 
evolving legislative sympathy for the act. The treatment of 
the offset forces the government to evaluate the context of 
benefits provided, and to confront the fundamental problem
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of overlapping private and public programs available 
through different levels of government and other providers, 
to say nothing of the role of the tax system.
Describing the offset issue in black lung is particularly 
complicated for several reasons. First, the issue has been 
treated quite differently under the Part B and Part C pro 
grams. Second, each amendment to the 1969 law brought 
changes to the matter. Third, the extent of the offset, if any, 
may vary under either Part B or Part C in any single year due 
to the following variables: the miner's age, the source of the 
income, the type of dependent involved, the nature of the 
disability, to name only a few. Yet one thing is at least very 
clear; the offset has been a very significant issue in every in 
stance when Congress acted in this area.
Part B Benefits
In the original law, Part B benefits paid to miners or 
dependents were to be reduced for income from workers' 
compensation programs, unemployment insurance and 
disability insurance provided under state law (only five states 
provided for such benefits). Additionally, benefits for black 
lung were reduced to the extent the beneficiary had income 
exceeding the "excess earnings" amount under section 203 
of the Social Security Act. This provision paralleled the earn 
ings test for elderly workers seeking old age benefits under 
the Social Security Act.
The controversial element under Part B developed out of 
section 224 of the Social Security Act, wherein miners eligi 
ble for benefits both for black lung and for social security 
disability (SSDI) could have the former used to offset the lat 
ter. According to this provision, which preceded the Black 
Lung Act, persons disabled after June 1, 1965 who are 62 
years of age or younger will have any workers' compensation 
benefits added to SSDI so as to not exceed a maximum level
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of benefits. For a person receiving both benefits, the max 
imum was set at 80 percent of average current earnings prior 
to disability, or 100 percent of the amount of total family 
benefits under SSDI, whichever is higher. Where the com 
bined payments would exceed this, SSDI benefits are reduc 
ed. While representatives of the miners expressed dissatisfac 
tion with all of the various offsets, the sharpest criticisms 
were reserved for the SSDI offset. Part B benefits were not 
workers' compensation, they argued, and the 1965 SSDI off 
set provision was inapplicable. Thus, the offset forced the 
issue of explicating the precise purposes of and reasons for 
the Part B program.
In the 1972 amendments, the SSDI offset was removed by 
adding the explicit language that Part B "shall not be con 
sidered a workmen's compensation law or plan for purposes 
of section 224" of the Social Security Act. The Senate- 
backed version of the 1972 amendments represented a com 
promise of sorts, retaining an offset but only where benefits 
exceeded 100 percent of the worker's previous earnings. The 
House version, which succeeded in the Conference Commit 
tee, simply eliminated the offset by defining the Part B pro 
gram so as to be exempt from it. This method also allowed 
Congress to achieve its end without having to amend the 
Social Security Act itself. Thus, matters could be left with 
Congressman Perkins rather than going to some other House 
committee.
Opponents of this change in the law pointed to the seem 
ingly perverse outcome that the change meant for states pro 
viding workers' compensation benefits for miners with 
CWP. Assume that a miner with a wife and dependent child 
earns $390/month and is entitled to $244/month in SSDI 
benefits based on his earnings. Assume that miner A comes 
from a state that enables him to collect $200/month in 
workers' compensation for his respiratory illness. Since there
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is an 80 percent maximum based on his previous earnings of 
$390/month, the miner can expect to receive $312/month. 
Because state workers' compensation provides $200/month, 
the miner would receive only $112 from SSDI, the other 
$132/month offset against state workers' compensation 
benefits. Since the miner receives $200/month through the 
state, and the Part B benefits at this time were below this 
level, and offsettable against them, there are no black lung 
benefits. Worker B, with a similar family situation and earn 
ings record comes from a state where no workers' compensa 
tion benefits are provided. He receives the $244/month for 
SSDI and $153 for black lung under Part B for a total of 
$397/month, $85/month more than worker A. Aside from 
the lack of equal treatment, critics of the law argued that it 
punished workers from the more progressive states with bet 
ter workers' compensation laws.
The 1972 amendments provided that workers could be 
found to be totally disabled under the law while still being 
employed. 3 As such the earnings of the miner under Part B 
were considered in setting his benefit level just as if he were 
seeking retirement benefits under social security. In 1972, 
this meant that the first $l,680/year in earnings were ex 
empted, subsequent earnings of $2 meant a $1 loss in 
benefits, but where earnings exceeded $2,880/year, there was 
a $1 benefit reduction for each added $1 in earnings.
In summary, by 1972 recipients of Part B benefits were 
subject to offsets for payments from state workers' compen 
sation, unemployment insurance, state disability insurance 
and "excess earnings." An exception to the latter offset was 
that dependent widows and children (but not miners, depen 
dent siblings or parents) were not subject to the excess earn 
ings test. This variety of offsets, combined with the inconsis 
tent treatment of benefits under the separate programs 
created an incentive for beneficiaries under the Part B pro-
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gram to supplement benefits under the Part C program. By 
applying to DOL under Part C, benefits lost to various off 
sets applied under Part B were then paid to the beneficiary, 
bringing many back to the maximum level of benefits, 
regardless of their other sources of income.
The 1977 amendments further liberalized the handling of 
the Part B offsets. Spokesmen for the miners objected to the 
application of the offset for benefits paid under state 
workers' compensation laws when the disability was not due 
to a respiratory disease arising out of coal mine employment. 
Given the dangers of employment in mining, many miners 
were receiving workers' compensation for bodily injuries at 
the same time that they were seeking black lung benefits. 
This argument would appear to be more potent if Part B 
were expressly a workers' compensation program. The 1977 
amendments eliminated the offset in such cases. Part B 
benefits to miners are reduced where the miner receives 
benefits under a state program for disability due to 
pneumoconiosis. However, where death from 
pneumoconiosis occurs and triggers a state benefit, there is 
no corresponding offset of benefits for widows or dependent 
children in the Part B program. (It is offset under Part C.)
When John Erlenborn testified on the administration bill 
in December 1981 he reported that there were a considerable 
number of Part B beneficiaries that were drawing multiple 
benefits from SSA without any offset. 6 At the time, he 
reported that 91,000 beneficiaries under Part B were also 
drawing OASDHI benefits. Specifically, 63,000 were receiv 
ing retirement or survivor's benefits, and 28,000 others were 
getting SSDI benefits alongside Part B.
Part C Benefits
Offsets under the DOL program have been simpler and 
there is less contention about them than about those under
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Part B. The only offsets under Part C have been for workers' 
compensation benefits under state or federal (including Part 
B) programs and, until 1981, an "excess earnings" test for 
dependent brothers, sisters or parents of miners. Only 
workers' compensation for pneumoconiosis from coal mine 
employment was offset even in the original law. As expressly 
a workers' compensation program, there has been only 
limited objection to the SSDI offset against Part C benefits. 
At the time of the 1972 amendments, when Congress 
eliminated the SSDI offset under Part B, the matter was 
debated and left intact. Later, Congressman Perkins in 
troduced legislation to end this offset and to pay retroactive 
benefits to those who had lost benefits due to the SSDI offset 
of Part C benefits. The effort was apparently not a serious 
one. Objections have also been raised by miners' represen 
tatives and Black Lung Associations regarding the "double 
offset," such that a miner receiving state workers' compen 
sation benefits can have this used to reduce both Part C 
benefits and SSDI. In some cases, this could result in lower 
total payments than if there were no state payments at all.
The 1981 amendments significantly changed the offset 
under Part C by applying a social security type "excess earn 
ings" test to miners or their dependent survivors. The com 
promise that was worked out applies the new rule only to 
those Part C beneficiaries who filed a claim after December 
31, 1981. The large majority of current beneficiaries are 
unaffected by the change. As of January 1, 1982, exempted 
earnings were $4,400/year for miners under age 65, $6,000 
for miners 65-71 years, and no excess earnings test for miners 
aged 72 and over. By January 1, 1983, the age to which the 
earnings test applied dropped to 70. A miner's "excess earn 
ings" are charged to the primary benefit and to the benefits 
of all other augmentees entitled under that account. The off 
set is $1 lost for every $2 in earnings above the exempted 
amount. By contrast, surviving dependents' "excess earn-
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ings" are charged only against their own benefits and not 
those of the other dependents (such as dependent children in 
the household). These changes brought Part C beneficiaries 
into conformity with Part B beneficiaries in terms of an ear 
nings test. The 1981 amendments left other existing offsets 
intact.
Questions have been raised on several occasions about the 
rigor with which SSA or DOL actually monitored the receipt 
of potentially offsettable benefits from state sources. Earlier 
we noted Erlenborn's testimony in 1981 before a Senate 
committee where he reported that neither SSA nor the Labor 
Department were rigorously seeking to identify recipients of 
state benefits for purposes of offsetting federal payments.
Pennsylvania had provided benefits to miners with 
pneumoconiosis prior to the enactment of the 1969 law. 
Benefits were paid from general revenues of the state, and 
were, therefore, not considered to be workers' compensation 
benefits. In July 1970 the state amended its law so as to 
reduce or end payments for workers receiving federal black 
lung benefits. At that point the Social Security Administra 
tion restored benefits that were subject to offset for Penn 
sylvania payments. Part C benefits were never reduced for 
miners receiving Pennsylvania benefits under that state pro 
gram.
In summary, the complexity of offset provisions applying 
to black lung is impressive. It serves to illustrate the variety 
and overlapping nature of many transfer payment programs 
and the difficulty of integrating these with various sources of 
earnings. Black lung is only worse than other areas because 
of the existence and separate evolution of the Parts B and C.
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Supplementary Income
Benefits under the black lung program are not very 
generous, but they should not be viewed as the sole source of 
support for miners or their survivors. There are a variety of 
public disability or retirement programs that may supple 
ment these benefits, only some of which involve the offset of 
benefits from one source or the other. In addition to these, 
there may be privately provided income, a significant source 
being the United Mine Workers of America Health and 
Retirement Funds. These funds are obtained through collec 
tive bargaining between the UMWA and signatory 
employers.
There are two basic retirement-disability pension plans for 
miners covered under these funds. The first is the so-called 
1950 Pension Plan and Trust covering miners entitled to 
benefits on or before December 6, 1974, or who last worked 
in classified jobs for signatory employers on or after 
December 31, 1975 (or became disabled on or after 
December 6,1974). The second plan is the 1974 Pension Plan 
and Trust covering miners who became disabled or retired 
after the coverage period of the 1950 plan expired.
A discussion of details of the two plans is beyond the 
scope of this study. 7 There are several notable features, 
however, of each plan. Under the 1950 plan, eligibility for 
retirement benefits required that the miner be 55 years of age 
and have 20 years of credited service (a variable number of 
which must be with a signatory employer) or 10 years of 
credited signatory service beginning on or after May 29, 
1949, three of those years beginning on or after January 1, 
1971. Depending upon the year of retirement, benefits under 
the 1950 plan were as follows:
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Table 6.7
Monthly Pensions for Mine Workers Who Have 
20 Years of Credited Service
Period





















SOURCE: 1950 Pension Plan-Summary Plan Description, 1978 UMWA Health and 
Retirement Funds, p. 13.
For a number of years, the miner's pension benefit was 
itself reduced where a black lung benefit was received. Fur 
ther, the disability pension under the 1950 and 1974 plans 
specifically excluded benefits for miners disabled by black 
lung. Disability benefits are limited to miners suffering a 
disabling injury in a mine accident that is medically suffi 
cient to enable the worker to receive SSDI. Black lung can 
not be included in this category.
Under the 1974 plan, normal retirement age is 62 years, 
but otherwise eligible miners can begin to draw (actuarially 
based) reduced benefits at age 55. The formula to calculate 
benefits under this plan is more complicated than the earlier 
one and involves a calculation based on the miner's age at 
retirement (if between 55 and 62 years), the number of years 
in service as well as when those years were, but does not de 
pend upon whether or not black lung benefits are being 
received. A miner retiring on or after March 27, 1978 at age 
62 could, for example, receive $275/month for 20 years ser 
vice, $420/month for 30 years service or $570/month for 40 
years service.
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Several things must be kept in mind regarding these pen 
sion benefits. First, most retired miners or survivors under 
the UMWA programs are covered by the earlier plan, but 
eventually the 1974 plan will be the dominant one. As of 
March 1980, there were 12,400 pension recipients under the 
later plan and 72,000 under the 1950 plan, but the number of 
beneficiaries under the 1974 program were growing while 
those under the 1950 program was declining steadily. Sec 
ond, many miners who are not affiliated with the UMWA 
may be covered under other pension arrangements, involving 
collectively bargained plans or otherwise. Additionally, 
many former miners were or are eligible for retirement or 
disability pensions based on employment outside the coal 
mining industry. It is likely, however, that some miners 
employed or retired have no pension benefits assured to 
them.
The pension and health programs of the miners under the 
UMWA agreements have been known to be in serious finan 
cial condition for some time. A report by the President's 
Commission on Coal in 1980 estimated the 1950 Pension 
Plan's unfunded liability as $1.9 billion.
Annual payments of approximately $2,800 per 
underground miner and $6,500 per surface miner 
are required under the Bituminous Coal Wage 
Agreement to meet current payments for pensions 
and to provide full funding for past service by the 
end of 1986. The pension of a miner under the 1950 
plan is $275 per month. That liability will be a con 
tinuing source of concern to the parties. Member 
companies of the BCOA are concerned about the ex 
tent of their individual liability, and the cost of the 
1950 plan is a factor in the UMWA's organizing 
difficulties. 8
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Problems with adequate funding and apprehension about 
the future viability of the pension and health plans are not 
new concerns of miners or observers of the coal industry. 
The black lung program did not serve simply to supplement 
the earnings of miners with retirement or disability pensions. 
It allowed private pension benefits to grow less rapidly than 
they would have in its absence. It also served to assure some 
miners or survivors that supplements to social security 
benefits would exist, regardless of the developments in the 
pension plan. The problems of funding the health care pro 
gram under the UMWA plan have been enormous. As a con 
sequence of difficulties and abuses heaped on the scheme 
from several sides, the plan had to be reorganized and 
benefits curtailed in the mid-1970s. 9
The President's Commission on Coal estimated that a 
miner retired under the 1950 or 1974 plans might be receiving 
in 1979 the following: $275 per month from their UMWA 
pension (1950 plan) or $480 per month (the average) under 
the 1974 plan, plus $295 per month for black lung (assumes 
one dependent) and $272 per month from their social securi 
ty retirement benefit (assumes no dependents). Thus, it was 
not uncommon for miners to receive in excess of $1,000 per 
month in benefits in 1979 (largely tax free) from three 
separate sources.
Between March and May of 1983, Audits and Surveys, a 
contractor retained by the Labor Department, conducted 
telephone and personal interviews of beneficiaries under the 
black lung program. 10 One of the purposes of the study was 
to establish the amount and sources of income that were be 
ing received by miner and survivor benefit recipients. The 
survey provides information solely based on survey 
responses and only for calendar year 1982. Miners 
represented 47 percent of the sample group, widows were 52 
percent, while surviving dependent children were 1 percent
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of the respondents. There were 1,771 completed interviews, 
which included 51 partially completed surveys.
In evaluating the income of beneficiaries, it is necessary to 
keep in mind that this population is certainly not represen 
tative of the U.S. population. A number of factors that set 
this group apart from others in U.S. society affect how one 
views their earnings. First, most miners and survivors live in 
rural areas, where living costs differ (and are likely lower) 
than for many others. Second, this group on average has 
very low educational attainment levels. Audits and Surveys 
reported that only 1 miner in 10 had completed high school 
and about 3 out of 4 miners had not attended high school. 
Ideally, one would compare incomes of this population to 
others in comparable circumstances.
Eighty percent of the miners were 65 years of age or older. 
Amongst this subset of the miner sample, only 2 percent 
received income solely from black lung benefits and under 1 
percent received only black lung benefits and a private pen 
sion. Fifty-five percent of those miners aged 65 and older 
received both black lung and social security retirement 
benefits, while another 40 percent received black lung, social 
security and private pension benefits. The private pension 
payments came from employer or union retirement plans.
While income from black lung, social security and pen 
sions appeared to be very common for miners, there were 
relatively few other sources of income that were widely 
received. Only 6 percent reported wage and salary income 
for the household in the previous year, 9 percent reported in 
come from assets, 3 percent received black lung benefits 
under state programs, while 2 percent more received other 
state workers' compensation payments. Veterans benefits 
were received by 5 percent of the respondents. Only 1 percent 
of the miner sample had received general assistance, AFDC 
or ADC payments or supplemental security income. The 
mean total household income of miners in 1982 was $11,740.
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For the sample of widows, 91 percent received social 
security benefits in addition to their black lung benefits. 
Twenty percent of the widows reported receiving benefits 
under a union or employer retirement plan. Approximately 7 
percent were in households with incomes from wages and 
salaries in 1982. The mean income in 1982 of widows in the 
program was $8,170.
It is no simple matter to gauge the adequacy or generosity 
of black lung benefits. In 1982 a miner or widow collecting 
benefits for the entire year, assuming no offsets, would have 
collected over $3,500, while a dependent present could have 
raised the benefit to over $5,300 (see table 6.1). Given the 
beneficiaries' mean incomes, it is clear that black lung 
benefits represented a sizable portion of their overall income 
and kept many individuals or families out of the poverty 
classification. In 1982, the poverty threshold for unrelated 
individuals aged 65 or over was $4,600; it was $5,800 for a 
two person household with the head aged 65 or over. 11 In the 
entire U.S. in 1982, the median and mean incomes of 
unrelated individuals 65 years and older who were female 
were $6,128 and $8,604 respectively. 12 The median and mean 
incomes nationally for a married couple household, with the 
head of the household 65 years or older, were $15,305 and 
$20,372 in 1982. 13
Claims Volume
An examination of the data on black lung claims and their 
disposition provides some clues as to the program's fortunes. 
Perhaps the single most significant aspect of the data is the 
impressive number of claims put forward for benefits. 
Granted that the concept of coverage was expanded after the 
original 1969 law, which meant that surface mining would be 
covered, or that "miners" actually meant more than miners 
in a conventional sense, black lung was limited to a single oc 
cupation and industry and to a single cluster of diseases.
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Moreover, no compensation was paid for temporary or par 
tial disability. Despite these limits, the program drew amaz 
ing numbers of applicants.
In examining and evaluating the data on black lung 
claims, more than the usual cautions need be exercised. All 
the data shown in this section are taken from SSA or Labor 
Department reports. The Labor Department, particularly, 
has had a consistently difficult time in bringing its data 
system into order. Various reports show inconsistent 
numbers and, even within the same report, errors can be 
detected.
A second issue concerns possible double counting of 
claims. While some of this can be avoided, at least one prob 
lem remains. Some claimants who were denied benefits at 
SSA filed claims subsequently at the Labor Department. To 
treat each as a separate claim overstates the number of 
claimants, though it does not overrepresent the caseload of 
the agencies.
Some of the data are defined in ways that are not obvious. 
For example, for several years the Labor Department 
distinguished between a claim filed and a claim received. The 
distinction reflected the Department's sensitivity to its huge 
backlogs and the problems it had in receiving claims that 
were filed in SSA local offices. This aside, certain claims 
received by the Labor Department required virtually no deci- 
sionmaking by the Department and ought not be treated as 
part of its adjudicatory caseload.
Another issue in understanding the data on claims volume 
and disposition is the meaning of the decisions reached on a 
year by year basis. Many reported denials eventually became 
acceptances based on the re-reviewing processes that the 
1972 and 1977 amendments forced SSA and the Labor 
Department to undertake.
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The data on SSA's experience with Part B are shown in 
table 6.8. Possibly the most striking aspect of it is the huge 
number of claims by miners or their widows under this pro 
gram. In particular, note that about one-quarter of a million 
claims were submitted in the first 12 months of the program. 
This outpouring of claims emerged from an industry that 
had an average daily employment level in 1970 of under 
145,000 coal miners.
Table 6.8 









































SOURCE: Annual Reports to Congress on the Administration of Part B of the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, SSA.
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are calculated as a percentage of claims decided.
a. Calculated as a percent of claims filed.
Prior to the 1972 amendments that required a re-review of 
denied claims along with eased criteria to be used in deciding 
these, and pending claims, SSA had approved about one- 
half of all claims filed. The 1972 amendments caused 42,000 
claims to be allowed by December 31, 1972 that had 
previously been denied or were pending. By the end of 1973, 
about 108,000 claims had been approved that had been or
230 Dimensions of the Program
would have been denied, save for the 1972 amendments. By 
1973 and 1974, the average approval rate on claims rose to 
about 62-64 percent of claims decided over the entire period. 
Of claims filed by widows, about 75 percent were approved, 
compared to just under 60 percent of living miner claims. 
The higher rate of approvals in death cases, many of which 
involved fatalities that occurred many years earlier, is consis 
tent with the stiffer burden of proof applied to living miners, 
where current medical examinations and X-rays could be us 
ed in evaluating the claim. About 65 percent of the claims fil 
ed by the end of 1974 were from living miners.
At the end of 1974, SSA only had responsibility for paying 
the claims it had approved earlier and providing assistance to 
the Labor Department as an intake source of claims. SSA's 
involvement was reactivated by the 1977 amendments, which 
required it to re-review claims it had earlier denied, subject 
to the claimant's choice. Previously denied claimants were 
given the opportunity to have either the Labor Department 
or SSA conduct the review. Further, the law mandated that 
denials by SSA on re-review would automatically be sent to 
the Labor Department where the claim was to be judged by 
that agency. About 80,000 previously denied claims were re- 
reviewed by SSA by June 30,1979, resulting in almost 23,000 
newly approved claims. The 28 percent acceptance rate for 
these claims was considerably higher than the rate an 
ticipated at the time of the 1977 amendments, though it fell 
below the proportions accepted by SSA in the re-reviewing 
process after the 1972 amendments. This brought the 
number of approved claims by SSA to roughly 400,000, with 
over 70 percent of all claims being accepted sooner or later. 
Approximately 37,000 denied Part B claimants asked to have 
the Department of Labor review the claim directly, and 
about 47,000 denied Part B claimants waived their rights.
Table 6.9 summarizes the experience under the Labor 
Department's program, excluding several categories of
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claims. Column 1 represents the new Part C claims reviewed 
during various time periods. Several aspects of it are 
noteworthy. First, while there was some bunching of claims 
in the first 18 months of the program, the numbers are con 
siderably smaller than the explosion of cases that greeted 
SSA in January 1970. Moreover, after its initial bubble, the 
annual inflow of new claims varied only between about 
19,000 and 25,000 during the the next five years, providing a 
somewhat stable flow of work. There was a major jump in 
claims in 1980, probably a reflection of the somewhat eased 
standards of adjudication that began to be applied in 1978 
and were ended in 1980. With considerably tougher stan 
dards imposed during 1980, the number of claims fell off 
sharply in 1981. Miners and survivors had been advised to 
submit claims before the interim criteria were replaced in 1980 
by the tougher, permanent criteria.
Column 2 of table 6.9 is the number of decisions (initial 
determinations) made by the Labor Department during 
various years of the program. Two entries are shown in col 
umn 2 for each year beginning in 1978. The upper number 
refers to decisions made on claims filed on or after March 1, 
1978, the effective date of the 1977 amendments. The lower 
entry refers to decisions based on claims that were denied or 
pending as Part C claims prior to March 1, 1978. Most of 
these were claims that were re-reviewed because of the re 
quirements imposed by the 1977 amendments. Columns 3 
and 4 show the rate of acceptance and denial as a proportion 
of decisions made in that year.
There are several striking features in table 6.9. Note the 
very large gap between claims received and decisions in the 
first 18 months of Labor Department involvement. Follow 
ing this, the gap grows even wider with more claims received 
than determinations made during 1975 and 1976. A small 
















































































SOURCE: Department of Labor Annual Reports, 1974-1982.
a. Claims filed prior to March 1, 1978 that were denied or pending as of that date.
CY is calendar year.
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witnessed a major addition to the inventory of undecided 
claims. These backlogs reflected the Department's immense 
difficulties in administering the claims and created very con 
siderable pressure on the agency to move the cases along. By 
the end of 1978, the Department had received 143,625 claims 
but made only 77,805 determinations. In the three years 
beginning in 1979, the Labor Department succeeded in 
deciding a huge volume of claims, leaving less than 5,000 
claims pending by 1982.
One cannot sum the numbers in column 2 of table 6.9 to 
reach the cumulative number of Part C decisions made 
because of double counting. Many of the claims that were 
denied prior to March 1, 1978 were considered again and 
decided anew after this date. Claims that were appealed 
where an initial determination was reversed may show up for 
that reason in more than one year. For these reasons, one 
also cannot simply sum columns 3 or 4, which reflect the 
nature of the determinations made by the Labor Depart 
ment.
Overall, the Labor Department approved about 37 percent 
of the 210,000 Part C claims that it decided by the end of 
1981. Yet, during the first four-and-one-half years of its pro 
gram, the approval rate of claims decided was only 7.8 per 
cent (5,744 approved of 73,806 claims decided by December 
31, 1977). The Labor Department found itself with a large 
and growing backlog in 1976 and 1977, a very small propor 
tion of claimants being successful, and itself looking par 
ticularly harsh when compared to the experience of 
claimants under the Part B program, particularly after the 
1972 amendments. The watershed for the Department was 
the 1977 amendments. Of the 85,000 decisions based on new 
claims since March 1, 1978, about 25 percent were approved 
or about a three times higher approval rate than before the 
amendments.
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The Labor Department was required to re-review almost 
120,000 Part C claims because of the 1977 amendments. Of 
that group of claims, approximately 43 percent were approv 
ed. The data do not allow us to separate the approval rates of 
the previously denied from the claims pending in the Labor 
Department's backlog on March 1, 1978. The 43 percent 
figure, however, is much higher than the 28 percent approval 
rate that the Department of Labor had projected in April 
1978.
In table 6.10, data are presented on the Part B claims re- 
reviewed after the 1977 amendments by the Labor Depart 
ment. Of the 73,000 claims involved, about 27 percent were 
approved, also well above the rate forecast for approvals by 
the Department of Labor in early 1978. The claims reached 
the Labor Department in one of two ways. Some of them 
were denied by SSA after a re-review, and then automatically 
sent to the Labor Department for its review of the claim. In 
those cases, the claimant was permitted to add evidence to 
the original file for the Labor Department's review. SSA's 
re-review was limited to evaluating the existing file only. A 
second set of claims was not reviewed by SSA but went 
directly to the Labor Department at the claimant's request. 
In either case, these 73,000 claims presented similar degrees 
of effort for the Labor Department to administer, as did the 
Part C claims re-reviewed after March 1, 1978. In terms of 
these decisions, taken together with the Part C claims, the 
Labor Department approved over 98,000 black lung claims 
(35 percent) out of 283,000 decisions made by it.
In addition to the claims described here, two other sets of 
cases are sometimes described as claims. It appears inap 
propriate, however, to pool them with cases requiring a deci 
sion on compensability for black lung by the Labor Depart 
ment. One of these involved the Part B claims that had been 
approved by SSA, where the claimant sought medical
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benefits subsequent to the 1977 amendments. Since those 
benefits were administered by the Labor Department, an ap 
plication was made to recover certain medical expenses. The 
basic question of compensability, however, had already been 
decided by SSA.
Table 6.10 
Part B Denials Reviewed by the Department of Labor

















SOURCE: Annual Reports, Department of Labor.
The second set of cases involved claims approved by SSA 
subsequent to the 1977 amendments. If approved, the claims 
were put into payment status through the Labor Depart 
ment, the majority of them involving claims against the 
Trust Fund. The Labor Department reported these as claims, 
yet they involved little decisionmaking by the Department.
The number of beneficiaries in the program has risen con 
siderably under Part C as the Department of Labor eventual 
ly reduced its large backlog. In calendar year 1981, there 
were 95,135 primary beneficiaries under the DOL program. 14 
Of these, 63,000 were living miners, 31,000 were surviving 
spouses, and under 2,000 beneficiaries were dependent sur 
vivors who were not spouses. SSA's beneficiaries, as of 
December 31, 1981 numbered 376,500, of which 111,200 
were miners, 146,200 were widows and the balance of 
119,100 were dependents.
The data in table 6.11 reflect the extent to which (suc 
cessful) claimants were clustered in a few of the coal mining
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Table 6.11 
Received (Processed) and Allowed Oaims by State
_______Part B Program as of December 31,1974________
Processed claims Allowed claims
U.S. total 555,842 (100%) 356,642 (100%)
Pennsylvania 163,740 (29) (29%)a 124,014 (35) (35%)a
West Virginia 101,583 (18) (47%) 59,903 (17) (52%)
Kentucky 60,294 (11) (58%) 32,847 (09) (61%)
Illinois 38,160 (07) (65%) 24,636 (07) (68%)
Ohio 34,270 (06) (71%) 20,100 (06) (74%)
Alabama 29,396 (05) (76%) 15,905 (04) (78%)
Virginia 29,132 (05) (81%) 16,221 (05) (83%)
_______Part C Program as of December 31,1981________
Received claimsb Claims in payment
12/31/81C
U.S. total 425,428 (100%) 97,738 (100%)
Pennsylvania 102,737 (24) (24%) 125,473 (27) (27%)
West Virginia 79,009 (17) (41%) 14,531 (16) (43%)
Kentucky 48,676 (11) (55%) 8,311 (09) (52%)
Ohio 37,004 (09) (64%) 9,652 (10) (62%)
Virginia 24,414 (06) (70%) 5,152 (05) (67%)
Illinois 23,387 (05) (75%) 5,249 (06) (73%)
Alabama 22,075 (05) (80%) 3,463 (04) (77%)
SOURCES: Part B-Fifth Annual Report to Congress on the Administration of Part
B .... p. 8. Part C-Black Lung Benefits Act: Annual Report on Administration of the Act
During Calendar Year 1981, submitted 1982, table 2.
a. Percentage cumulated.
b. Includes Medical Benefits Only Claims and Transferred SSA Cases.
c. Includes Trust Fund and Responsible Operator Cases.
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states. In the Part B program, 47 percent of all applicants 
came from two states (Pennsylvania and West Virginia), 
two-thirds of all claimants came from 4 states, and 7 states 
were responsible for more than 80 percent of claimants. The 
allowed claims were even more concentrated, probably 
reflecting the higher proportion of successful claimants that 
came from the anthracite regions in Pennsylvania. 15 The 
data are not precisely comparable for the Part C program, 
but the Labor Department's claims were almost as 
geographically concentrated as those in SSA. As of 
December 31, 1981, Pennsylvania accounted for about one 
of every four claims, and 7 states were responsible for four 
out of every five. At that time, payments being made to suc 
cessful claimants were largely in four states: Pennsylvania, 
West Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio.
Costs
Establishing the costs that have occurred under the black 
lung program is no simple matter. Because the program has 
been funded by more than one agency, because of the 
overlap between private and public sector liabilities, with 
consideration for interest payments on borrowing to support 
the Trust Fund to name only three complicating factors, it is 
not possible to take a single figure (or set of figures) and call 
this the program's cost.
In examining the program's history, at least two elements 
of program costs are quite clear. First, projections regarding 
anticipated costs have typically been quite far from the 
mark, with the largest degree of error usually occurring as 
members of Congress who supported the law underestimated 
what program costs would be. Second, by federal standards 
at least, the program initially appeared to be a very low cost 
item in the budget, amounting to well under $100 million in 
the first year and declining thereafter. The smooth sailing
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that the law's supporters experienced can partly be attributed 
to the disinterest that most members of Congress showed 
toward this apparently low cost item in the budget. So long 
as the bill appeared to be very cheap, and given the very 
vigorous support for it from key legislators such as Perkins 
and Randolph, the law understandably found easy going.
Errors in projecting costs of federal programs must be ex 
pected, especially when new territory is covered. The black 
lung area was particularly problematic. First, no one really 
knew how large the pool of potential applicants would be. 
This issue depended upon a whole series of unknowns, i.e., 
precisely what the disease to be covered was, how widespread 
the disease was, the extent to which people would know of 
the availability of benefits and submit claims, and the stan 
dards of proof imposed by the administering agency. Aside 
from these difficult questions, cost projections depended 
upon future benefit levels, which themselves were a function 
of future inflation rates (since these would trigger pay in 
creases for federal employees, the benchmark for benefit 
rates). Inflation rates were poorly forecast during the life of 
the program. Another variable to be considered in any cost 
projection was the expected number of years that benefits 
would be paid a claimant. Clearly, this depended on the pro 
jected longevity of a group of persons presumably suffering 
from totally disabling disease. No good assessment of this 
existed in 1969. What was known, however, was that the 
Part C program was to terminate by December 30, 1976.
After the Conference Committee had fashioned its version 
of Title IV of the 1969 law, a vigorous debate occurred on 
the floor of the House of Representatives between the few 
foes of the law (that is, the bill that emerged from the con 
ference) and its advocates. 16 Erlenborn said that the original 
cost estimates had been stated by the law's advocates to be in 
the range of $30-40 million a year and had been raised to the
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$50-60 million range. Secretary of Interior Walter Hickel 
had written to Senator Javits estimating the costs to the U.S. 
Treasury of black lung legislation to be in a range from $155 
million to $385 million per year, based on the conference 
bill. Using existing SSDI disability criteria, Hickel forecast 
that 54,400 miners would be eligible for benefits, and assum 
ing 1.5 dependents each, at $2,657 each, costing $145 million 
per year. In addition to this, the cost of the survivor's benefit 
would be about $10 million per year for a total of $155 
million, exclusive of any administrative costs.
Assuming a disability standard that was less strict than the 
one applied under SSDI, Hickel forecast that there would be 
140,200 successful living miner claimants at an annual cost 
of $374 million, plus the same $10 million per year for sur 
vivor beneficiaries, or a total of up to $385 million per year. 
Congressman Perkins charged that these cost estimates were 
simply scare tactics by the administration to undermine sup 
port for the law. Congressman Burton described the Hickel 
letter as an "ignoble effort" and the cost estimates as 
"politically motivated." Congressman Dent was the most 
colorful in speaking to the issue of costs. 17
Dent estimated that the cost of black lung for living miners 
would be $32.3 million per year at a maximum. He based his 
estimate on a miner population of 110,000 persons, noting 
that only underground miners were susceptible to the 
disease. He forecast that 3,300 miners would have the 
disease. By contrast, Representative Collins of Texas argued: 
"This program will add billions to the federal budget at the 
time we are trying to achieve a balanced budget so as to halt 
the inflation facing the country," 18
On the Senate side, Harrison Williams estimated that 
about 50,000 miners would receive compensation due to the 
law. Senator Javits said his estimates for the law were in the 
$80-100 million per year range, and certainly no more than
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$120 million. Presumably, the costs would fall thereafter as 
recipients died off.
Eugene Mittelman served as Senator Javits staff aide on 
the 1969 legislation. He reported that the Conference Com 
mittee was aware of estimates in the House of a $40 million 
per year program and estimates voiced in the Senate of 
$100-120 million per year. 19 According to him, some far 
higher estimates were expressed in the Conference Commit 
tee, but the issue of costs was largely ignored.
As noted earlier, SSA was sorely criticized by black lung 
supporters prior to the 1972 amendments on the grounds 
that it was administering the law too severely. Yet, in the 
light of some of the cost estimates and projections of usage 
that were made in 1969, these criticisms reflect some incon 
sistencies or misjudgments by the critics. That is, despite 
what program advocates charged was an excessive denial rate 
by SSA, SSA benefits were $110 million, $379 million and 
$554 million in the first three years of the program. At the 
time the 1972 amendments were passed (in May), 365,000 
claims had been filed with SSA, of which 171,000 were ap 
proved and 20,000 were still pending determination. (Many 
of those disallowed claims would later be approved under the 
re-review of SSA or the Department of Labor.)
Prior to the passage of the 1972 amendments, the issue of 
costs arose again. The major source of increase in federal 
costs due to the amendments was the extension of Part B 
beyond the original cutoff date. By adding the provision that 
X-ray evidence alone could not be used to deny claims, the 
House Committee assumed that SSA costs would increase by 
about $10 million per year. Opponents of the proposed bill 
in the House (HR 9212) argued that the program costs were 
excessive already and would be up to $375 million annually 
by the end of that fiscal year. (This was itself a substantial 
underestimate, as benefits paid in calendar year 1971 had
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already been at this rate; benefits rose by over 46 percent in 
calendar year 1972.) Moreover, the lack of reliability of the 
cost estimates made in 1969 was held up now by critics of the 
attempt to liberalize the law. In response, Congressman Dent 
completely disregarded the legislative record of 1969 in 
several respects. First, he asserted that no one had estimated 
the costs of black lung legislation in 1969. Moreover, he 
argued, if an estimate of $40 million had been made, it ap 
plied only to complicated pneumoconiosis as proposed in the 
House bill. Further,
Even during debate on the conference report, pro 
ponents of the compromise version refrained from 
making positive statements about the actual cost of 
the program. The Chairman of the Committee, Mr. 
Perkins, stated then: "This legislation transcends 
petty arguments over costs." At the time, I said: "I 
do not know what the total costs of this provision 
will be. . . ." In my only specific reference to cost, 
I was speaking of complicated pneumoconiosis. 20
Dent's memory clearly proved selective. His "chinchilla 
coat" argument was made in defense of the Conference 
Committee's bill, which had dropped the term "com 
plicated" from the earlier House version. Dent's estimates 
would prove to be at least as far off the mark in 1972 as they 
were in 1969. First, Dent predicted that the number of claims 
filed in the first two years of the program, ". . . far and 
above might be 90 percent of all claims which will ever be 
considered. . ." 21 He also predicted that the costs of the pro 
gram would be $190 million in 1972, $135 million in 1973, 
$231 million in 1974, and $219 million in 1977. At this point, 
Congressman Erlenborn pointed out that these were not the 
projected total costs, but one forecast of the incremental in 
crease in costs if HR 9212 was adopted. In fact, the estimates 
provided by Social Security of the cost implication of HR
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9212 were considerably higher than this. Dent tried to deflect 
the estimates of SSA by asserting that they had prepared five 
separate, contradictory estimates on the costs of HR 9212, 
and he blamed them for his own calculation of $40 million as 
the cost per year of the 1969 law. 22
Senator Javits forecast an annual cost to the Treasury of 
$900 million for extending the federal program for 18 
months. In fact, this estimate proved to be fairly near the 
mark.
Table 6.12 contains the estimated cash benefits provided 
under the Part B program since its inception. The direct 
payments under the program have remained remarkably 
stable from 1973 through 1984 at about $1 billion per year. 
Since the program was turned over to the Department of 
Labor, three basic factors have affected SSA's payments. 
First, some re-reviewed cases were subsequently added to its 
payment roles. Second, cost of living adjustments annually 
tended to increase overall program costs. Third, declines in 
the number of beneficiaries due to deaths about balanced off 
this increase. Thus, by December 1984, the number of Part B 
beneficiaries was 36 percent below the peak reached in the 
program in 1974. (See table 6.13.) Most of the decline occur 
red among miners, where the number of benefit recipients in 
1984 was only one-half the number in 1974. From 1974 to 
1984, however, average benefit payments under the social 
security program rose from $235 per month to $376 per 
month. 23
In addition to the benefits paid by SSA, the agency incur 
red certain administrative costs in operating the program. At 
its maximum, these costs were approximately $38 million, in 
curred in 1973. 24
Payments under the Part C program actually could be 
paid in several ways. First, payments could be made by
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employers designated as liable responsible operators. In the 
absence of responsible operators, liability could be that of 
the Trust Fund established in 1978. Prior to that time, where 
no responsible operator was identified, payments were made 
by the U.S. Treasury for the Department of Labor. Addi 
tional expenses for the government were incurred in the pay 
ment of medical expenses.
Table 6.12 
Social Security Expenditures • Part B Program8
(In millions)














































SOURCE: Supplied by SSA to the author.
a. Includes lump sum payments made during the year.
Several matters complicate this picture, however. The 
Trust Fund or the Treasury have frequently made payments 
to beneficiaries where a responsible operator denied any 
liability. In some instances, these employers later repaid the 
Treasury or the Trust Fund. Further, when the Trust Fund 
was created, the Treasury was to be repaid for the expen-
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ditures incurred by it, both for benefits paid directly by the 
government under Part C and for administrative costs in 
operating the program. Since the Trust Fund has been in 
operating deficit for its entire existence, however, it has had 
to borrow from the U.S. Treasury to stay afloat. The 
Treasury has been debiting the Trust Fund's account for in 
terest on this borrowing, adding both to the appearance of 
near-insolvency that the Fund has lived under since 1978 and 
to the costs of the program. However, since the Fund is 
presumably the responsibility of the coal industry, ultimate 
ly, the costs of the program may not be borne directly by the 
U.S. Treasury.
Table 6.13 


















































































SOURCE: Social Security Bulletin, August 1985, table M-34. 
'Figures may not sum due to founding.
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The data in table 6.14 reflect payments made for cash and 
medical benefits under both the Department of Labor and 
the SSA programs. They do not include benefits paid by 
mine operators or their insurers, administrative expenses in 
curred by either agency, or the rather sizable interest expense 
incurred by the Trust Fund due to its borrowing from the 
Treasury. Benefit payments do include both regular monthly 
payments made during the calendar year, as well as lump 
sum payments in that year where retroactive benefits were 
awarded. The next to last column of table 6.14 is only one in 
dicator of the program's size. Since the Trust Fund is financ 
ed (in theory, at least) by a tonnage tax on coal operators, 
payments from it cannot be considered a federal obliga 
tion—unlike the Part B benefits.
Table 6.14 reveals the very slow start-up of the Part C pro 
gram as the huge backlog of claims accumulated in the 
Department of Labor. As the agency began to see its role dif 
ferently after the 1977 amendments, payments in 1979 
jumped by almost 13 times the levels of 1978. Many of these 
payouts in 1979 and 1980 involved retroactive awards, one of 
the primary reasons that benefits payments declined 
thereafter.
An alternative way to focus on some of the costs of the 
program can be seen in table 6.15. Columns 1 and 2 are the 
combined Parts B and C benefit payouts to disabled miners 
and survivors respectively, from 1970 through 1984, ex 
clusive of both medical benefits and payments by responsible 
operators and their insurers. Benefits to miners peaked 
twice, first in 1973 when only the SSA program was making 
payments, and again in 1979 and 1980 after the blockage in 
the Department of Labor had ended. By contrast, the death 
benefit program has tended to grow over time. Column 3 is 
the ratio of death payments to disability payments; by 1984, 
the ratio hit a peak at over 86 percent. It appears evident that
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the program will soon be as costly in the survivors' area as in 
the disability area, at least to those beneficiaries supported 
by SSA and the Trust Fund.
The last two columns in table 6.15 are the ratios of black 
lung benefit payments from SSA and the Trust Fund as a 
fraction of all disability and all survivors' benefits (excluding 
federal black lung payments) under workers' compensation 
in the United States. Thus, federal black lung payments to 
living miners were as high as 28.2 percent of the level of all 
disability payments under workers' compensation programs, 
excluding black lung in 1973. That proportion fell to 11.2 
percent in 1978 but turned upward in 1979 when the Depart 
ment of Labor began clearing out its backlog. Since then the 
ratio has declined again, in part due to the continuing in 
creases in benefits paid out under state workers' compensa 
tion programs.
In the last column of table 6.15 is the ratio of survivors' 
benefits paid under the federal programs, excluding respon 
sible operators, to survivors' benefits paid under all workers' 
compensation programs (excluding federal black lung) in 
that year. It is notable that in three of the years in the series 
(1973, 1974, and 1979) more benefits were paid to survivors 
under federal black lung programs than in all (other) 
workers' compensation programs in the nation. Indeed, 
beginning with 1972, the proportion has never been below 80 
percent. At one level it seems incredible that death benefits 
for one class of workers, and for a single (set of) disease(s) 
should be anywhere near the level of benefits paid for all 
death claims under workers' compensation in the entire na 
tion. An important ingredient that must be understood, 
however, is the cost-of-living adjustment for past awards 
that is built into the federal program but does not exist in 
most state programs.
Table 6.15 
Black Lung Payments, Part B and C 




















































































































SOURCES: Adapted from Daniel N. Price, "Workers' Compensation: Coverage, Benefits and Costs, 1982," Social Security Bulletin, 
December 1984, table 1; Price, "Workers' Compensation: 1976-80. Benchmark Revision," Social Security Bulletin, July 1984, table 3; and data 
supplied to the author by SSA.
NOTES: Column 3 is column 2/column 1. Column 4 is column I/all disability payments made under workers' compensation that year, ex 
clusive of black lung. Column 5 is column 2/all death payments made under workers' compensation that year, exclusive of black lung, 
a. Excludes medical benefits and responsible operator and their insurer payments.
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As the costs of the black lung program mounted steeply, 
some concerns began to be expressed about them. Sup 
porters of the program argued that the costs were totally ap 
propriate, as they represented a "catchup** for benefits that 
ought to have been paid under the state workers* compensa 
tion programs. Lorin Kerr argued:
The current annual expenditure of slightly more 
than $1 billion is scant recognition of the long years 
of neglect the miners have endured. These 
payments to living survivors of decades of uncon 
trolled dust exposure can never equal workmen's 
compensation payments which should have been 
initiated in 1943 when Britain first provided such 
coverage. 25
A description of the Trust Fund and its activity is found 
elsewhere in this study. 26 It is in context here, however, to 
note that projected cost estimates regarding the Trust Fund 
have also tended to be underestimated. Because the tax was 
initially set too low, the rates were raised in the 1981 amend 
ments "temporarily.** In fiscal years 1980 and 1981, the 
Trust Fund ran a deficit of over one-half billion dollars a 
year. In fiscal year 1981, revenue from the coal tonnage tax 
was only 87 percent of its size in the previous year, and was 
only approximately 36 percent of the size of the benefits paid 
that year, to say nothing of coverage for administrative ex 
penses and interest repayment on the $1.5 billion in advances 
made by the Treasury to the Fund. 27
In 1980, at a hearing before his committee on proposed 
amendments, Congressman Carl Perkins downplayed the 
Trust Fund*s problems:
(The Trust Fund) will come out of the red within 
the next year and especially 2 or 3 years from to 
day. ... I would say, within 5 years, the Trust
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Fund could easily be solvent. No one knows for 
certain, but that could easily be the case with the in 
creased production of coal. 28
At the time of the 1981 amendments, the Department of 
Labor forecast the impact of the higher taxes and future 
payouts. Their projections called for the Trust Fund to re 
quire advances from the Treasury in fiscal years 1982, 1983 
and 1984 of $235 million, $62 million and $37 million respec 
tively, followed by surpluses that would permit full repay 
ment of the accumulated debt, with interest, by 1993. 
Needless to say, the projections have been well off the mark. 
In fiscal year 1982, the Treasury was forced to advance $283 
million, and in fiscal year 1983, it advanced $358 million 
more, raising the Trust Fund's accumulated debt to $2.2 
billion. Preliminary data for fiscal year 1984 show even a 
larger deficit and a larger forecasting error than in 1983. 29 
The errors in forecasting occurred as benefit payouts were 
underestimated and projected revenues were seriously 
overestimated. 30 For fiscal year 1985, coal excise tax collec 
tions are in the neighborhood of $576 million, while the 
forecast had been for revenues of about $700 million. 31 A 
larger gap than this will likely occur between projected and 
actual benefit payments.
Data Gaps
The data in tables 6.12 and 6.14 provide only partial 
estimates of the costs of the black lung program. Unfor 
tunately, hard data do not exist that would permit one to ar 
rive at more complete estimates. There are several basic gaps 
in the data that ought to be accounted for. First, there are no 
available estimates of the extent to which insurers and self- 
insured employers are paying benefits under the federal pro 
gram. Incredibly, the Labor Department is unable to provide 
any data on such payments. There are a few clues, however, 
regarding these payments. Prior to the 1977 amendments,
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only an insignificant number of responsible operator claims 
were in payment status. Recall that less than 5 percent of 
those mine operators who were designated as responsible 
operators were actually paying benefits, while the balance 
were involved in appeals. Then, some of the claims that were 
being paid were transferred to the Trust Fund in 1978. Recall 
also that the 10,000 or so claims that were switched over 
from responsible operators to the Trust Fund as a result of 
the 1981 amendments were probably more than one-half of 
all the responsible operator claims in that period, and many 
of these were appealed. Finally, a "rough estimate" by a 
high level Department of Labor official is that 4 to 6 percent 
of all claims in current payment status, subsequent to the 
1981 amendments, were being paid by responsible operators.
A second gap exists because it is not possible to calculate 
the costs of state workers' compensation program benefits 
for black lung. It is useful to recall, however, some evidence 
based on the survey of black lung beneficiaries. 32 In 1982, 
about 2 percent of the federal black lung beneficiaries receiv 
ed some state black lung benefits. 33 About 1.5 percent of 
total money income came from state benefits, compared to 
39.5 percent which came from the federal black lung pro 
gram. However, there is an unknown number of state black 
lung beneficiaries who receive no federal benefits due to the 
size of the state benefit and the federal offset provision.
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The character of the Black Lung Act was changed con 
siderably by the amendments passed in 1981. While the 
modifications are less dramatic in their impact than one 
might suppose, looking only at the law this action by the 
Congress must be considered a significant turning point. At 
the very least, the series of steps taken to liberalize the law 
after 1969 were set back.
To understand these amendments requires a realization 
that a compromise was developed behind the scenes by the 
contending parties. For perhaps the first time in the history 
of the law, the executive branch played a vital role in shaping 
the legislation and served as a counterforce to the program's 
supporters in the Congress. The basic parameters of the 
political struggle involved a new administration on one side, 
pitted against the still influential supporters of the program 
on the other side led by Congressman Perkins and Senators 
Byrd, Randolph and Ford. In 1981, the supporters feared 
that the newly elected president, Ronald Reagan, would seek 
to scuttle the entire program. The fear was not wholly un 
justified. The new president rode into office on a very high 
wave of public support that permitted him some other 
significant legislative accomplishments early in his ad 
ministration. The Senate was Republican-controlled, and the 
support of his programs by some southern Democrats in the
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House of Representatives provided him with substantial 
strength, if not control, there. Indeed, Congressman John 
Erlenborn, Perkins' foe on black lung since the Conference 
Committee report in 1969, hoped to turn the entire program 
back to the states.
Aside from the fear of Ronald Reagan, the program's ad 
vocates were on the defensive in 1981 for other reasons as 
well. The GAO report on the Social Security 
Administration's handling of the Part B program had receiv 
ed considerable publicity and had made the program appear 
to be little more than the coal miners' pork barrel. 1 The 
GAO was about to issue its report on the Department of 
Labor's administration of the Part C program and it promis 
ed to be highly critical as well. 2 Further, the program was 
proving to be far costlier than had been forecast, weakening 
support for it by those outside of the coal-mining states who 
had previously seen it as a cheap way to deal with the miners. 
The growing obligations of the Trust Fund and the 
Treasury's need to continually shore it up dramatized the 
unanticipated costliness of the program.
Had the administration tried to push through the abolition 
of the program, or at least ceased accepting new claims, it 
might have been rebuffed by one or both Houses of Con 
gress. The issue clearly was not a customary conflict between 
conservatives and liberals or Republicans versus Democrats. 
In a power fight, the liberal supporters of the program could 
have counted on substantial assistance from Senators and 
Representatives from the coal-mining states and areas, some 
of whom were supporters of the president on most other 
issues. It is likely that the new president did not want to take 
on Perkins, Byrd and Randolph in an all-or-nothing conflict. 
With both sides uncertain of their strength, and mindful of 
the other legislative struggles yet to come, compromise on 
this issue seemed both reasonable and inevitable.
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In lining up the compromise, several changes that had oc 
curred since the 1977 amendments loomed very large. First, 
the 1980 regulations issued by the Department of Labor dur 
ing the Carter administration meant that the interim criteria 
were no longer to be used. As a result, the approval rate of 
claims by the Department was certain to drop substantially 
from where it had been since 1978. Thus, many of the 
perceived excesses in the program's administration had end 
ed by 1981. Very high priority was to be given by the ad 
ministration to transferring about 10,000 special cases to the 
Trust Fund from what had been the liability of responsible 
operators. This turned out to be an easy compromise to 
achieve since the United Mine Workers always preferred to 
have claimants deal with the Trust Fund rather than with 
responsible operators who vigorously defended their cases.
From the perspective of the program's advocates, perhaps 
the major change since 1977 was that so many of the old 
claims had been filed and approved by 1980 or 1981. In a 
sense, they had accomplished so much already that so long as 
recipients would not be forced to cease receiving benefits, 
they had relatively little to lose. In addition, state programs 
had become much more generous to miner and survivor 
claimants, in terms both of the likelihood of receiving 
workers' compensation and the level of their benefits. Thus, 
the federal program became somewhat less significant to 
them.
The 1981 amendments consist of two titles. The first is 
called the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, and the 
second is the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981. The 
law was signed by the president on December 29, 1981 to be 
effective three days later. Title I deals with the Trust Fund 
and is added to the Internal Revenue Code. Primarily, it rais 
ed the tax on coal produced. Additionally it transferred the 
over 10,000 cases to become the liability of the Trust Fund 
and not of the responsible operators or their insurers.
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Title II modified five sections of the law affecting a claim 
ant* s opportunity to successfully seek benefits. First, for 
claims filed after January 1, 1982, it eliminated the restric 
tions on the rereading of X-rays by the government's "B" 
readers. (Section 202(a).) Next, section 202(b) eliminated 
three presumptions found in section 411(c) of the law, i.e., 
the 20-year presumption (411(c) (2)), the 15-year rule 
(411(c) (4)), and the presumption for survivors of miners 
who worked 25 years or more in the mines prior to June 30, 
1971 (411(c) (5)). The fifth change (section 202(c)) modified 
section 413(b), dealing with the widow's affidavit where no 
other medical or other evidence existed. It limited the use of 
such affidavits to persons not eligible for benefits in the 
claim, that is, to nonself-interested parties.
The 1981 amendments made three significant changes in 
benefits under the law. First, they limited death benefits in 
future cases to those instances where the death was due to 
black lung disease. Second, they provided that federal 
benefits be offset where the miner had earnings, according to 
the social security practice. This provision applies only to 
claims filed after January 1,1982 and would bring consisten 
cy in the treatment of Part B and future Part C beneficiaries. 
Finally, the change eliminated the Trust Fund's obligation to 
pay retroactive lump sum benefits in claims where an initial 
determination of eligibility had been made, but where the 
responsible operator had contested the award.
The compromise bill was supported by the National Coal 
Association, representing surface and underground mine 
operators in the East and West. It was clear, however, that 
the bill was far from the "complete reform" that they would 
have liked, thereby causing a split vote by the Association's 
Board of Directors. 3 The United Mine Workers testified in 
support of the bill as well. 4 Opposition to the bill came from 
the Edison Electric Institute, a trade organization of electric
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utility companies who found the reforms inadequate and the 
future costs to mine operators unacceptably large. Totally 
behind the bill was the insurance industry, eager to get off 
the hook for many of the over 10,000 cases that had been 
dealt them by the 1977 amendments.
The bill was pushed through Congress in a way that bruis 
ed some congressional egos. The bill required unanimous 
consent to go directly to the Senate floor from subcommit 
tee, so as to be acted on quickly before the session ended. 
When the bill was then sent to the House, floor debate was 
limited to 20 minutes and no further amendments were per 
mitted. The straight up and down vote was to be on the 
Senate bill. The only House committee that played a role in 
the amendments was Ways and Means,which dealt only with 
the tax issues prior to forwarding them to the Senate. Clear 
ly, the parties to the compromise had done their homework 
and wanted no last minute objections or changes to cause the 
deal to become unglued.
Strikingly, the strongest objections came, once again, 
from John Erlenborn. Having been forced to swallow the 
1969 Conference Committee bill and the equally repugnant 
1972 and 1977 amendments, he believed that the 1981 
changes were far from adequate to reform the law. 3 His ob 
jections, briefly noted here, were directed at:
— the procedures that prevented both adequate debate 
and the opportunity to amend, as well as the complete 
bypassing of the House Education and Labor Commit 
tee.
— the tax changes, which were completely inadequate to 
deal with the Trust Fund's financial needs.
— the dropping of the presumptions not applying to the 
many thousands of pending cases still to be resolved by 
the Department of Labor. Indeed the 25-year presump-
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tion was to be dropped only for those claims filed six 
months after the law's effective date.
— the extension of the earnings offset under Part C only 
to future claimants, leaving intact the existing arrange 
ment for scores of thousands of current beneficiaries.
— the rereading of X-rays not being applied to cases 
pending at the time in the Department of Labor.
— the amendment's failing to change the definition of 
"total disability" and "pneumoconiosis."
— the transferring of 10,200 claims to the Trust Fund, 
which would eliminate most, if not all, defense against 
them.
— the elimination of the affidavit by the self-interested 
claimant not going far enough. Finding someone else 
to swear that the deceased miner had respiratory prob 
lems would be a simple matter for most claimants.
— the amendments failure to reverse the rule that a 
negative X-ray could not, by itself, be the basis for a 
denial of the claim.
Erlenborn's preferences can also be seen in the bill he in 
troduced in that session, HR 4387. However, there was no 
way he could stand in the way of the compromise that in 
cluded the mine operators, the United Mine Workers, the 
Reagan administration and Representative Per kins.
Just prior to the vote on the 1981 amendments, Perkins 
rose to explain his view of one of the key changes made by 
the amendments. In so doing, he sought to establish for the 
legislative record the way that the death benefit provision 
was to be administered. It also served to reveal the type of 
dealing that preceded the compromise:
With respect to the administration's operation of 
the program, the Education and Labor Committee
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of the House will continue to monitor it very close 
ly to determine the effect of the changes we are 
making by the passage of the legislation today. 6
With this warning to the Department of Labor, he 
stipulated how the bill was to be administered:
A question has been raised regarding the proper in 
terpretation of the provision in the bill relating to 
the availability of survivor's benefits in those cases 
where the miner's death is unrelated to 
pneumoconiosis. We have been very concerned 
about the authority in current law to pay survivor's 
benefits in those situations; HR 5159, as amended 
by the Senate, reflects that concern by eliminating 
prospectively the authority to initiate benefit 
payments when that happens. The administration 
expressed these same concerns. . . .
I want to emphasize, however, that it is not the pur 
pose of HR 5159 . . .to deny benefits when com 
plications of pneumoconiosis have caused a miner's 
death or where pneumoconiosis was a substantially 
contributing factor to that death. For example, 
pneumoconiosis may have been a substantially con 
tributing cause of death in a case where the prin 
cipal cause of death was pneumonia.
Of course, survivors would not be eligible for 
benefits in those situations where death was caused 
by a traumatic injury or an unrelated medical con 
dition.
As a procedural matter, a survivor would initially 
file a claim for benefits. I understand that the 
Labor Department's claims examiners will be in 
structed to give all such claims the highest priority 
in developing the evidence necessary to reach a fair
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and prompt decision. Once the Labor Department 
has received medical evidence establishing that 
pneumoconiosis was the cause of death or a 
substantially contributing factor to the death, the 
survivor will receive benefits unless the weight of 
the evidence developed by the Labor Department's 
Deputy Commissioner or by a responsible operator 
establishes the death was unrelated to 
pneumoconiosis. In cases involving a responsible 
operator, the burden would, of course, be on it to 
present medical evidence to rebut evidence by the 
survivor which otherwise would appear to establish 
eligibility for benefits.
It is my expectation that the Department of Labor 
would administer the new law in accordance with 
this explanation of the survivorship provisions. 7
With this, Perkins made it exceedingly plain that the 
Department of Labor was to interpret the cause of death 
liberally in future survivors' claims. Moreover, for most pur 
poses, the burden of proof rested on the defense. This, of 
course, meant that either the Labor Department, acting for 
the Trust Fund, or the responsible operator stood between 
the widow and her award.
The GAO Reports
Following the enactment of the 1977 amendments, the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) undertook a review of the 
administration of the Black Lung law at the request of John 
Erlenborn. In mid-1980, the GAO published its findings on 
the administration of the Social Security Administration's 
portion of the law. 8 The report was highly unfavorable of 
both the legislation and the manner in which the law was ad 
ministered by SSA. Most important, the GAO was able to 
examine a randomly selected sample of claims files and 
report how actual cases were being decided by SSA.
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The GAO study was limited in several respects. It did not 
examine rejected claims, for example. As such the report 
sheds no light on why claims were being rejected by SSA, 
much less whether there was a significant difference between 
these cases from those that were being accepted. Since no 
new claims for benefits were being filed under Part B at this 
time, the study examined cases being re-reviewed as a conse 
quence of the 1977 amendments. Until May 1979, when the 
sample of 200 files was drawn, SSA had approved 14,789 re- 
reviewed claims.
In auditing these 200 successful claims, GAO examined 
the available X-ray evidence, lung function and blood gas 
studies as reported in the file, medical statements, death cer 
tificates, and autopsy reports. In evaluating the lung func 
tion studies, the GAO used the test values that had been 
established originally by SSA for the program. Where a 
GAO auditor questioned the adequacy of the medical 
evidence in the file, a consulting physician examined the file 
also, using the same criteria that all the auditors had used.
The GAO's findings are shown below:
Table 7.1 
_____________Benefits Paid To_____________
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SOURCE: GAO Report, July 28, 1980, p. 8.
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According to the GAO's findings, only 12 percent of the suc 
cessful claims were based on "adequate" medical evidence. 
It is critical to recognize that this summary finding was not a 
reflection of SSA's disregard for the law. Instead, it meant 
that by the medical standards used by GAO, the large bulk 
of compensated claims lacked medical evidence proving total 
disability or death due to pneumoconiosis. For example, 
SSA established compensability in 39 percent of all suc 
cessful claims (60 percent of the death claims) by accepting 
statements from persons with a knowledge of the miner's 
condition. In 68 of these 78 claims, the statements were sign 
ed by the claimant, that is, by the recipient of the benefits to 
be paid under the program. SSA allowed very general or 
vague statements about the condition to suffice. Of the 78 
claims established by affidavit only, the length of coal mine 
employment was established by affidavit as well in 43 of 
these cases.
The two examples cited in the GAO report involving the 
acceptance of survivors' affidavits are reproduced in toto 
below:
— In April 1966, a retired miner died from a coronary oc 
clusion at the age of 82—38 years after the last 
reported period of coal mine employment. In June 
1973, the miner's widow filed a black lung claim 
stating that her husband had worked over ten years in 
coal mines and had shortness of breath. Twelve years 
of coal mining employment was substantiated by a co- 
worker, but there was no medical evidence of disabili 
ty. SSA approved the claim in January 1979 based on 
ten years of coal mine employment and the widow's 
statement of shortness of breath.
The claim had been previously denied twice on the 
basis that medical evidence did not establish disability. 
However, under SSA's revised criteria for the 1977
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amendments, disability was presumed by affidavit and 
the claim approved. The only other evidence in the file 
was a statement by a physician several years before 
death that the miner's lungs were clear. The widow was 
awarded a retroactive payment for black lung benefits 
of $12,240.40 plus a monthly allowance of $232. The 
retroactive payment was for benefits from January 1, 
1974.
In June 1973, a 54-year-old former miner applied for 
black lung benefits. On his application he reported 15 
years of coal mine employment and listed his disability 
as "shortness of breath." SSA substantiated four 
years of coal mine employment. In July 1973, the 
claimant's physical examination resulted in an X-ray 
negative for pneumoconiosis and a lung function study 
that showed no disability. On August 31, 1973, the 
claimant died of stomach cancer. SSA denied his 
living-miner claim on September 11, 1973, because of 
the negative X-ray and lung function study.
On September 10, 1973, the claimant's widow filed a 
survivor's claim for benefits giving the miner's disabili 
ty as "shortness of breath." SSA denied the claim in 
January 1974 and again in October 1978 because of the 
negative X-ray and lung function study. Although SSA 
was able to substantiate only four years of coal mine 
employment, SSA approved the claim in March 1979 
on the basis of statements that the coal miner had at 
least ten years of coal mine employment and had a 
chronic lung impairment before he died. The only 
evidence in the file to establish disability was the 
deceased claimant's and his widow's statements about 
"shortness of breath."
On March 5,1979, the day the survivor's claim was ap 
proved, the living-miner claim, which had been denied
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in September 1973, was again denied by SSA under the 
1977 amended eligibility criteria. The widow received a 
retroactive lump-sum payment of $22,007.80 and 
monthly benefit payments of $348. 10
According to GAO, 61 of the 69 living miner claims (88 
percent) were based upon evidence that was inconclusive. Of 
the 61, 56 files (92 percent) contained X-ray evidence of sim 
ple pneumoconiosis as determined by the claimant's doctor. 
In 23 cases (38 percent) there were physician's comments 
about a respiratory or pulmonary disorder, but no other 
medical evidence was presented. SSA found that 37 of the 56 
X-rays (or 66 percent) did not show evidence of black lung. 
Of these 61 claims, 57 (93 percent) had lung function studies 
showing no breathing impairment. GAO reports that most 
of these claims were accepted on the basis of ten years or 
more of coal mine employment, and a positive chest X-ray 
for simple pneumoconiosis.
The two claims summaries prepared by GAO involving 
living-miner claims are reported below:
— On September 9, 1971, a 58-year-old miner applied for 
black lung benefits, reporting over 20 years of coal 
mine employment and naming his disability as black 
lung. SSA substantiated 13 years of coal mine employ 
ment through SSA earning records. On October 6, 
1971, the miner had an X-ray taken, which was read 
positive for simple pneumoconiosis by one radiologist 
and negative by two others. The miner had two more 
X-rays taken on February 15,1972, and May 30, 1974. 
The radiologist who took the X-rays read both of them 
as negative. The miner also had two lung function 
studies made, neither of which met SSA's revised stan 
dards for establishing disability. A physical examina 
tion did not show a chronic respiratory or lung disease.
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SSA denied the claim in November 1971, January 
1972, and August 1973 because of the negative medical 
evidence. The claim was also denied by an ad 
ministrative law judge in December 1974. Never 
theless, after the 1977 amendments, the claim was ap 
proved because (1) the miner had more than ten years 
of coal mine employment, (2) an X-ray showed simple 
pneumoconiosis, and (3) the miner said that he had 
black lung. The 1977 law precluded SSA from 
rereading an X-ray interpreted by a qualified reader as 
showing the presence of pneumoconiosis. The miner 
received $22,638.90 in a retroactive lump-sum payment 
and $348 a month.
On November 10, 1970, a 48-year-old miner applied 
for black lung benefits. In his application he alleged 12 
years of coal mine employment and described his 
disability to include, among others, his lungs and em 
physema. SSA substantiated 6-1/2 years of coal mine 
employment through employment records. An X-ray 
taken in 1971 did not identify pneumoconiosis. An 
X-ray taken in 1973 indicated possible 
pneumoconiosis. SSA had the X-rays reread in 1974, 
and they were identified as negative. Lung function 
tests taken in July 1972 and March 1973 indicated no 
disability using the revised standards. A blood gas test 
taken in March 1973 indicated no disability. Physi 
cians' comments during 1971-76, however, indicated 
lung impairment.
SSA denied the claim in January 1971 and July 1973 
because evidence failed to establish a lung impairment. 
Although SSA was able to substantiate only 6-1/2 
years of coal mine employment, SSA approved the 
claim in April 1979 because the miner states in his 
claim that he had been employed in coal mines for at
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least ten years and had a positive X-ray for simple 
pneumoconiosis. The claims examiner did not consider 
the negative lung function tests. The miner received 
$19,404 in a retroactive lump-sum payment and $348 a 
month. 11
The final batch of accepted survivor claims involved the 
use of the 25-year presumption (section 41 l(c) (5)). Of the 37 
claims accepted in accordance with this presumption (28 per 
cent of all the accepted survivor claims) 29 (or 78 percent) 
had no evidence either of disability or of the presence of 
black lung. In seven of the other cases, the claimant's 
radiologist found positive X-ray evidence of simple 
pneumoconiosis. One claim involved a physician's statement 
about the deceased miner's pulmonary-respiratory disorder. 
GAO's description of the two cases they summarized is 
below:
— On February 10, 1953, a 50-year-old miner was killed 
from falling slate while working in a coal mine. On 
February 8, 1971, the miner's widow filed a black lung 
claim—almost 18 years after the miner died—stating 
that the miner had worked 32 years in coal mines and 
that she thought he might have had a lung condition. 
SSA substantiated 33 years of coal mine employment 
from his employer.
SSA denied the claim on April 3, 1971, because the 
miner's death was caused by a broken neck resulting 
from a mine accident and because the hospital medical 
examination failed to reveal the presence of black lung 
or a respirable disease. On April 9, 1973, SSA again 
denied the claim for the same reasons. The denial was 
contested by the widow, and on April 10, 1974, the 
claim was again denied by an administrative law judge.
SSA approved the claim on September 8, 1978, 
because of the more than 25 years of coal mine
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employment and no rebutting evidence—death 
presumed due to black lung. The widow was awarded 
an $11,776.40 retroactive lump-sum payment and $232 
in monthly payments.
— On April 28, 1962, a 55-year-old miner was killed in a 
coal mining accident. On April 9, 1973, the miner's 
widow filed a black lung claim stating that the miner 
had worked 31 years in coal mine employment and that 
he had shortness of breath. SSA substantiated 29 years 
of coal mine employment from his employers. SSA 
denied the claim on June 21, 1973, because (1) the 
miner was killed in a mine accident, (2) no autopsy was 
performed, and (3) there was no medical evidence of 
complicated pneumoconiosis. After the 1977 amend 
ments, SSA approved the claim on August 21, 1978, 
because over 25 years of coal mine employment 
established disability for the miner and there was no 
rebutting evidence. The widow was awarded an 
$11,092.50 retroactive lump-sum payment and $219.90 
in monthly payments. 12
In evaluating the GAO report, SSA accepted the factual 
findings of the report and the conclusion in the report, which 
included: "We believe there was little medical evidence that 
most of the miners involved in successful awards were totally 
disabled by or died from black lung." 13 SSA did contend, 
however, that the legislation allowed claims to be approved 
without medical evidence of disability or the presence of 
disease.
Reaction to the GAO report was predictable along the 
lines of program supporters and critics. Congressman 
Perkins submitted his views on it for the record. 14 He ex 
pressed satisfaction that claims approvals were found to be 
consistent with the law, but regretted that GAO had 
substituted its judgment on what ought to be compensated
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for that of Congress. He criticized GAO for using a purely 
medical notion of disability and for "ignoring the 
uniqueness of the coal industry." He also questioned the 
credentials of the GAO's consultant, whose sole certification 
was in preventive medicine.
The GAO study of the Department of Labor's program 
closely matched the one prepared on Part B re-reviewed 
claims. 15 In a few respects, however, it differed. First, a sam 
ple of 50 cases was drawn from each of the nine regional of 
fices that processed DOL claims during the period January- 
December 1980. Of these, 205 were approved claims. Some 
of these represented newly filed claims while others were re- 
reviewed under the 1977 amendments. About 4 percent of 
these approved claims were filed after March 30, 1980, the 
date the interim presumptions were replaced by the perma 
nent, and more rigorous criteria.
Using similar criteria to those applied to the SSA claims 
audit, GAO's findings are shown in table 7.2 below:
Table 7.2










































SOURCE: GAO Report, January 1982, p. 10.
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According to GAO, about 84 percent of claims approved 
(172 out of 205) were not based on adequate medical 
evidence. Included in these were 104 successful claims based 
almost entirely on the use of the presumptions. While all the 
presumptions except 411(c) (3) are rebuttable, GAO found 
that "Labor rarely attempted to rebut these presumptions, 
even where there was medical evidence indicating that the 
miners were not disabled from black lung." 16 GAO also 
reported that "a Labor official told us that Labor was con 
cerned about getting claims approved and that the guidance 
for rebutting presumptions did not specifically state what 
type and how much evidence was needed to deny a claim. In 
addition, numerous Labor field officials told us that because 
rebuttable evidence was not specifically defined, they ig 
nored medical evidence that could have been used to rebut 
the claim." 17
In 27 percent of the approved claims, GAO found that the 
file contained conflicting medical evidence, and that the 
preponderance of evidence or the latest medical evidence did 
not support the claim. GAO found that claims examiners at 
the Labor Department did not attempt to resolve conflicting 
medical evidence, instead, giving the benefit to the claimant.
The 1977 Act prohibited the re-reading of X-rays by cer 
tified "B" readers. The Labor Department sent claimant's 
X-rays to such experts, however, to evaluate the quality of 
the picture. A positive re-reading of a previously judged 
negative X-ray, however, would be used to support a claim 
ant's application. GAO was able to see the results of 164 re- 
readings by "B" readers out of the 205 approved claims and 
match these with the initial X-ray reading.
Note in table 7.3 that over one-third of the X-rays said by 
the claimant's doctor to show pneumoconiosis were found to 
be negative by "B" readers. Strikingly, almost 10 percent of 
those X-rays initially read as negative were seen as positive
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by the "B" readers. In these cases, however, the claimant 
could have the benefit of the "B" reader's decision. Thus, 
"errors" of both types were present, at least as reflected by 
disputes of the interpretation of chest X-rays.
Table 7.3
Results of "B" Reader Rereading of 164 X-Rays 





























SOURCE: GAO Report, January 1982, p. 16.
One of two cases cited in the GAO report is repeated here:
— In June 1978, a 70-year-old former miner with ten 
years established coal mine employment applied to 
Labor for black lung benefits. In February 1979, the 
claimant took a pulmonary function test that indicated 
he was disabled and a blood gas test that indicated he 
was not. The X-ray taken during the same month was 
interpreted as positive for pneumoconiosis and reread 
by a "B" reader in March 1979 as negative. A physi 
cian examined the claimant in February 1979 and 
diagnosed pulmonary fibrosis and chronic bronchitis 
due to coal mine employment. Labor denied the claim 
in June 1979, citing a lack of disability and causality, 
but approved the claim one month later, stating that 
disability, disease, and causality had been established.
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The miner received a retroactive lump-sum payment of 
$4,799 and a monthly benefit payment of $348. 18
According to GAO, 7 of the 205 claims were approved 
based on survivor's affidavit. The file contained no other 
medical evidence, or the evidence indicated that the miner 
had not been totally disabled or died due to pneumoconiosis.
GAO found that 6 claims of the 205 awards were based on 
a physician's medical opinion, with either no accompanying 
medical evidence, or medical evidence that contradicted the 
physician's opinion. From GAO's perspective, this was 
regarded as inadequate medical evidence.
The GAO tracked the experience of 191 miners whom the 
Labor Department referred to the University of West 
Virginia Medical Center for testing in 1977 and 1978. 19 Based 
on these tests, ten of the miners were found to have met the 
Department's criteria for being totally disabled. By 1980, 
GAO learned, SSA had approved three claims from this 
cohort of 191 and the Labor Department approved 97 
claims.
The circumstances involving the latter claims are shown in 
table 7.4.
Table 7.4
GAO Findings of Labor Department Approvals 
____________Medically Tested Cohort___________
Approvals
Claims approved by Labor with inadequate
medical evidence: 77 ( 79%) 
Presumptions 70 
Conflicting medical evidence 5 
Unsupported medical opinion 2
Claims approved by Labor with adequate 
medical evidence 8 ( 8%)
Claims approved by Labor (unable to locate cases 
files—information obtained from payment records) 12 ( 12%)
Total claims approved by Labor 97 (100%) 
SOURCE: GAO Report, January 1982, p. 33.
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The GAO summarized two of the claims from this group 
in their report, one of which follows:
— In November 1974, a 62-year-old miner with 13 years 
proven coal mine employment applied for black lung 
benefits. In October 1977, the miner had a physical ex 
amination, an X-ray, and a pulmonary function test. 
These tests indicated that the miner did not have black 
lung or a disabling lung impairment. The doctor who 
conducted the physical examination concluded that the 
claimant suffered from chronic bronchitis. In January 
1980, the claimant had the same medical tests perform 
ed again. The X-ray indicated that the miner did not 
have evidence of pneumoconiosis. The pulmonary 
function test met the eligibility test values for disabili 
ty. The blood gas test showed that the claimant had 
normal blood gas levels. Labor approved the claim on 
March 19,1980, citing the positive pulmonary function 
test and a presumption of the presence of black lung 
due to coal mine employment. 20
The response by the Labor Department to the GAO was 
similar to SSA's reaction. The audit did not find that the 
Labor Department was operating inconsistently with the 
statute. It was clear in both reports that GAO's unhappiness 
was with the product of congressional action and not with 
how the agencies administered the law. In both cases, the 
agencies used their discretionary authority in a manner that 
favored claimants, i.e., the law was interpreted liberally with 
respect to them.
The primary reason claims were paid in the absence of 
adequate medical evidence was that Congress wrote the law 
precisely to accomplish this. What GAO did not address was 
why the near impossibility of obtaining conclusive medical 
evidence for some persons should mean that they would not 
receive compensation as would occur in traditional workers'
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compensation systems. Nor did it deal with the difficulties 
claimants would face in the absence of presumptions where 
medical evidence or opinion is ambiguous or inconsistent. 
What the studies do, however, is shed light on the impor 
tance of the various devices that were created so as to raise 
the likelihood that benefits would be paid to claimants.
Conclusions
In several respects, the black lung law was historic. It 
represented the first tangible step by the federal government 
to involve itself in activities which, until then, had been left 
entirely to the states. When viewed in conjunction with sec 
tion 27 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 
which created the National Commission on State 
Workmen's Compensation Laws, it served as a possible 
forerunner of much greater federal involvement in workers' 
compensation matters. To the extent that it was viewed this 
way, the program's successes and failures must be 
understood as having an impact far beyond the limited area 
of coal mining and coal workers' pneumoconiosis. It seems 
highly likely, in retrospect, that the perception of the pro 
gram's costs and benefits (broadly construed) may have 
shaped public policy towards other possible areas of federal 
involvement in compensation.
It is probably simplistic to argue that a generally well 
received black lung program would have brought about a 
major federal intrusion into state compensation programs. 
Certainly, the many interest groups that wish to retain ex 
isting state programs are not without considerable political 
force. Moreover, the very substantial federal expansion into 
new areas that characterized conditions in the 1960s and ear 
ly in the next decade seemed to lose its impetus by the latter 
part of the 1970s. One may only speculate as to how signifi 
cant this single program has been in shaping a federal policy
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on workers' compensation. It is not speculative, however, to 
note that the single area in compensation receiving the most 
national attention in recent years, that is, asbestos and other 
long latency diseases, has had a continuing flow of proposed 
federal legislation without any serious movement towards 
congressional passage. These bills have all been marked by 
certain obvious parallels with the black lung law.
In evaluating any law, there exists the problem of identify 
ing its goals. The black lung legislation is especially difficult 
to nail down since its supporters appeared to have widely dif 
fering agendas for it. Clearly, within the Congress there were 
vastly different perceptions of it. The record makes clear 
that people such as Senator Javits wanted the program to be 
temporary in nature, at least after the backlog of "old" 
cases was dealt with. The convoluted structure of the law, 
with its separate Part B and Part C programs existed because 
of the (misplaced) belief that the states would step in and 
assert their jurisdiction in this area. In retrospect, this judg 
ment proved to be as unsound as the one forecasting that the 
states would quickly make the federal role under OSHA de 
minimus.
The near frenzy "to do something for the miners" that 
followed the Farmington, West Virginia catastrophe resulted 
in the passage of the 1969 law. Support for something 
beyond simple health and safety legislation was so 
widespread that virtually no real opposition was mounted to 
the original compensation provisions. It was only after the 
Conference Committee reported out its substantial altera 
tions to both the Senate and House versions that con 
siderable controversy developed. It seems clear that the goals 
of the program varied from those who would at least tolerate 
a small (inexpensive) program limited to very serious cases of 
a highly specific and uncommon illness (disabling, com 
plicated CWP in underground coal miners), to those whose 
goal was far broader.
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The reason some of the conservatives gave for limiting the 
program was a fear that a large scale program could 
somehow threaten the survival of state workers' compensa 
tion programs. Ironically, the reverse has occurred. The 
greatly enlarged scope of the black lung program together 
with many of its perceived difficulties, appears to have 
strengthened the hand of state program supporters. 
Criticisms that are voiced regarding existing state laws are no 
longer treated implicitly as a call for federalization. Thus, by 
having the program grow in its dimensions beyond all the 
worst fears of 1969, the security of the state programs has 
become somewhat more assured.
For the ardent supporters of the program, their goal was 
not simply to enact legislation that appeared to benefit 
members of the coal mining community. If they aimed no 
higher than that, they could have left matters alone after 
1969, or certainly stopped after the time of the 1972 amend 
ments. Instead, they continued to monitor the program 
closely, and extended it substantially with the 1977 amend 
ments. Indeed, one of the clearest aspects of the program 
was that its well-placed supporters in the Congress were in 
tent on having the money actually flow to former miners and 
their survivors. Where administrators exercised any discre 
tion that restricted this flow, the wrath of these supporters 
was sure to come down on them.
The United Mine Workers of America were neither the 
most ardent nor the most effective advocates of the black 
lung program. Initially, the more radicalized Black Lung 
Associations took the lead in generating support for a pro 
gram at the local level. With its own leadership problems 
preoccupying it, the miners' union was almost dragged along 
into the process, both in West Virginia and nationally. As 
the leadership problems in the UMWA were gradually 
resolved, the union reestablished a spokesman's role for 
itself, and the Black Lung Associations became less influen 
tial.
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While UMWA leaders could be counted upon to assist 
congressional supporters in their various reform efforts, it 
seems clear that the impetus did not come from the union 
itself. Instead, it was that core of totally committed members 
within the Congress that responded to the messages being 
received from their constituents, if and when the program 
was failing to deliver on its promises.
If one is to learn from the experience of 1969 forward, 
there are a number of strengths and shortcomings in the pro 
gram that must be recognized. The following is a brief listing 
of some of these fundamental characteristics of the program.
The underlying purpose of the program was never made 
explicit. This inadequacy was more than simply an academic 
nicety that Congress failed to produce. It led to a variety of 
problems that shadowed the program throughout its life. For 
example, was the program to be thought of as a workers' 
compensation scheme, a specialized supplementary pension 
program, a disability program, a depressed areas benefits 
plan, or some type of indemnity or support scheme as in 
agriculture or under the Trade Adjustment Act to assist vic 
tims of a specific industry's decline?
The results of this vagueness that surrounded the program 
were significant at several levels. First, it generated substan 
tial amounts of ill will by those people, both in and out of 
Congress, who were willing to tolerate a modest program. By 
expanding the program at every opportunity, e.g., in the 
Conference Committee, and with the later amendments, the 
aspirations of the program's staunchest supporters 
materialized in a way never envisioned either by them or 
their opponents. This led, inevitably, to conflict regarding 
the program.
Perhaps the most serious consequence of the uncertainties 
regarding the program's aims was the impact on the ad 
ministrative agencies. It seems clear that neither SSA nor the
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Labor Department fully understood what was expected of 
them, at least until 1972, and probably not until 1978. By 
1973, SSA appeared to realize that it was not operating sim 
ply a small variation of its Disability Insurance program. 
The interim standards so lowered the criteria for receipt of 
benefits, that its Part B program took on more of the aspects 
of the administratively straightforward old-age program 
than its disability program.
It was only in 1977 and thereafter that the Labor Depart 
ment appeared to understand that its mission was to pay 
benefits quickly, and not to treat each case as a workers' 
compensation claim. Once that became clear, and the 
Department was able to promulgate its own interim stan 
dards, it was able to comply with the intent of the program's 
supporters. The uncertainty of the program's aims also af 
fected the miners and their survivors. The evidence is clear 
that publicity about the program was enormously effective at 
getting out the claimants. Credit for this goes to the agencies, 
particularly SSA, to the union, and especially to the Black 
Lung Associations in the earliest days of the Part B program. 
It is also clear, however, that the miners and their families 
may not have understood precisely what their entitlements 
were. This appears evident from the apparent disappoint 
ment that many seemed to experience when their claims were 
denied or not promptly paid. The measure of this disillusion 
ment can be seen indirectly by the anger that members of 
Congress expressed and demonstrated towards the 
program's administrators, in response to criticisms they 
heard expressed by their constituents. In retrospect, the ex 
pectations that were raised in the mining community, partly 
as a way to alert people to their rights to file claims and prob 
ably, in part, to take credit for the program's existence, may 
have been unrealistic, at least initially. Thus, the program 
was attacked by some for being too generous and by many 
others, whose expectations had been raised, for being too 
tight-fisted and limited.
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It is hard to evaluate the black lung program and not be 
struck by some of its contradictions. No intellectually 
satisfactory rationale exists for a federal compensation pro 
gram that is unique to one occupation and to one source of 
impairment. The reality of its existence can be traced partly 
to some vague feelings of guilt felt by the public about 
economic and safety and health conditions in coal mining. 
Much more influence must be assigned to the political power 
concentrated in the hands of key people in Congress from 
the mining states. Perhaps Congressman Dent from Penn 
sylvania was right on target when he argued that the program 
warranted support in Congress, just as some of the specific 
agricultural support programs that had received his vote in 
the past. This was legislation designed to aid a specific 
population because a need was clearly present, and the votes 
were there. While the other groups of workers, survivors or 
retirees might also be in need of help due to a lack of, or a 
shortcoming in, appropriate government programs, the 
votes for them were not there.
Certainly, other serious gaps and shortcomings existed in 
state workers' compensation programs in the late 1960s, but 
no federal program was devised to deal with any of them. 
Moreover, not a single serious study of workers' compensa 
tion and pneumoconiosis had been undertaken by 1969. As a 
result, while the widely accepted notion that the system was 
not working may have been true, it was not documented at 
all. Had Congress been willing to have the matter studied 
prior to its legislative initiative in 1969, it might have found 
other areas of occupational disease that were inadequately 
dealt with by existing compensation practices. Certainly 
asbestos was already well known to be an occupational 
health disaster.
The question that remains, then, is why the foray into an 
essentially virgin territory for a single disease and one set of 
workers? The answer seems quite clear. A larger program,
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involving broader coverage of industries or diseases, would 
have run into serious trouble. First, its potential costs would 
have meant that serious opposition would have come from 
the Nixon administration. Perhaps, more important, it 
would have lost some support from those many members of 
Congress who cared little about coal mining or black lung, 
and who saw the program as no more than a miniscule tap 
ping of the federal Treasury. A larger scale program also 
would have brought down on Congress the wrath of all those 
who were strongly committed to complete retention of the 
state workers' compensation systems as they existed. Thus, 
black lung mattered little to most parties so long as it ap 
peared to be both small (in coverage and in dollars) and 
unique. And by contrast, it mattered a great deal to its very 
powerful, well-placed supporters in Congress, such as 
Messrs. Perkins, Flood, Randolph, Byrd et al.
A continuing source of criticism of the program has been 
of the legislated presumptions found in the law. Again, as 
the law is regarded by many as a compensation law, it is in 
evitably compared to the state laws which generally make 
much less use of presumptions. In the insurance and 
employer communities, there appears to be disdain, if not 
hostility for the presumptions found in this federal law. In 
deed, the term, presumptions, as associated with black lung, 
has almost become synonymous with excessive liberality and 
irresponsible generosity towards workers. It is also held up 
as an example of what can be expected if an unsophisticated 
Congress legislates in this area where it has little or no ex 
perience. To make matters worse, the presence of the ir- 
rebuttable presumption was certain to offend many at 
torneys who were unaccustomed to such rules in compensa 
tion cases and whose legal training seems to make such bar 
riers offensive to them.
There is no need here to argue the merits or the shortcom 
ings of the particular presumptions found in the law. Several
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points, however, need to be made in hindsight about these 
presumptions. First, many states had presumptions, in 
cluding irrebuttable ones, in their laws regarding occupa 
tional diseases in 1969 (some of which are still in existence). 
Since these are not labelled explicitly as presumptions, some 
persons may not recognize them as such. Yet various rules 
that limit the rights of workers or survivors to make suc 
cessful claims in such cases are nothing other than presump 
tions, some of them irrebuttable, that impose burdens on 
claimants. Such "artificial barriers" have been in place for 
many years and seem no less offensive than the presumptions 
in black lung. Thus, some of the criticism of the principle of 
having presumptions in the law may be no more than opposi 
tion to the ideological character of the law.
An argument for the presence of presumptions in the law, 
though not necessarily of the ones actually used, probably 
can be made on grounds of both fairness and efficiency. In 
terms of the first, a number of circumstances existed that 
made it difficult, if not impossible, for claimants to provide 
proof of the kind normally used in compensation programs. 
This was especially true in claims involving fatalities that oc 
curred in the early years of the program or before 1969. On 
efficiency grounds, the presumptions enabled many 
claimants who otherwise would have been compensated 
anyway, to be dealt with more speedily.
Undoubtedly, administration was simpler and cheaper 
because of the presumptions, and they helped achieve the 
goal of the program's advocates, that is, to get money to the 
miners and their survivors. In one sense, this is confirmed by 
the behavior of SSA and the Labor Department after they 
became aware of the real intent of the law. Where claims did 
not involve responsible operators, the agencies rarely chose 
to use their legitimate right to rebut the presumptions invok 
ed by claimants. As such, the presumptions served to allow
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the agencies to comply with the perceived interest of the pro 
gram's congressional advocates.
Aside from various ambiguities or uncertainties that made 
the law difficult to rationalize and to administer, the statute 
created certain contradictions that could not be easily 
justified. Two of the most obvious of these arose out of the 
Part B-Part C approach, though they were not a necessary 
consequence of the split programs. First, there was the 
period until 1978 when the standards for determining the 
presence of compensable black lung disease were substantial 
ly different in the two agencies. Second, the excessively con 
voluted approach to offsets meant that recipients of benefits 
under Part B and Part C were treated differently.
With the benefit of hindsight, the program must be con 
sidered as a burden on the integrity of the Congress. 
Throughout the life of the program, estimates of prospective 
usage and costs emerging from that branch were off by a 
wide mark. Had those errors not taken a consistent pattern, 
one could dismiss them as the simple product of having to 
work in the dark, that is, a new type of program with no base 
of experience from which to extrapolate. However, the er 
rors were quite consistent in the direction of forecasting less 
usage and lower costs than actually were incurred subse 
quently. This pattern had all the earmarks of dis- 
ingenuousness on the part of the program advocates in Con 
gress, as they sought to sell their colleagues on the bill or its 
amendments.
Praise or criticism for much of the black lung program has 
been directed here consistently towards Congress. Until 
1981, the role of the White House was consistently minimal. 
Perhaps the program was too small to warrant presidential 
attention. More likely, White House relations with Congress 
were focused on other issues that could have been upset by 
some strong involvement by the chief executive. It is also
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possible that both Democratic and Republican ad 
ministrators between 1969 and 1980 saw the program as a 
cheap bone to throw to organized labor, at a time when little 
else was being made available. For whatever reason or set of 
reasons, the impetus for and the shape of the legislation were 
entirely congressional and bore no real marks of the White 
House.
How successful was the black lung program? If the goal of 
the program was to get federal money to the coal miner com 
munity, primarily to older workers or the survivors of 
miners, the program was very largely successful. Given the 
unrestrictive standards applied by SSA after 1972 and by 
DOL after 1977, it seems totally unlikely that any significant 
numbers of worthy applicants for benefits were rejected. 
What seems more likely is that the hundreds of thousands of 
successful beneficiaries actually exceeded the wildest possible 
goals set by the program's supporters in 1969. With a signifi 
cant share of the cost of the program borne by the U.S. 
Treasury, and with the Trust Fund partly supported by sur 
face mine operators in the West, this was accomplished 
without too great an economic impact on the underground 
mine employers. Such was also a goal of many of the pro 
gram's advocates, especially the ones from the coal mining 
states.
By most other standards the program was not successful. 
Surely it is not considered a model workers' compensation 
program that the states might wish to emulate. Using any 
conceivable standard, the program was not administered 
well. Most significantly perhaps, the program has reduced 
the probability that the federal government will play a 
significant role in the near future in workers' compensation 
for occupational disease. Indeed the fact that efforts to 
create such a federal presence all failed in the 1970s and early 
1980s must be attributable in part to the perception that 
another black lung program, perhaps on a grander scale, 
would be an expensive blunder.
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